K.D.D. v. Juvenile Officer

• Decision Date: 01 November 2022
• Docket Number: WD 84232
• Parties: In the Interest of: K.D.D., Appellant, v. JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

655 S.W.3d 222

In the Interest of: K.D.D., Appellant,

v.JUVENILE OFFICER, Respondent.

WD 84232

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

OPINION FILED: November 1, 2022

Jeffrey Esparza, Kansas City, MO, for appellant.

Michael Herrin, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.

Elizabeth Walker, Kansas City, MO, co-counsel for respondent.

Mark Timmerman, St. Louis, MO, counsel for amicus curiae.

Before Division Two: Lisa White Hardwick, P.J., Thomas N. Chapman and Janet Sutton, JJ.

Janet Sutton, Judge

K.D.D. appeals a judgment entered by the Jackson County Circuit Court Juvenile Division (juvenile court) dismissing his juvenile proceeding and transferring him to a court of general jurisdiction for criminal prosecution as an adult following a section 211.071¹ hearing (certification hearing). On appeal, K.D.D. argues that the juvenile court erred and violated his constitutional and statutory rights to be physically present at the certification hearing and also K.D.D.’s right to counsel when it required him to attend his hearing by two-way video instead of permitting him to be physically present in court. K.D.D. also argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance and in dismissing his juvenile cause of action and certifying him to be prosecuted as an adult under the general laws. Considering the Supreme Court of Missouri's opinion in J.A.T. v. Jackson County Juvenile Office , 637 S.W.3d 1 (Mo. banc 2022), we vacate the juvenile court's judgment and remand for an in-person certification hearing.

Factual and Procedural Background

In late October 2018, K.D.D., who was then 16 years old, allegedly operated a vehicle in a reckless and dangerous manner, resulting in a collision with another vehicle, the death of one person, and injuries to another. In February 2020, the Jackson County Juvenile Officer (Juvenile Officer) received a referral for the incident and filed a petition alleging that K.D.D. committed first-degree involuntary manslaughter, ² second-degree assault, and resisting arrest. The juvenile officer alleged K.D.D. committed the acts personally, or with an accomplice for whom K.D.D. would be criminally responsible.

In early March 2020, the Juvenile Officer, as authorized by section 211.071.1, filed a petition for certification to allow prosecution of K.D.D. under the general law as an adult. The petition for certification alleged that K.D.D. was not a proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile code, and that he was beyond the rehabilitative care, treatment, and services available to him through the juvenile court. K.D.D. was 18 years old at the time of the filing.

The juvenile court scheduled K.D.D.’s certification hearing for early September 2020. Two days before the hearing, K.D.D. moved for a continuance, stating that K.D.D.’s psychological evaluation was not complete, K.D.D. was incarcerated on unrelated adult criminal charges, and he had an outstanding warrant from Kansas and counsel expected K.D.D. would go there after his release. The request noted that K.D.D. was 18 years old and that "a continuance is of no prejudice to [K.D.D.] as he has likely already ‘aged out’ of many services the Family Court has to offer." The day before the certification hearing, K.D.D. filed a separate motion in which he asserted his right to attend the hearing in person and objected to holding his certification hearing by video. K.D.D. argued, among other things, that he had the right to be physically present in the courtroom and confront adverse witnesses in person under both the United States and Missouri Constitutions.

The parties, all at different locations using the Webex two-way video conferencing platform, appeared for the certification hearing. K.D.D. appeared by two-way video from the Jackson County Detention Center—an adult jail—where he was being held on unrelated adult charges and his counsel appeared by two-way video from a separate location.

Before the hearing began, K.D.D.’s counsel objected again to proceeding without K.D.D.’s physical presence in the courtroom and in a different location from his counsel, and requested the matter be continued. K.D.D.’s counsel argued that not allowing K.D.D. to be present at his certification hearing interfered with his ability to confer with counsel. The attorney for the Juvenile Officer responded that orders from both the Supreme Court of Missouri and Jackson County permitted proceeding by video. The juvenile court overruled both K.D.D.’s continuance request and his objection to holding the certification hearing without his physical presence in the courtroom, stating that its reasoning was "[b]ased on the most recent Supreme Court rulings as well as administrative orders of [Jackson County] and Webex being an approved form of conducting these hearings."

The juvenile court conducted the certification hearing, requiring K.D.D. to participate via two-way live video from the detention center. All others participating in the certification hearing—including the Juvenile Officer's sole witness—also appeared via two-way live video.

The Juvenile Officer's witness, the Deputy Juvenile Officer (DJO), testified about her certification report, her findings, and recommendation that K.D.D. be certified as an adult. Her recommendation was based on the nature of the present offenses, that K.D.D. had a pattern of committing offenses, and because of his age and prior participation in services through the juvenile system. K.D.D.’s counsel participated in the certification hearing by cross-examining the DJO and submitting a psychological evaluation that was completed after the hearing and that recommended K.D.D. remain in the juvenile justice system. The juvenile court delayed ruling on the certification petition until the psychological evaluation could be completed and filed with the court.

The juvenile court entered its judgment dismissing the petition under section 211.071 and transferring jurisdiction over K.D.D. to a court of general jurisdiction.

K.D.D. appealed, and in late August 2021, this Court stayed the appeal pending the Supreme Court of Missouri's decisions in J.A.T. and C.A.R.A. , which specifically analyzed the constitutional implications of conducting juvenile proceedings, specifically, adjudication hearings, by two-way video. J.A.T. , 637 S.W.3d at 7-10 ; C.A.R.A. v. Jackson Cnty. Juv. Off. , 637 S.W.3d 50, 54, 64-66 (Mo. banc 2022). After J.A.T . and C.A.R.A. were vacated and remanded on January 11, 2022, the stay in this matter was lifted.

Legal Analysis

In his first point, K.D.D. argues the juvenile court erred by requiring him to attend his certification hearing via two-way video because it violated his constitutional due process rights and statutory right to be present at a critical stage of prosecution, and that the Supreme Court of Missouri's Operational Directives did not authorize the juvenile court to hold the certification hearing remotely via two-way video. K.D.D. properly preserved this issue for appeal by objecting to the virtual certification hearing before and at the outset of the hearing.

We review juvenile proceedings in the same manner as other court-tried cases and we will affirm the judgment "unless it is not supported by evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law." J.A.T. , 637 S.W.3d at 6 (citation omitted). Whether a juvenile's constitutional rights were violated is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. "Properly preserved constitutional violations are presumed prejudicial." Id. at 7.

"Juvenile proceedings are civil, not criminal, and are focused on continuing care, protection, and rehabilitation of the juvenile, and not punishment." In re C.A.M. , 644 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (citation omitted). "However, ‘the constitutional protections applicable in criminal proceedings are also applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings due to the possibility of a deprivation of liberty equivalent to criminal incarceration.’ " Id. (quoting In re N.D.C. , 229 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. banc 2007) ). "The United States Supreme Court has recognized certification hearings as ‘critically important’ proceedings that ‘must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.’ " Id. at 605-06 (quoting Kent v. United States , 383 U.S. 541, 556, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) ).

"The Fourteenth Amendment's due process protection applies to juvenile proceedings." J.A.T. , 637 S.W.3d at 7 (citing In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) ). "The United States Supreme Court has held certain rights enumerated within the Bill of Rights apply to juvenile proceedings, including notice of charges, right to counsel, right of confrontation and cross-examination, and privilege against self-incrimination." Id. (citing Gault , 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 56, 87 S.Ct. 1428 ).

The United States Constitution, the Missouri Constitution, and Missouri statutory law guarantee the right to be present at critical stages of trial. J.A.T. , 637 S.W.3d at 7. "[A] defendant is guaranteed the right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure." Id. at 8 (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer , 482 U.S. 730, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987) ).

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. State v. Justus , 205 S.W.3d 872, 878 n.6 (Mo. banc 2006). "One of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial." Illinois v. Allen , 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) ; see also MO. CONST. art. I, sec. 18(a) ("That in...