Justus v. Wood
| Decision Date | 20 October 1961 |
| Parties | James H. JUSTUS, Bertha Justus and Judy Ann Justus, By Next Friend, etc., v. William WOOD. 13 McCanless 55, 209 Tenn. 55, 349 S.W.2d 793 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Thomas Dossett, Wilson, Worley & Gamble, Kingsport, for plaintiffs in error.
Penn, Hunter, Smith & Davis, Kingsport, for defendant in error.
Mr. Justice Burnett, obviously out of his regard for the ability, integrity and sincerity of counsel for the petitioner and due to the importance of the question herein, granted a second petition to rehear in these cases. The questions presented originally have again been thoroughly considered and investigated by the majority of this Court, and after doing so we are in a position to answer this second petition.
It must be kept in mind that these cases came to us on their dismissal by the trial judge wherein he sustained a demurrer to the declarations.
All that has been decided by the two previous opinions herein, and that is to be determined by this opinion, is that the question of negligence is one to be decided by the jury, based on their determination from the evidence in the case of the question of foreseeability upon which the proximate cause depended.
To hold, as is the contention of the petitioner, that the injuries herein were due solely to the negligent operation, by an unauthorized person, of this automobile appears to beg the question, because to hold this way assumes that the misappropriation of the car was unforeseeable. The statute (Sec. 59-863, T.C.A.), itself, is based in part on the likelihood that cars left unattended in violation of this statute will be taken, and implies a degree of foreseeability of that result. It follows that violation of the statute could be found to be an act of negligence which created a foreseeable risk of the car being taken and driven off. If that occurred, and a party was injured by the negligence of such driver, the injury could be held to have been proximately caused by the negligent act of leaving the car unattended.
The statute (Sec. 59-863, T.C.A.) is a safety device because to do the things that it requires all result in preventing interference with the automobile's stationary condition and mechanical immobility. It is protection to life and property which might otherwise be affected by improper movement of the automobile. The Legislature in enacting this statute provided in the very first sentence of the caption of the Act that the purpose of this Act is 'to promote highway safety by regulating the operation of vehicles in Tennessee, * * *.' Pub.Acts 1955, c. 329. We must ascribe to the Legislature a desire to effect a purposeful end by the language...
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