K.A. v. F.A.
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. FM-13-0901-13 |
| Decision Date | 15 June 2020 |
| Citation | 473 N.J.Super. 151,279 A.3d 22 |
| Parties | K.A., Plaintiff, v. F.A., Defendant. |
| Court | New Jersey District Court |
Brian Largey, for plaintiff (Largey Law, attorneys)
Angela F. Pastor, Watchung, for defendant (Law Offices of Pastor and Pastor, LLC, attorneys)
This case presents a question of first impression: may a child support obligation be modified retroactively prior to the date of application where the substantial, permanent change in circumstances is an adult adoption that terminated the obligor's parental rights. For the reasons stated herein, the court concludes that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a ’s ban on retroactive modification to child support does not bar modification, or even termination, of child support retroactive to the date of the adult adoption.
Despite the parties’ litigious history, the salient facts on this issue are not disputed.
The parties were married in 1997 and had three children. They divorced in February 2008 pursuant to a final judgment of divorce that incorporated a marital settlement agreement which provided for, among other things, F.A.1 to pay unallocated child support. Thereafter, K.A. re-married. When the oldest child matriculated at college, the court modified F.A.’s ongoing child support in February 2017, such that a portion of the support obligation was allocated to the oldest child, but the remainder of the support obligation was unallocated among the two younger children.
On July 19, 2018 – after their respective eighteenth birthdays – the two oldest children were adopted by their stepfather. Their biological father, F.A., now seeks to terminate his support obligation for the two adopted children and, accordingly, modify his child support obligation for the third child retroactive to July 19, 2018. Although K.A. agrees that a modification of support is appropriate, she objects to any retroactive modification, contending that because the support obligation was unallocated, any modification may only be retroactive to the date of the current application – not the date of the adoptions.2
It is axiomatic that "[e]ach parent has a responsibility to share the costs of providing for the child while [the child] remains unemancipated." Martinetti v. Hickman, 261 N.J. Super. 508, 512, 619 A.2d 599 (App. Div. 1993). Even where there is estrangement between the non-custodial parent and the child, the support obligation continues. L.V. v. R.S., 347 N.J. Super. 33, 43, 788 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 2002) (). Put another way, "[t]here is no divorce between parent and child." Zazzo v. Zazzo, 245 N.J. Super. 124, 130, 584 A.2d 281 (App. Div. 1990).
Also well-established is that child support orders are subject to review and modification on a prima facie demonstration of a substantial, permanent change in circumstances. See, e.g. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157, 416 A.2d 45 (1980). A child's adoption or emancipation constitutes such a changed circumstance – a legal principle the parties do not dispute here. E.g., J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327, 73 A.3d 405 (2013) ; Harrington v. Harrington, 446 N.J. Super. 399, 401, 141 A.3d 1228 (Ch. Div. 2016).
As a general proposition, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a prohibits courts from retroactively reducing child support obligations prior to the date of application. That statutory prohibition may, at times, lead to unforgiving impacts. See, e.g., Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8, 14, 654 A.2d 474 (App. Div. 1995) (). With limited exceptions, courts doggedly enforce the prohibition on retroactive modifications. See, e.g., Ohlhoff v. Ohlhoff, 246 N.J. Super. 1, 8, 586 A.2d 839 (App. Div. 1991) (). Nevertheless, courts have carved out limited exceptions to the, at times, inequitable effects of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a. See, e.g., Centanni v. Centanni, 408 N.J. Super. 78, 82, 973 A.2d 404 (Ch. Div. 2008) (child's death).
The most notable exception to the statutory ban on retroactive modifications – and most analogous to the circumstances here – is for a child's emancipation. Mahoney v. Pennell, 285 N.J. Super. 638, 643, 667 A.2d 1119 (App. Div. 1995) ; Bowens v. Bowens, 286 N.J. Super. 70, 73, 668 A.2d 90 (App. Div. 1995). Yet, to date, no court has addressed whether the adult adoption of a child constitutes an additional, limited exception to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a ’s otherwise applicable ban on retroactivity.
Emancipation is the conclusion of "the fundamental dependent relationship between parent and child." Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308, 700 A.2d 384 (App. Div. 1997). Although few bright lines exist, "[i]n the end[,] the issue is always fact-sensitive and the essential inquiry is whether the child has moved ‘beyond the sphere of influence and responsibility exercised by a parent and obtains an independent status of his or her own.’ " Ibid. (quoting Bishop v. Bishop, 287 N.J. Super. 593, 598, 671 A.2d 644 (Ch. Div. 1995) ).
On emancipation, the rights and obligations related to care, custody, and – most relevant here – support incident to the parent-child relationship are extinguished. Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 543, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982). Although emancipation does not fully sever the relationship, as rights to inheritance and other limited rights continue, on emancipation "a parent relinquishes the right to custody and is relieved of the duty to support a child." Ibid.
In recognition of the legal consequences of emancipation, on December 20, 1995, a singular Appellate Division panel issued a tandem of decisions discussing the interplay of N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a ’s ban on retroactive modification and emancipation.
First, in Mahoney, the Court noted that "[i]mplicit ... in the judicial obligation to enforce the terms of a child support order is the underlying premise that a duty to support exists." 285 N.J. Super. at 643, 667 A.2d 1119. Because on emancipation "there is no longer a duty of support [and thus] no child support can become due," the court could not "ascribe to [ N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a ] ... any indication that the legislature so intended[ ] to bar termination of child support retroactively to the time a child became emancipated." Ibid. Thus, the court held that " N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a does not bar the cancellation of child support arrearages which accrued subsequent to the date of the minor's emancipation as retroactively determined by the court." Ibid.
Second, in Bowens, the court held that even where a "judicial declaration of emancipation was not announced on or near the date of occurrence, that should not detract from when emancipation occurred." 286 N.J. Super. at 73, 668 A.2d 90. There, the child was retroactively deemed emancipated on May 20, 1988. Although the application to eliminate arrearages was not filed until September 1993 – some five years after emancipation – the court in Bowens concluded that despite such a significant delay, any arrearages accruing from the emancipation date were to be cancelled.
With that settled law as backdrop, the court must consider here whether an adult adoption is sufficiently analogous to emancipation, such that the principles undergirding Mahoney and Bowens should be extended to create an additional, limited exception to N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a ’s ban on retroactive modification to child support.
"[S]olely a creature of statute" and recognized by New Jersey law since 1925, L. 1925, c. 99, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:22-1 to 2A:22-3, adult adoptions serve myriad purposes including situations, as here, where "a step-child ... has developed a strong relationship with a step-parent." In re P.B. for Adoption of L.C., 392 N.J. Super. 190, 192-95, 920 A.2d 155 (Law Div. 2006). The adult adoption statute requires a ten-year age difference between the adult to be adopted and the adopting adult to "ensur[e] a semblance of a parent-child relationship" between the parties. Id. at 197, 920 A.2d 155.
The adult to be adopted must "request[ ]" the adoption. N.J.S.A. 2A:22-2. And, importantly, in the adult adoption context, notice need not be provided to the natural parent or parents. In re Adoption of Adult by C.K., 314 N.J. Super. 605, 609, 715 A.2d 1030 (Ch. Div. 1998).
As with a child adoption, an adult adoption establishes the same rights, privileges, and obligations between the parties as if the adopted adult had been born of the adoptive parent. Unlike child adoption, however, which terminates all rights and obligations between the child and the natural parent, adopted adults retain the right to inherit intestate from their natural parents. N.J.S.A. 2A:22-3(a). Putting that distinction aside, as with a child adoption, an adult adoption terminates all other "rights, privileges and obligations due from the natural parents to the person adopted." N.J.S.A. 2A:22-3(b) (emphasis added). Thus, and as the parties concede here, F.A. no longer has a child support obligation to his two oldest children who were adopted as adults. But, as with an emancipated child, rights of intestate inheritance remain.
Although the parties acknowledge that the adult adoption of the two oldest children is a Lepis changed circumstances sufficient to warrant a review and modification of the on-going child support obligation for the youngest child, the parties dispute whether the child support obligation should be modified retroactive to the date of the application or to the date of the adult adoptions.
On this issue, due to the fundamental similarity between adult adoption and emancipation whereby both terminate parental obligations of support, the court concludes that N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a does not bar a retroactive modification to...
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