E.K. v. Stampford Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 28 May 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:07cv800.,3:07cv800. |
| Citation | 557 F.Supp.2d 272 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | E.K., Plaintiff, v. STAMFORD BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant. |
Joseph Patrick Sargent, Fairfield, CT, for Plaintiff.
Andreana R. Bellach, Gwen J. Goodman, Shipman & Goodwin, Stamford, CT, Patrick M. Fahey, Shipman & Goodwin, Hartford, CT, for Defendant.
Plaintiff E.K.'s action challenges the defendant Stamford Board of Education's expulsion order against him in violation of his rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment and deny the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment.
This factual background is reflected in the parties' memoranda and evidentiary material attached thereto.
During the time relevant to this action, plaintiff was a senior at Stamford High School in Stamford, Connecticut.
On February 1, 2007, plaintiff engaged in a verbal altercation with a female student, for which plaintiff was suspended from school.
On February 3, 2007, the same female student received racist and threatening voice mail messages. These messages were brought to the attention of the School Administration and Police Officer William Brevard, the Stamford Police Resource officer assigned to the School.
On February 27, 2007, plaintiff engaged in a fight with a male student, and was subsequently suspended for this behavior.
Officer Brevard investigated the incident related to the threatening voice mail messages and prepared an affidavit based on written statements given by witnesses. The classmate gave a statement to the police, identifying plaintiffs voice as "possibly" one voice of the several male voices on the messages.
Plaintiff told Officer Brevard that he was in the car while the calls were being made and also identified the other individuals involved. These other students later gave the police written statements that plaintiff made the first phone call and that they were also involved in leaving messages.
On March 26, 2007, plaintiff was arrested on a felony hate crime charge related to racist messages left on a classmate's voice mail. On March 30, the Board notified plaintiff and his parents that he would be suspended from Stamford High School for a violation of the Stamford Board of Education Policy and Administrative Regulation prohibiting harassing, intimidating or demeaning behavior on the basis of race.
By letter dated April 5, 2007, Joseph F. O'Callaghan, Executive Director for Youth Development for the Stamford Board of Education, informed the parents that the Board of Education would be moving for the student's exclusion from Stamford High School. The letter notice explained that plaintiff would have an expulsion hearing at which plaintiff would have the right to testify, produce witnesses and other evidence, and "to demand that any witnesses against him/her appear in person to answer his/her questions."
The letter also described the behavior that would be considered as grounds for expulsion:
More specifically, the administration has determined that on February 1, 2007, E.K. called a female student derogatory names and threatened this student, which conduct caused disruption in the classroom. The administration has also determined that on or about February 3, 2007, E.K. threatened, intimidated and/or demeaned a student on the basis of race and/or sex. In addition, on February 27, 2007, E.K. engaged in a fight with a male student. The incidents on February 1 and 27, 2007 occurred on school grounds; the incident of February 3, 2007 occurred off school grounds. The foregoing conduct is considered prohibitive behavior for which your son can be expelled under Board of Education Policy 5131/Administrative Regulations 5131-R and/or Connecticut General Statutes Section 10-233d, as the administration has determined that it has cause to believe that E.K. has engaged in conduct on school ground ... which endangers persons or property, is seriously disruptive of the educational process or is violative of a publicized Board policy or conduct off school grounds which is seriously disruptive of the educational process and violative of the publicized policy of the Board.
In a letter dated April 20, plaintiffs counsel requested postponement of the expulsion hearing scheduled for May 3 and indicated that he needed to "make arrangements" to issue subpoenas and participate in the expulsion hearing.
On May 8, the expulsion hearing was held. The Board presented testimony from Susan Brown Koroshetz, Principal of Stamford High School; Angela Thomas, Assistant Principal at Stamford High School; and Officer Brevard.
Plaintiff appeared at the hearing and was represented by counsel. The Hearing Officer admitted a redacted copy of the police affidavit and allowed Koroshetz, Thomas, and Brevard to testify about the student witnesses' accounts of the incident. Plaintiffs counsel objected to the admission of documents containing student witnesses' accounts of the incident as hearsay evidence. Plaintiffs counsel cross-examined the Board's witnesses but was not allowed to cross-examine Officer Brevard regarding the other voices on the tape.
Plaintiff called no witnesses, did not testify on his own behalf, and presented no evidentiary materials.
The Hearing Officer found that plaintiff had committed an expellable offense and expelled him from the Stamford Public Schools for a period of ninety days. Pursuant to its statutory obligation, the Board provided plaintiff with an alternative educational opportunity during the expulsion period.
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991).
The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute. American Int'l Group, Inc. v. London American Int'l Corp., 664 F.2d 348, 351 (2d Cir.1981). In determining whether a genuine factual issue exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
If a nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. If the nonmoving party submits evidence which is "merely colorable," legally sufficient opposition to the motion for summary judgment is not met. Anderson, All U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Plaintiff argues that his constitutional right to due process was violated because the Board admitted hearsay evidence, failed to provide him the opportunity for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and failed to follow administrative procedures. Plaintiff also brings a vagueness challenge to Connecticut's expulsion statute, Connecticut General Statute Section 10-233d.
Plaintiff challenges defendant's admission of hearsay evidence, failure to provide for confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and failure to follow administrative regulations.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that, generally, a person must be afforded the opportunity for a hearing prior to being deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 & n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Thus, in order to sustain an action for deprivation of property without due process of law, a plaintiff must identify a property right and show that the state actor has deprived plaintiff of that right without due process.
The fundamental requisite of procedural due process is the opportunity to be heard. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). This opportunity must be granted within a meaningful time and manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). Further, the hearing must be "appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).
The parties do not dispute that plaintiff has the right to procedural due process in connection with his expulsion from school, and that constitutional compliance requires at least notice and opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574-79, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). In Goss, the Supreme Court noted that the students' interest in safeguarding against "unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process" must be balanced against the school's interest in "discipline and order." Id. at 579-80, 95 S.Ct. 729. The proceedings need not take the form of take a judicial or quasi-judicial trial. Remer v. Burlington Area School Dist, 286 F.3d 1007, 1010 (7th Cir.2002). Escalating the formality and adversary nature of the suspension or expulsion process may render such hearings so costly as to destroy their effectiveness as a disciplinary tool. Goss, 419 U.S. at 583, 95 S.Ct. 729.
The Court must apply the analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge to determine whether the admission of hearsay evidence without allowing plaintiff to confront the student witnesses and the limitation of plaintiffs cross-examination of the Board witness Brevard constitute violations of plaintiffs right to due process. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1...
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