Juvenile v. Williams, 2001-SC-0645-DG.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2003 |
| Docket Number | 2001-SC-0645-DG. |
| Citation | 113 S.W.3d 82 |
| Parties | M.M., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT v. HENRY WILLIAMS, SUPERINTENDENT, WOODBEND YOUTH DEVELOPMENT CENTER AND RALPH KELLY, COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, APPELLEES. AND COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 2001-CA-1291 MORGAN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 01-CI-00067.
Timothy G. Arnold, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellant.
A.B. Chandler III, Attorney General, Counsel for Appellee.
Matthew D. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General, Frankfort, KY, Counsel for Appellee.
GRAVES
On January 4, 2001, Appellant, M.M., a juvenile, pled guilty in the Floyd District Court to charges of third-degree assault and attempted escape, which occurred while he was in custody at the Big Sandy Area Detention Center. The Floyd District Court thereafter released Appellant to his parent's custody and transferred the case to the Laurel District Court for final disposition since Appellant was a resident of Laurel County.
On March 22, 2001, the Laurel District Court entered an order committing Appellant to the Clark County Detention Center pending placement by the Department of Juvenile Justice. Appellant appealed to the Laurel Circuit Court and sought release pending the appeal pursuant to RCr 12.04. The Laurel Circuit Court denied the motion for release. The Department for Juvenile Justice subsequently placed Appellant in a facility in Morgan County.
Appellant thereafter sought habeas corpus relief in the Morgan Circuit Court to preclude further enforcement of the March 22, 2001, order of the Laurel District Court pending resolution of his appeal to the circuit court. In granting Appellant's petition for relief, the Morgan Circuit Court ruled:
Appeals from juvenile court orders "shall be taken in the manner provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure." KRS 610.130. RCr 12.04(4) provides that "the timely filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment of the district court shall stay proceedings on the judgment as long as the case remains on appeal, except for the requirement of bail." KRS 610.190 provides that "The law relating to bail shall not be applicable to children detained in accordance with this chapter . . . ." In light of the foregoing authority, the May 22, 2001 order was stayed by operation of law pending resolution of the appeal. Consequently there presently is no enforceable judgment which would permit the Respondents to retain custody of Petitioner.
A split panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the Morgan Circuit Court, holding that Appellant's habeas petition was procedurally improper, and that Appellant instead should have sought relief through the normal appellate procedures or through a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Court of Appeals declined to address the application of RCr 12.04 to juvenile proceedings. This Court thereafter granted discretionary review.
As he did in the courts below, Appellant argues that KRS 610.190 clearly provides that appeals from juvenile court orders "shall be taken in the manner provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure." Further, RCr 12.04 states, in pertinent part, that "the timely filing of a notice of appeal from the judgment of the district court shall stay proceedings on the judgment as long as the case remains on appeal. . . ." As such Appellant contends that the Laurel District Court's March 22, 2001, order of commitment was stayed by operation of law when he timely filed his appeal in the circuit court. Consequently, Appellant believes that he was properly entitled to habeas relief since he was illegally detained in the Morgan County facility.
The Commonwealth counters that the sole issue in this case concerns whether "a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum — the Great Writ — is an appropriate remedy to executive branch detention that has been authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction." The Commonwealth asserts that the appropriate remedy lies directly in a writ of mandamus rather than collaterally in a petition for habeas. Like the Court of Appeals, we need not reach the RCr 12.04 issue, for we also conclude that this case solely concerns the proper application of habeas corpus.
KRS 419.020 provides:
The writ of habeas corpus shall be issued upon petition on behalf of anyone showing by affidavit probable cause that he is being detained without lawful authority or is being imprisoned when by law he is entitled to bail. The writ may be issued by any circuit judge on any day at any time and his power to issue such writs shall be coextensive with the Commonwealth.
The statute is a codification of the constitutional right of an individual to petition a court to determine the legality of his detention. U.S. Const. art. I § IX; Ky. Const. § 16. However, in Smith v. Henson, 298 Ky. 182, 182 S.W.2d 666, 668 (1944), our predecessor court explained:
[W]here there has been a judgment in the case, a habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral attack on that judgment. It lies only where the judgment is void and does not lie to obtain . . . an appeal or release from custody by establishing error or disclosing some latent or hidden fact which may have affected the result.
Early Kentucky decisions concerning the application of habeas corpus limited the inquiry to whether the court had jurisdiction of the offense and the person of the accused. Thomas v. Maggard, Ky., 313 S.W.2d 271 (1958) (); Owen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 524 (1955) (); Hoskins v. Buchanon, 311 Ky. 246, 223 S.W.2d 904 (1949) (); Department of Public Welfare v. Polsgrove, 250 Ky. 517, 63 S.W.2d 603 (1933) ().
In 1963, the Court rendered Rice v. Davis, Ky., 366 S.W.2d 153 (1963), wherein it adopted the "federal" view of habeas corpus that "A...
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