K.J. v. L. A. Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 January 2020
• Docket Number: S241057
• Citation: 257 Cal.Rptr.3d 850,456 P.3d 988,8 Cal.5th 875
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: K.J., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents; Luis A. Carrillo, Objector and Appellant.

8 Cal.5th 875

456 P.3d 988

257 Cal.Rptr.3d 850

K.J., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs,

v. LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents;Luis A. Carrillo, Objector and Appellant.

S241057

Supreme Court of California.

January 30, 2020

Werksman Jackson Hathaway & Quinn, Kelly C. Quinn and Mark W. Allen, Los Angeles, for Objector and Appellant.

Coleman and Associates, John M. Coleman, Pasadena; Law Offices of Bruce T. McIntosh and Bruce T. McIntosh, Los Angeles, for Defendants and Respondents.

Opinion of the Court by Groban, J.

This case presents a narrow question of procedural law: Does a Court of Appeal have jurisdiction to review an order directing an attorney to pay sanctions when the notice of appeal identifies the attorney’s client as the appealing party, but other indicia make clear that the attorney was the party seeking review? The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the attorney’s client lacked standing to challenge the sanctions order and that the notice of appeal could not be liberally construed to include the omitted attorney.

We reverse the Court of Appeal’s dismissal and hold that, when it is clear from the record that the omitted attorney intended to participate in the appeal and the respondent was not misled or prejudiced by the omission, the rule of liberal construction compels that the notice be construed to include the omitted attorney. We further conclude that test is satisfied here based on the following: (1) the notice of appeal expressly designated the sanctions order as the sole order or judgment at issue in the appeal; (2) the challenged order only imposed sanctions against the attorney and had no effect on the rights of the client; (3) during the trial court proceedings, the attorney engaged in substantial litigation regarding the sanctions motions that focused exclusively on whether the court had authority to discipline him; and (4) the adverse party, Los Angeles Unified School District, did not assert that it was misled or prejudiced from the notice’s failure to reference the attorney as an appealing party.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings

Attorney Luis Carrillo represented K.J., a minor, in a negligence action against the Los Angeles Unified School District and district personnel (collectively LAUSD) arising from a sexual assault that occurred on LAUSD property. During the litigation, LAUSD filed an application for sanctions asserting that Carrillo had willfully obstructed a court-ordered psychiatric examination of K.J. by directing the examiner not to ask questions about the details of the assault. LAUSD contended that Carrillo’s conduct directly violated a prior discovery order in which the trial court had declined to place any such limitations on the examiner.

After issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order of contempt finding Carrillo guilty of willfully disobeying the prior discovery order. The court ordered Carrillo to serve 24 hours in county jail and to pay a $750 fine. The court’s order also invited LAUSD to file a supplemental application to recover the fees and costs it had expended in litigating the sanctions motion and the contempt proceedings. Carrillo filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal challenging the contempt order. On October 26, 2015, the Court of Appeal issued an order staying the order of contempt.

While the stay was in effect, LAUSD filed its supplemental application, which sought $100,000 in sanctions from Carrillo and his law firm. The requested sanctions included $52,247 in fees and costs that LAUSD had incurred in litigating the original application for sanctions and an additional $47,752 penalty to "deter future misconduct."

At the hearing on the supplemental application, the court informed the parties that it intended to order Carrillo to pay discovery sanctions totaling $16,111. K.J.’s cocounsel, John Henrichs, argued that the Court of Appeal’s stay of the contempt order barred the trial court from entering any further sanctions against Carrillo. In response, the trial court explained that it was not "looking at this as contempt sanctions. I mean, it’s arising out [of] that incident and it came up in connection with a contempt hearing, but it’s really a motion for interference with [the] discovery process. [¶] ... [¶] So, this particular decision will stand, in my view, regardless of what the appellate decision is. [¶] ... [¶] There is no penal component on this award."

On December 1, 2015, the trial court entered an order directing "Luis A. Carrillo, individually, and/or the Law Offices of Luis A. Carrillo, jointly and severally" to pay $16,111 to LAUSD. The order pertained only to Carrillo; it had no effect on K.J.

Several weeks after the order was filed, the Court of Appeal issued a "suggestive Palma notice" (see Brown, Winfield & Canzoneri, Inc. v. Superior Court (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1233, 1238, 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 223 P.3d 15 ; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc . (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893 ), informing the trial court that there was insufficient evidence to find Carrillo had willfully disobeyed the discovery order, and that it intended to issue a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the trial court to enter a new order finding Carrillo not guilty of contempt.

In response to the Palma notice, the trial court vacated its contempt order and issued a new order finding Carrillo not guilty of willfully disobeying the prior discovery order. The court’s order clarified, however, that the "new order [did not] ... reverse or change the Court’s previous order, dated December 1, 2015, awarding sanctions totaling $16,111.00 to LAUSD, based upon its finding that [Carrillo] had violated discovery statutes ...."

On January 26, 2016, attorney Mark Allen filed a notice of appeal using Judicial Council form APP-002. In the caption area of the standard form, Allen identified himself as K.J.’s attorney, and incorporated the same case title that was used in the trial court, "K.J., a minor through her guardian ad litem, ... v. Los Angeles Unified School District." Section one of the notice stated: "1. NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT ... K.J., a minor through her guardian ad litem, ... appeals from the ... order in this case, which was entered on ... December 1, 2015[.]" In a preprinted list that allows the appellant to designate the type of judgment or order being appealed from, a box was checked indicating an appeal of an order pursuant to " Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1(a)(3)–(13)."¹ Allen signed the notice, which contained no reference to Carrillo.

B. The Court of Appeal’s Dismissal of the Appeal

1. The parties’ contentions on appeal

The appellant’s opening brief argued that the trial court’s sanctions order should be reversed for two reasons. First, appellant contended the Court of Appeal’s stay of the contempt order had divested the trial court of authority to issue the subsequent sanctions order. In support, appellant noted that the contempt order included language inviting LAUSD to seek the very fees and costs the court had awarded in its subsequent sanctions order. Second, appellant argued that once the trial court had vacated its contempt order, it had no basis to direct the payment of further sanctions based on the same conduct that was at issue in the contempt proceedings.

In its respondent’s brief, LAUSD argued for the first time that the appeal should be dismissed based on K.J.’s "obvious lack of standing" to challenge an order that only imposed sanctions against Carrillo. LAUSD did not address whether the notice of appeal could or should be construed to include Carrillo. LAUSD’s brief also responded to the merits arguments raised in the opening brief, contending that the Court of Appeal’s stay of the contempt order did not preclude the trial court from entering a separate sanctions order for discovery violations.

Appellant’s reply brief did not dispute that K.J. lacked standing to challenge the sanctions order. The brief asserted, however, that in furtherance of the "strong policy in favor of hearing appeals on their merits," the notice of appeal should be liberally construed to include Carrillo as an intended party to the appeal. The brief contended that because the notice sought review of an order that directed only Carrillo to pay sanctions, it was clear that Carrillo was the intended "underlying litigant."

2. The Court of Appeal’s ruling

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Citing Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 39, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 337 ( Calhoun ) and People v. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Ins. Co. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 ( Indiana Lumbermens ), the court held that when a sanctions order is entered against an attorney, the right of appeal is vested " ‘in [the attorney], not [the attorney’s client]. ... Absent any attempted appeal by the sanctioned party, the sanction ruling is not ... reviewable.’ " (Quoting Calhoun, at p. 42, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 337.) The court also rejected K.J.’s assertion that the notice of appeal should be construed to include Carrillo, explaining that the liberal construction requirement could not be "stretch[ed] ... so far as to deem a notice of appeal to include an unnamed party."

Carrillo filed a petition for review seeking resolution of the following question: Does the Court of Appeal lack jurisdiction to review an order imposing sanctions on an attorney when the notice of appeal is brought in the name of the client rather than the attorney, or does the liberal construction requirement set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) permit the court to construe the notice to include the omitted attorney?

II. DISCUSSION

"[T]he timely filing of an appropriate notice of appeal or its legal equivalent is an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of appellate jurisdiction." ( Hollister...