Justice v. Marvel, LLC

• Docket Number: A20-1318
• Decision Date: 21 September 2022
• Citation: 979 N.W.2d 894
• Parties: Carter JUSTICE, Appellant/Cross-Respondent, v. MARVEL, LLC d/b/a Pump It Up Parties, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

979 N.W.2d 894

Carter JUSTICE, Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

v.MARVEL, LLC d/b/a Pump It Up Parties, Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

A20-1318

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: September 21, 2022

Mahesha P. Subbaraman, Subbaraman PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Patrick W. Michenfelder, Throndset Michenfelder, LLC, Saint Michael, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent.

Joseph A. Nilan, Daniel A. Ellerbrock, Jacob T. Merkel, Gregerson, Rosow, Johnson & Nilan, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant.

Taylor Brandt Cunningham, Conlin Law Firm, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Consumer Federation of America.

Matthew J. Barber, Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae Minnesota Association for Justice and Public Justice.

Brian J. Kluk, McCollum Crowley, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association.

Brian N. Johnson, Cortney G. Sylvester, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae Minnesota Ski Areas Association, et al.

OPINION

McKEIG, Justice.

At issue in this case is whether an exculpatory clause that purports to release respondent/cross-appellant Marvel, LLC from "any and all claims" related to use of its inflatable amusement play area is enforceable against a claim of negligence. Appellant/cross-respondent Carter Justice attended a party at Marvel's play area, and his mother signed a waiver on behalf of Justice and herself. Justice was subsequently injured when he fell from the top of an inflatable and hit his head on the carpet-covered concrete floor. After Justice turned 18, he sued Marvel, claiming that Marvel negligently operated the inflatables in its play area without adequate padding on the floor. We must determine whether the waiver signed by Justice's mother bars Justice's claim. Because the waiver does not specifically reference Marvel's own conduct or otherwise sufficiently express that Marvel was being released from liability for its own negligence, we conclude that the waiver—strictly construed—does not release Marvel from liability for its own negligence. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment for Marvel and remand to the court of appeals.

FACTS

In February 2007, when Justice was 7 years old, he attended a birthday party at Pump It Up Parties, an inflatable amusement play area owned by Marvel, LLC.¹ Before Justice entered the play area, Justice's mother, Michelle Sutton, signed a waiver of liability on "her own behalf, and/or on behalf of the participant(s) identified below," naming Justice. The waiver contained a liability release—the core provision at issue in this case—in which Sutton agreed to "release and hold harmless MARVEL, LLC ... from and against any and all claims, injuries, liabilities or damages arising out of or related to our participation in any and all Pump It Up programs, activities, parties, the use of the play area and/or inflatable equipment." The waiver stated that Sutton acknowledged the "inherent risks associated with participation in Pump It Up programs, parties, and/or use of the play area and inflatable equipment" and that she "knowingly and freely assume[d] all such risks, both known and unknown, including those that may arise out of the negligence of other participants." The waiver also noted that the agreement was "[i]n consideration of being allowed to enter into the play area and/or participate in any party and/or program at Pump It Up."

When Justice was playing on an inflatable, he fell and hit his head on the concrete floor, which was covered with commercial grade carpet. Justice was taken to a hospital and treated in the intensive care unit. Justice suffered several injuries, including multiple skull fractures

, a brain hemorrhage, a post-traumatic seizure, and a traumatic brain injury.²

When Justice turned 18, he sued Marvel on his own behalf, claiming that Marvel was negligent for not using pads on the floor near the inflatables. Justice alleged that he experienced "severe and permanent injuries" attributable to the traumatic brain injury

that he suffered because of his fall.

Marvel moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the waiver signed by Sutton before Justice entered the play area is enforceable and bars Justice's negligence claim. Justice responded that the waiver is unenforceable because it violates public policy, as evidenced by the statute voiding negligence waivers for inflatables, Minn. Stat. § 184B.20, subd. 5(b) (2020). Marvel countered that Minn. Stat. § 184B.20, which was enacted after the waiver was signed, does not apply retroactively to void the waiver. Marvel also argued that the waiver does not violate public policy because there was no disparity in bargaining power between the parties and providing inflatable amusements is not a public or essential service.

The district court granted Marvel's motion for summary judgment. As an initial matter, the court concluded that parents have the authority to sign liability waivers on behalf of their children. The court then concluded that the waiver is enforceable because it is unambiguous, does not purport to release Marvel from liability for intentional acts (in which case the waiver would be unenforceable), and does not violate public policy. The court also concluded that Minn. Stat. § 184B.20 does not apply retroactively to void the waiver in this case. Therefore, the court concluded, the waiver is enforceable, meaning that Justice's claim of negligence could not be pursued. Justice appealed.

The court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Marvel. Justice v. Marvel, LLC , 965 N.W.2d 335, 349 (Minn. App. 2021). First, the court held that "a parent generally has authority, on behalf of a minor child, to enter into an agreement that includes an exculpatory clause." Id. at 342. Regarding the issue of whether the inflatables statute applied, the court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 184B.20 does not apply to the waiver here because the statute was enacted after the waiver was signed and there is no indication that the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Justice , 965 N.W.2d at 345. The court held that the waiver does not violate public policy because "[t]here is no evidence in the summary-judgment record that the services Marvel provided were unavailable else where, and we may presume that Justice was not compelled to participate in the birthday party because the provision of inflatable amusement equipment is not a necessary service." Id. at 346. Further, the court recognized that "[a] business that provides inflatable amusement equipment is well within the category of recreational activities for which exculpatory clauses are not prohibited." Id. But the court also recognized that under our precedent, "[a]n exculpatory clause is unenforceable if it is ‘either ambiguous in scope or purports to release the benefited party from liability for intentional, willful or wanton acts.’ " Id. at 347 (quoting Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc. , 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. 1982) ). Against that standard, the court held that the waiver here is overly broad because it "purports to release claims of both ordinary negligence and greater-than-ordinary negligence, including claims based on intentional, willful or wanton acts." Id. But the court held that the waiver is enforceable as applied to Justice's claim of negligence. Id. Finally, in response to Justice's argument "that the district court erred by denying his motion to amend the complaint to add a request for punitive damages," the court of appeals held that the question was moot based on its affirmance of summary judgment for Marvel.³ Id. at 349.

We granted Justice's petition for review, which raised numerous grounds for the waiver's unenforceability. We also granted Marvel's request for conditional cross-review on whether portions of the waiver were overbroad.

ANALYSIS

This case comes to us on review of the district court's grant of summary judgment for Marvel. Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. Fact issues exist "when reasonable persons might draw different conclusions from the evidence presented." DLH, Inc. v. Russ , 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997). Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc. , 701 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Minn. 2005). We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Eng'g & Constr. Innovations, Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co. , 825 N.W.2d 695, 704 (Minn. 2013).

For Justice's claim to survive summary judgment, the waiver signed by his mother must be unenforceable. To determine whether the waiver is enforceable, we must first define the appropriate standard by which to judge exculpatory provisions and then analyze whether Marvel's release is enforceable under that standard. We address each of these issues in turn.

A.

Exculpatory clauses "are not favored in the law" because they "exonerat[e] a party from liability." Schlobohm v. Spa Petite, Inc. , 326 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Minn. 1982). Such provisions "will be strictly construed against the benefited party." Id. We have previously stated that this means that if an exculpatory "clause is either ambiguous in scope or purports to release the benefited party from liability for intentional, willful or wanton acts, it will not be enforced." Id. But we have never addressed how strict construction applies when an exculpatory clause purports to release all claims of liability without specific reference to negligent acts. This question is one of first impression.

In defining strict construction, it may be helpful for us to identify what strict construction is not. We have recognized that an alternative to strict construction is fair construction. See Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co. , 266 Minn. 426, 123...