JVA Enterprises, I, LLC v. Prentice, s. 4D08-4661, 4D08-5013, 4D09-1686.

CourtCourt of Appeal of Florida (US)
Citation48 So.3d 109
Docket NumberNos. 4D08-4661, 4D08-5013, 4D09-1686.,s. 4D08-4661, 4D08-5013, 4D09-1686.
PartiesJVA ENTERPRISES, I, LLC and Enterprises, Inc., Appellants, v. James S. PRENTICE, Appellee.
Decision Date10 November 2010
48 So.3d 109

JVA ENTERPRISES, I, LLC and Enterprises, Inc., Appellants,
v.
James S. PRENTICE, Appellee.


Nos. 4D08-4661, 4D08-5013, 4D09-1686.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District.


Nov. 10, 2010.

48 So.3d 110

Neil E. Bayer and Marc D. Sarnoff of Sarnoff & Bayer, Coconut Grove and Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole and Kerri L. McNulty of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, for appellants.

David R. Canning of Karcher, Canning & Karcher and Nancy Little Hoffmann of Nancy Little Hoffmann, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

KEYSER, JANIS BRUSTARES, Associate Judge.

JVA Enterprises I, LLC and Enterprises, Inc. appeal a judgment in favor of James S. Prentice. We affirm the trial court's denial of the appellants' motion to dismiss for fraud on the court. However, because the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence which the appellants sought to introduce concerning claims for prior injuries suffered by Prentice, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.

James Prentice (Prentice) served as chief engineer on the yacht Enterprise V, which is owned by Enterprises, Inc. (Enterprise) and operated by JVA Enterprises I, LLC (JVA) from September 2003 through May 2004. Prentice sued JVA and Enterprise for injuries allegedly suffered in December 2003 and March 2004. He asserted claims for unseaworthiness against Enterprise, maintenance and cure under admiralty law against both of the defendants, and negligence against JVA.

48 So.3d 111
Prentice alleged that, as a result of JVA's negligence, he herniated a disc in his neck at the C6-C7 level and tore his right rotator cuff, both of which required surgical repair.

In answers to interrogatories, Prentice denied that he was seeking compensation for exacerbation of any pre-existing injury. He did, however, disclose that he had filed a workers' compensation claim and a personal injury suit in California in the 1980s.

Prior to Prentice's deposition, a paralegal at the law firm representing JVA and Enterprise discovered that Prentice's name and social security number appeared three times in workers' compensation files in California. At his deposition, the defense counsel asked Prentice about the earlier claims in California. Prentice admitted to one prior workers' compensation claim, but did not remember the other two. Prentice stated that he had been working as an ironworker when he strained his lower back and hurt his knee in the mid-1980s. He was out of work for four or five months, during which time he received physical therapy. He settled that workers' compensation claim for a minimal amount. When asked if he had ever filed a workers' compensation claim where he sustained neck, head, shoulder and back injury, Prentice answered "no."

The workers' compensation claim records revealed that Prentice was injured on January 10, 1991, while working for a crane company in Los Angeles. The claim indicated that Prentice was drilling holes when he hit a rebar and "pulled his back out." He injured his back, neck and shoulder. When Prentice saw his physician on January 15, 1991, the doctor's medical report described his symptoms as follows: "[p]ain in his upper back radiating into left arm, stiffness in both sides of neck, hard to turn head and use his arm." The doctor diagnosed him as suffering from "Cervico-brachial Syndrome, Brachial Neuritis/Radiculitis, Thoracic strain sprain, [p]ain in thoracic spine."

In February 1991, Prentice was seen by two separate physicians who diagnosed cervical sprain and thoracic sprain. His complaints were constant sharp, throbbing pain in his upper back that traveled to his neck and both shoulders. He also complained of throbbing, aching bilateral shoulder pain that traveled down his right arm to his right hand.

X-rays taken in 1991 showed a slight decrease in the C5-6 disc space with a slight degree of left neural foraminal stenosis at C4-5. An MRI performed in 1991 revealed "the presence of small far right lateral disc bulges at C3-4 and C4-5 with moderate right neural foraminal stenosis at both levels."

In 1991, Prentice was diagnosed with "chronic cervical myofascial strain superimposed upon degenerative disc disease at C5-6 and 1.5 to 2 millimeter right lateral disc bulges at C3-4 and C4-5 with moderate right neural foraminal stenosis at both levels." Prentice's physician found, for the purposes of a disability rating, that Prentice's condition be considered "permanent and stationary." He felt that Prentice should "not engage in occupations requiring heavy lifting as defined by the Guidelines for Work Capacity" and felt that if Prentice were to engage in occupations exceeding those guidelines, he would be liable to have significant lasting exacerbation of his symptoms and a possible worsening of his underlying condition. The physician believed that fifty percent of Prentice's injuries were from the natural progression of pre-existing degenerative disease and the remaining fifty percent was attributable to the injury which occurred on January 10, 1991. Prentice settled the January 10, 1991, workers' compensation claim for $16,000.

48 So.3d 112

Approximately one month prior to trial, in May of 2008, JVA and Enterprise filed a motion for sanctions, including dismissal, against Prentice for concealing his 1991 injuries. Prentice defended against that motion, arguing that his earlier injury had been dissimilar to the present injury. Prentice relied on a report of Dr. Coats which indicated the present injury-a C6-7 disc herniation-was not related to the earlier 1991 accident which dealt with a degenerative disc disease at C5-6 and disc bulges at C3-4 and C4-5.

The trial court denied JVA and Enterprise's motion for sanctions, finding the temporal distance of the 1991 injury to the 2008 trial to be compelling. In denying the motion, the trial court indicated this might be an appropriate area for cross-examination or impeachment.

On the same day the trial court denied JVA and Enterprise's motion for sanctions, Prentice filed a motion in limine, asking the trial court to preclude admission of the 1991 workers' compensation records because they were unrelated to the 2003 and 2004...

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8 cases
  • Rierson v. Deveau, 3D18-0246
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 20 Marzo 2019
    ...not presented." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thorne, 110 So.3d 66, 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting JVA Enters., I, LLC v. Prentice, 48 So.3d 109, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ). As in Elsass, 662 So.2d at 393, the argument was particularly grievous, as Deveau was indeed the one to whom the i......
  • Herman v. Intracoastal Cardiology Ctr., 4D11-1214
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 7 Agosto 2013
    ..."has sentiently set in motion a scheme to defraud" after considering the standard set forth in JVA Enterprises, I, LLC v. Prentice, 48 So. 3d 109, 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The trial court first noted that it found Mr. Herman's testimony at the trial regarding his personal background false, ......
  • Herman v. Intracoastal Cardiology Ctr., 4D11–1214.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 26 Septiembre 2013
    ...Herman “has sentiently set in motion a scheme to defraud” after considering the standard set forth in JVA Enterprises, I, LLC v. Prentice, 48 So.3d 109, 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). The trial court first noted that it found Mr. Herman's testimony at the trial regarding his personal background f......
  • Bellevue v. Frenchy's S. Beach Café, Inc., 2D12–4537.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • 4 Diciembre 2013
    ...not presented.’ ” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Thorne, 110 So.3d 66, 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting JVA Enters., I, LLC v. Prentice, 48 So.3d 109, 115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).IV. Conclusion Because the jury is the ultimate arbiter of foreseeability and, in this case, whether Frenchy's was......
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