K. I. v. Wagner

• Decision Date: 02 May 2014
• Docket Number: D063822
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: K. I., a Minor, etc. Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOHN A. WAGNER, as Director, etc. Defendant and Respondent.

K. I., a Minor, etc. Plaintiff and Appellant, v. JOHN A. WAGNER, as Director, etc. Defendant and Respondent.

D063822

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Filed: May 2, 2014

(Super. Ct. No. 37-2010-00102184-

CU-WM-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joel M. Pressman, Judge. Affirmed.

Charles Wolfinger for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Julie Weng-Gutierrez, Assistant Attorney General, Leslie P. McElroy and Ernest Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.

An individual who is denied state or local social services may challenge the denial through an administrative hearing process administered by the state Director of Social Services (Director). If the party receives an unfavorable administrative decision, the exclusive remedy is a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. (Welf. & Inst.Code,¹ § 10962.) Section 10962 governs this judicial review process and provides: "The applicant or recipient shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs, if he obtains a decision in his favor."

In this case, a county social services recipient was unsuccessful in the administrative hearing process, but prevailed in the superior court writ of mandate action. The recipient then moved for attorney fees incurred for attorney services in the superior court and in the underlying administrative proceedings. The Director agreed to pay the fees incurred for attorney services in the superior court, but not the fees incurred for work during the administrative proceedings. The Director argued the recovery of the administrative attorney fees was not authorized under section 10962. The superior court agreed and awarded only those fees incurred for work related to the writ of mandate petition.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the court erred in concluding that as a matter of law it had no discretion under section 10962 to award attorney fees incurred for services performed in the underlying administrative proceedings. We hold the court properly interpreted section 10962. Applying well-settled statutory interpretation principles, we determine section 10962 permits a party to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in the writ of mandate proceeding, but not fees incurred in the administrative hearing process.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

This appeal arose from minor K's entitlement to certain In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) under California law. The IHSS program "enables aged, blind or disabled poor to avoid institutionalization by remaining in their homes with proper supportive services. . . ." (Bedoe v. County of San Diego (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 56, 58-59; see § 12300 et seq.) "The program compensates persons who provide the services to a qualifying incapacitated person." (Guerrero v. Superior Court (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 912, 920.) Generally, an eligible person is entitled to IHSS services not to exceed 195 hours per month. (§ 12303.4, subd. (a).) However, if the county welfare department determines the person needs "at least 20 hours per week" of specified care, the individual shall receive services not to exceed 283 hours per month. (§ 12303.4, subd. (b).) The determination whether the individual is entitled to the higher benefit level requires a factually intensive evaluation of the assistance needed for numerous specified daily living tasks.

In 2006, the County of San Diego (County) found that eight-year-old K, who was diagnosed with autism and a seizure disorder, was eligible to receive IHSS services for up to 195 hours per month. During the next several years, the County continued to find K eligible for the 195 monthly hours of paid in-home supportive services.

In 2009, K's mother (on her son's behalf) challenged the 195-hour limit, and sought to receive services under the 283-hour standard. An administrative hearing was held, at which neither K nor K's mother was represented by counsel. K's mother speaksJapanese, and can read and write English but has difficulty speaking and understanding spoken English. After the hearing, the Director denied the request.

K's mother then retained attorney Charles Wolfinger to challenge the Director's 2009 denial. Wolfinger agreed to represent the family on a pro bono basis because K's parents could not afford an attorney, and agreed to seek fee reimbursement only from the Director. While the administrative record was being prepared, Wolfinger filed a writ petition in the superior court to set aside the 2009 denial. However, after reviewing the completed administrative record, Wolfinger determined the record lacked sufficient documentary information to ensure success in the writ proceeding. He thus withdrew this writ petition and agreed to provide pro bono representation to K at a 2010 administrative hearing in which he planned to provide a more complete record.

At the 2010 hearing, Wolfinger submitted numerous documentary exhibits and an 18-page memorandum in an effort to show K's disabilities warranted the higher benefit level. Wolfinger also raised a legal issue regarding the propriety of the Director imposing blanket age limitations for meal preparation and meal cleanup. In July 2010, the Director denied K's claim, and provided a lengthy explanation.

Three months later, in October 2010, K, through his mother as guardian ad litem, filed a writ of mandate petition in the superior court challenging the Director's July 2010 decision. (§ 10962.) K was represented by Wolfinger. Wolfinger filed a memorandum of points and authorities supporting K's claim that the Director had improperly denied the higher benefit level for in-home supportive services.

The Director filed an answer denying the allegations, but did not file a responsive memorandum of points and authorities. Instead, several months later, the Director and K entered into a stipulated judgment granting K's petition and issuing a writ of mandate. Under the stipulation, the Director agreed to set aside the July 2010 decision and find K eligible to receive up to 283 hours of IHSS monthly services and pay provider back wages. This stipulation was based on the parties' agreement that K had an "assessed weekly need of 20.87 hours for the IHSS services of meal preparation, meal clean-up, bowel and bladder care, feeding, dressing, bathing, . . . oral hygiene and grooming, rubbing skin and care with prosthesis (taking medications) . . . ." In the stipulation, the parties also agreed "Petitioner's counsel Charles Wolfinger is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs, the amount to be mutually agreed on or determined after a noticed motion and memorandum of costs . . . ."

Wolfinger then documented his attorney fees as follows: $17,582 (54.1 hours x $325) for work performed in connection with the superior court writ petition and $21,320 (65.6 hours x $325) for work performed in connection with the 2010 administrative hearing. The Director agreed to pay the full requested fees for the work related to the writ petition ($17,582), but refused to pay the fees for the work related to the administrative hearing ($21,320). The Director argued that section 10962 precludes a court from awarding fees for work at the administrative hearing.

K then filed a motion under section 10962, requesting the court to order the Director to pay Wolfinger's total requested fees. Because the Director had agreed to pay the $17,582 fee amount, the sole focus of the motion was Wolfinger's argument thatsection 10962 provides a court with the authority to award attorney fees for services related to the administrative hearing. In a declaration, Wolfinger said that because he "had prepared the entire administrative record on the issues and briefed some of them for the hearing, I spent considerably less time on the merits of the writ petition than I would have, had I not represented [K] at the [administrative] hearing."

In response, the Director reasserted his arguments that "attorney's fees awarded under [section 10962] are limited to attorney's fees for work performed in connection with mandamus proceedings" and "[t]here is nothing in the statute which authorizes the payment of attorney's fees for work performed in connection with the underlying administrative hearing."

In reply, Wolfinger discussed the "lodestar" concept for the first time, but did not request an upward adjustment of his fees and argued only that he should be awarded his requested fees based on the actual amount of time worked both on the administrative hearing and the writ petition portions of the case. Wolfinger also requested that the court award him fees incurred to litigate the attorney fees motion.

In its tentative ruling, the court agreed with the Director that the administrative attorney fees were not recoverable under "the plain meaning" of section 10962. After a hearing, the court confirmed this ruling and stated: "Petitioner's motion is granted for attorney's fees requested for work on the litigation in the amount of $17,582 and denied for attorney's fees requested for work on the administrative hearing and for work on this fee motion."

DISCUSSION

K contends the trial court erred in interpreting section 10962 as precluding an attorney fees award for services provided during the underlying administrative proceeding.

I. Statutory Interpretation

"The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] 'In determining intent, we look first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its "plain meaning." ' [Citations.] Although we may properly rely on extrinsic aids, we should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.] Where the words of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that...