K. P. Const. Co., Inc. v. Parrent's Death, 48995
| Decision Date | 12 January 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 48995,48995 |
| Citation | 562 P.2d 501 |
| Parties | K.P. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., and the Travelers Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. In the Matter of the DEATH of James Oliver PARRENT et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Sanders, McElroy & Carpenter by Jerry H. Holland, Tulsa, Ralph Smith, Oklahoma City, for petitioners.
Jerry D. Balentine, Yukon, for respondents.
A trial judge determined James Oliver Parrent died as a result of injury sustained from work-related heart attack during covered employment. Death benefits were awarded Claimant, surviving widow, who suffered pecuniary loss by reason of decedent's death. State Industrial Court en banc affirmed the trial judge's order and award. Petitioners, K.P. Construction Company, Inc., and the insurer, hereafter Respondents, have brought this proceeding for review to vacate this award.
Deceased, a 60-year-old truck driver, was employed by Respondents in September, 1973, without physical examination. Complaints of tiredness motivated Claimant to get deceased to doctor some two weeks prior to occurrence of heart attack. The physician advised deceased he was all right except for high blood pressure, for which medication was prescribed. Work involved driving a heavy dump truck, loaded with rock or sand, to various construction sites, which required driving 250--300 miles per day, sometimes during six-day work week, and occasionally cleaning the truck on Sunday. It was not unusual that deceased would be required to change as many as four flat tires a week, although sometimes assisted by another driver, deceased's son-in-law Croon. Deceased would get up each morning feeling well and leave for work at 4:30--5:00 a.m. For a month prior to November 16, 1974, deceased would return in late evening feeling bad, complaining of exhaustion and scarcely able to eat, and retire immediately. Payroll records showed deceased worked 76 1/2 hours overtime during 16 days immediately prior to November 16, 1974.
On November 16, 1974, deceased and Croon left home by car about 4:30 a.m., checked and fueled their trucks, and began the day's hauling. While stopped for lunch in Snyder, Oklahoma, Croon observed deceased acted peculiarly, but upon inquiry deceased stated he had indigestion but would be all right. The trucks were driven to Childers, Texas, and unloaded, and returned to the plant near Altus with deceased in the lead. Upon arrival Croon observed deceased's truck had not been loaded, and deceased was dragging around, but finally got into his truck although pale and looking bad. After loading deceased stated he was unable to drive, and was taken about 15 miles in Croon's truck to reach deceased's car. Deceased attributed his condition to indigestion, but looked bad and was taken on without changing vehicles. Upon arrival home he was white, bathed in perspiration, complaining of chest pain and unable to sit up. Claimant and daughter, Croon's wife, arranged for ambulance removal to an Altus hospital where emergency treatment was administered. Diagnosis was acute myocardial infarction and severe supraventricular tachycardia. Deceased was under intensive care several days. Released to go home on November 27, 1974, deceased was under regular medication for sleep and nerves, and restricted to sitting up in bed.
December 11, 1974, Respondents' adjuster appeared at the home and tape recorded an interview with deceased concerning his work, daily activities and prior health. Pointedly establishing deceased's consent to giving a statement, interrogation was directed to eliciting answers showing deceased expended no unusual effort and did not consider his work stressful; was not subjected to mental or emotional strain and did not feel bad; knew of no job-related activity except long hours which could have provoked onset of attack. Attack occurred while deceased was sitting in truck, without having engaged in strenuous activity, when stricken by sickening chest pain. The interviewer admittedly did not advise deceased the statement was to be used in the case.
That evening deceased again required emergency hospitalization. Medication did not restore normal heartbeat and it was necessary to resort to electric shock treatment to relieve paroxysmal auricular tachycardia. After another episode on December 26th deceased was transferred to a Lawton hospital, treated and returned home. Hospitalized again for emergency treatment on February 3, 1975, deceased was discharged home February 14, 1975, but expired from myocardial infarction due to cardiac arrythmia on February 17, 1975.
Claimant's evidence concerned deceased's work routine, and apparent exhaustion the two or three months prior to accident, particularly the last month when deceased would return from work completely exhausted. Witness described deceased's condition and apparent illness upon arrival home, with chest pains and later overcome by nausea. Prior to this, deceased had never missed a day's work from illness, and had not complained of chest pains. On return from hospital after first episode deceased was bedfast, under strong medication, not getting along well, and was vague about things. Claimant answered part of the questions asked during the recorded interview because she did not think deceased understood what he was saying.
The witness Croon testified the work was hard because of constant need to rush. Deceased did not act right when they stopped for lunch on November 16th, and was looking bad and dragging around when they arrived back at the sand plant near Altus. After trucks were loaded and at the scales deceased said he was unable to drive, and they began the journey home in Croon's truck. Deceased looked bad, although stating he had indigestion. Witness recalled assisting deceased in changing a tire on November 15th--this was nearly a daily occurrence--and each usually helped the other when this occurred.
Four contentions presented as grounds for vacating this award are based upon evidentiary consideration. Supporting argument in each rests entirely upon a premise evolved from Respondents' interpretation of weight and quality of evidence. Each premise, in turn, is measured by novel application of rules of evidence stated in equity cases, tort actions, or Federal criminal cases, as basis for the conclusion this award cannot be sustained.
Whether heart attack sustained by a workman arose out of and in course of employment, or from other cause unrelated to or disconnected from employment, presents a fact question for State Industrial Court determination. Bill Gover Ford Co. v. Roniger, 426 P.2d 701 (Okl.1967). Settled law declares Supreme Court, when reviewing State Industrial Court orders, neither weighs conflicting evidence nor determines preponderance thereof, but reviews the entire record only to ascertain whether there is any reasonable competent evidence to sustain the order or award. Goombi v. Trent, 531 P.2d 1363 (Okl.1975); Dayton Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vires, 538 P.2d 194 (Okl.1975). The present review is confined to determining whether this award is sustained by any competent evidence.
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