JVA Enterprises, I, LLC v. Prentice
| Decision Date | 10 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 4D08-4661, 4D08-5013, 4D09-1686.,s. 4D08-4661, 4D08-5013, 4D09-1686. |
| Citation | 48 So.3d 109 |
| Parties | JVA ENTERPRISES, I, LLC and Enterprises, Inc., Appellants, v. James S. PRENTICE, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Neil E. Bayer and Marc D. Sarnoff of Sarnoff & Bayer, Coconut Grove and Elliot H. Scherker, Brigid F. Cech Samole and Kerri L. McNulty of Greenberg Traurig, P.A., Miami, for appellants.
David R. Canning of Karcher, Canning & Karcher and Nancy Little Hoffmann of Nancy Little Hoffmann, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
JVA Enterprises I, LLC and Enterprises, Inc. appeal a judgment in favor of James S. Prentice. We affirm the trial court's denial of the appellants' motion to dismiss for fraud on the court. However, because the trial court erred in excluding certain evidence which the appellants sought to introduce concerning claims for prior injuries suffered by Prentice, we reverse the judgment and remand for a new trial.
James Prentice (Prentice) served as chief engineer on the yacht Enterprise V, which is owned by Enterprises, Inc. (Enterprise) and operated by JVA Enterprises I, LLC (JVA) from September 2003 through May 2004. Prentice sued JVA and Enterprise for injuries allegedly suffered in December 2003 and March 2004. He asserted claims for unseaworthiness against Enterprise, maintenance and cure under admiralty law against both of the defendants, and negligence against JVA.Prentice alleged that, as a result of JVA's negligence, he herniated a disc in his neck at the C6-C7 level and tore his right rotator cuff, both of which required surgical repair.
In answers to interrogatories, Prentice denied that he was seeking compensation for exacerbation of any pre-existing injury. He did, however, disclose that he had filed a workers' compensation claim and a personal injury suit in California in the 1980s.
Prior to Prentice's deposition, a paralegal at the law firm representing JVA and Enterprise discovered that Prentice's name and social security number appeared three times in workers' compensation files in California. At his deposition, the defense counsel asked Prentice about the earlier claims in California. Prentice admitted to one prior workers' compensation claim, but did not remember the other two. Prentice stated that he had been working as an ironworker when he strained his lower back and hurt his knee in the mid-1980s. He was out of work for four or five months, during which time he received physical therapy. He settled that workers' compensation claim for a minimal amount. When asked if he had ever filed a workers' compensation claim where he sustained neck, head, shoulder and back injury, Prentice answered "no."
The workers' compensation claim records revealed that Prentice was injured on January 10, 1991, while working for a crane company in Los Angeles. The claim indicated that Prentice was drilling holes when he hit a rebar and "pulled his back out." He injured his back, neck and shoulder. When Prentice saw his physician on January 15, 1991, the doctor's medical report described his symptoms as follows: "[p]ain in his upper back radiating into left arm, stiffness in both sides of neck, hard to turn head and use his arm." The doctor diagnosed him as suffering from "Cervico-brachial Syndrome, Brachial Neuritis/Radiculitis, Thoracic strain sprain, [p]ain in thoracic spine."
In February 1991, Prentice was seen by two separate physicians who diagnosed cervical sprain and thoracic sprain. His complaints were constant sharp, throbbing pain in his upper back that traveled to his neck and both shoulders. He also complained of throbbing, aching bilateral shoulder pain that traveled down his right arm to his right hand.
X-rays taken in 1991 showed a slight decrease in the C5-6 disc space with a slight degree of left neural foraminal stenosis at C4-5. An MRI performed in 1991 revealed "the presence of small far right lateral disc bulges at C3-4 and C4-5 with moderate right neural foraminal stenosis at both levels."
In 1991, Prentice was diagnosed with "chronic cervical myofascial strain superimposed upon degenerative disc disease at C5-6 and 1.5 to 2 millimeter right lateral disc bulges at C3-4 and C4-5 with moderate right neural foraminal stenosis at both levels." Prentice's physician found, for the purposes of a disability rating, that Prentice's condition be considered "permanent and stationary." He felt that Prentice should "not engage in occupations requiring heavy lifting as defined by the Guidelines for Work Capacity" and felt that if Prentice were to engage in occupations exceeding those guidelines, he would be liable to have significant lasting exacerbation of his symptoms and a possible worsening of his underlying condition. The physician believed that fifty percent of Prentice's injuries were from the natural progression of pre-existing degenerative disease and the remaining fifty percent was attributable to the injury which occurred on January 10, 1991. Prentice settled the January 10, 1991, workers' compensation claim for $16,000.
Approximately one month prior to trial, in May of 2008, JVA and Enterprise filed a motion for sanctions, including dismissal, against Prentice for concealing his 1991 injuries. Prentice defended against that motion, arguing that his earlier injury had been dissimilar to the present injury. Prentice relied on a report of Dr. Coats which indicated the present injury-a C6-7 disc herniation-was not related to the earlier 1991 accident which dealt with a degenerative disc disease at C5-6 and disc bulges at C3-4 and C4-5.
The trial court denied JVA and Enterprise's motion for sanctions, finding the temporal distance of the 1991 injury to the 2008 trial to be compelling. In denying the motion, the trial court indicated this might be an appropriate area for cross-examination or impeachment.
On the same day the trial court denied JVA and Enterprise's motion for sanctions, Prentice filed a motion in limine, asking the trial court to preclude admission of the 1991 workers' compensation records because they were unrelated to the 2003 and 2004 injuries. Prentice argued that the old records were for a wholly different injury, which was totally unrelated to this claim. The trial court granted the motion in limine and found that JVA could not "bring up this California injury in any way, shape, or form during trial."
JVA and Enterprise filed a motion for reconsideration and proffered evidence of an affidavit of Dr. Lichtblau, a rehabilitation physician expert, who opined that a patient must give a truthful past medical history before a doctor can provide a full, fair, and honest evaluation. JVA also proffered the deposition testimony of Dr. Cohen, who had examined the 1991 California case and noted that the MRI revealed disc abnormalities at C3-4, C4-5, C5-6, which were just above the location where Prentice had his current injury at C6-7. Dr. Cohen noted that the 1991 injury had been "permanent," thus suggesting it was material to the diagnosis and evaluation of Prentice's current condition. Dr. Cohen further testified that the disc bulges that were diagnosed in 1991 would "[u]sually" worsen over time and that the heavy lifting would exacerbate Prentice's condition. Although the prior injury was in 1991, Dr. Cohen stated the passage of time is "pretty much wholly irrelevant" because the injury is permanent and "it doesn't go away." JVA and Enterprise's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
At trial, Prentice testified that in December 2003, the captain instructed him to open a valve in the waste-disposal system and, while trying to pry it open using a bar as a lever, the valve released, causing the bar to strike him in his ear and left shoulder. (Prentice contended this caused his herniated disc.) The second injury occurred in March 2004, when he was tightening bolts on the waste-disposal system. Prentice had his hands over his head and felt something in his right shoulder pop. (Prentice contended this caused his torn right rotator cuff.) Prentice was diagnosed with a possible tear in his right rotator cuff and a herniated disc at the C6-7 level. Dr. Coats, Prentice's treating neurosurgeon, performed a spinal fusion of C6-7 and was of the opinion that the injury to the C6-7 disc was due to the December 2003 accident.
This appeal follows the jury's subsequent substantial award of damages to Prentice for lost wages and benefits, medical expenses, and for physical and emotional pain.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to dismiss the case for fraud on the court. InArzuman v. Saud, 843 So.2d 950, 952 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), this court held the trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when a plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court. The requisite fraud on the court occurs where "it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier of fact or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense." Id. (quoting Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir.1989)). "Because 'dismissal sounds the death knell of the lawsuit,' courts must reserve such strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious.' " Arzuman, 843 So.2d at 952 (citations omitted). While a trial court has discretion to dismiss an action for fraud on the court, it should exercise this severe sanction "only in extreme circumstances." Id.
When imposing this harshest of sanctions, trial courts should weigh the "policy favoring adjudication on the merits" with the need to "maintain the integrity of the judicial system." Id.; Bass v. City...
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