Juvenile Delinquency Appeal, In re, 29,375
| Decision Date | 17 April 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 29,375,29,375 |
| Citation | 289 S.W.2d 436 |
| Parties | In re JUVENILE DELINQUENCY APPEAL. Case |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
R. P. Smith, Cape Girardeau, for appellant.
HOURSER, Commissioner.
This is an appeal from an order of the Cape Girardeau Court of Common Pleas entered on June 8, 1955 committing appellant, an adjudged juvenile delinquent, to the Missouri Training School for Boys.
The first point sought to be advanced is that the court erred in finding appellant to be a delinquent minor. It is urged that there is a complete absence of record evidence to support the finding. That finding was made on November 19, 1954. An 'application for appeal' from that order was filed in the lower court within 60 days after November 19, 1954 (see Section 211.410 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.), but that appeal was abandoned in the trial court, which subsequently made an order purporting to strike the application for appeal from the records, and the appeal was never perfected in this court. In order to have secured a review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of his status as a delinquent child it would have been necessary for appellant to have taken an appeal within 60 days after the entry of the judgment of November 19, 1954 and to have perfected the same. That not having been done, the question cannot be reviewed on appeal from an order of commitment issued more than 60 days after the entry of the judgment of conviction. The two proceedings, i.e. the determination of the status of the child and the determination of the question of commitment, are separate and distinct, each terminating in a final judgment or order from which an appeal will lie. In the case of In re Campbell, 323 Mo. 757, 19 S.W.2d 752, loc. cit. 754, the Supreme Court so construed Section 211.170 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. (the appeals statute relating to proceedings in first and second class counties). Although Section 211.410, supra, does not elaborate the distinction in the same detail, it appears that the legislative intent was the same and that the two statutes should receive the same construction. The point therefore cannot be considered on the instant appeal, which is from the order of June 8, 1955. This is true notwithstanding the parties have treated the point as if properly raised. A court is duty bound to inquire, sua sponte, into its jurisdiction, and when it has determined against its jurisdiction it cannot determine the particular...
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...would be a work of intolerable superarrogance predicated upon interdicted usurpation of judicial authority. In re Juvenile Delinquency Appeal, Mo.App., 289 S.W.2d 436, 437(3). Before probing the question of jurisdiction, we appropriately emphasize that, from the institution of this proceedi......
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...jurisdiction it cannot determine the particular matter notwithstanding the parties agree to its submission. In re Juvenile Delinquency Appeal, Mo.App., 289 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Mo.1956). Therefore, we must raise the question--Does an appeal lie from this juvenile court This question has not bee......
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...make such determination sua sponte. The urgency of this introspection is evident in view of our previous holding in In re Juvenile Delinquency Appeal, Mo.App., 289 S.W.2d 436. Section 211.261, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., is the section of the Juvenile Code which concerns itself with appeals from j......
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...intent that as to other forms of disposition a special dispositional hearing is not required. Appellant relies upon In re Juvenile Delinquency Appeal, Mo.App., 289 S.W.2d 436 and In the Interest of T_ _ G_ _, Jr., Mo.App., 455 S.W.2d 3. Both cases dealt with when appeal from a judgment in j......