Justice v. Ga. Dep't of Pub. Safety
Docket Number | A23A0160 |
Decision Date | 30 June 2023 |
Parties | JUSTICE v. GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
This appeal arises from the trial court's dismissal on the basis of sovereign immunity of Richard Andrew Justice's claim for breach of contract against the Georgia Department of Public Safety ("DPS"), which claim was predicated on the failure of DPS to pay him overtime under incorporated provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 21 USC § 201 et seq. Justice appeals the dismissal, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that certain documents exchanged by the parties did not constitute a written contract to establish that DPS had waived sovereign immunity. We reverse, for the reasons that follow.
[1]
The amended complaint alleged that Justice and 400 similarly situated plaintiffs who had been hired as state troopers with the Georgia State Patrol ("GSP")[2]and who were required to attend GSP trooper school had been underpaid approximately $4,782,848 in wages for overtime hours worked during trooper school pursuant to written contracts incorporating overtime provisions of the FLSA between 2014-2020. The complaint alleged that DPS had agreed in a written contract with Justice to comply with the FLSA regarding overtime pay worked by Justice.
DPS answered and moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the State had not waived sovereign immunity as to the claim. Justice responded to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the offer of employment, his acceptance thereof, and certain contemporaneously executed documents including the FLSA notifications provided by DPS constituted a written contract such that the trial court should find that the State had waived sovereign immunity for the purposes of his claim.
After limited discovery was allowed by the trial court, Justice filed a motion for summary judgment and associated documents that he claimed constituted a written contract between himself and DPS. First is a copy of a December 12, 2018 email from Diana Stephens, the Human Resources Employment Manager for DPS that stated, Justice also filed a copy of the letter that was attached to the Stephens email signed on behalf of DPS by Kate Mayer, Director of Human Resources, which read:
Congratulations! This letter serves as a final offer of employment as a Trooper Cadet[] and is your invitation to participate in the . . . GSP-[]) 106th Trooper School effective January 6, 2019. Your salary will be $36,110[] annually.
You will receive follow up information within the next few weeks regarding report time and new hire information.
Also attached was a copy of an email from Justice's email address responding to Stephens's email from the afternoon of December 12, 2018, which stated, and response from Stephens stating, "Thank you and good luck with all, Diana."
In his complaint, Justice maintained that he was a "non-sworn" employee during trooper school, which is the time during which he claimed that DPS failed to compensate him according to the terms agreed in the FLSA compensatory time acknowledgment.
Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss,[4] the trial court issued an order prepared by the State, which found that the documents at issue did not constitute a written contract, and therefore, DPS and the State had not waived sovereign immunity as to Justice's claim.
In his single enumeration of error, Justice argues that the trial court erred by finding that the documents as listed above do not constitute a written contract for purposes of waiving sovereign immunity. We agree.
For state employees, a state and its agencies enjoy immunity from suit, and specifically, the United States Supreme Court has explained that private rights of action under the FLSA are not available for this class of employees unless their state has consented to such private suits.[6] The parties have cited no law establishing that Georgia is among the states that have consented to private suits by state employees against state employers for alleged FLSA violations.
Despite the fact that private citizens are precluded from bringing private FLSA claims against state actors, Georgia has waived sovereign immunity "as to any action ex contractu for the breach of any written contract . . . entered into by the [S]tate or its departments and agencies."[7] We agree that if Justice establishes that he has a written contract with DPS incorporating overtime provisions of the FLSA into his terms of employment, he can pursue such a claim. The State is free to contract, and such a contract would not constitute a "blanket waiver of sovereign immunity for FLSA claims" as DPS argues, rather, it would simply be a separate avenue available for the plaintiff.[8]
Justice argues that the December 12 emails between him and DPS leading to his hire combined with the additional employment documents he signed on December 16, constitute a written contract or contracts such that the State has waived sovereign immunity as to his claim of breach of contract for overtime pay consistent with the FLSA while he was at trooper school.
"A valid written contract may be formed when there are multiple signed, contemporaneous agreements between the parties which demonstrate their intent to enter into a binding contract and the individual documents, considered together, include all of the necessary terms of a contract."[9] (a) DPS contends that because Justice was an at-will employee, he could not have an employment contract, and therefore no waiver of...
To continue reading
Request your trial