Kaack v. Stanton

• Citation: 112 S.W. 702
• Parties: KAACK et al. v. STANTON.<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL>
• Decision Date: 27 June 1908
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

112 S.W. 702

KAACK et al. v. STANTON.^†

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

June 27, 1908.

Rehearing Denied October 8, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Matagorda County; Wells Thompson, Judge.

Trespass to try title by Wm. E. Stanton, by guardian and others, against Hy. Kaack and others. From a judgment for plaintiff Stanton, defendants Kaack and others appeal. Affirmed.

Gaines & Corbett, for appellants. Willett Wilson, Holland & Krause, and Wilson & Dabney, for appellee.

McMEANS, J.

This was instituted in behalf of Wm. E. Stanton, alleged to be non compos mentis, by his guardian, Mary J. Worthen, and by Raymond Fretwell and Fannie Fretwell, by their guardian, John Fretwell, against Hy. Kaack, Mrs. W. K. Kaack, feme sole, Dave Kaack, Anna Kaack, John Kaack, F. S. Sherer, and J. F. Holt, in the ordinary form of an action of trespass to try title for 320 acres of land in Matagorda county, patented to the heirs of Wm. G. Ewing, and for damages. Defendants answered by plea of not guilty, and also pleaded the statute of limitations of 3, 5, and 10 years, and for the value of the improvements made in good faith by them on the land. They also vouched in as party defendants E. P. Layton, C. I. Layton, F. P. Layton, I. R. Layton, M. L. Layton, M. F. Wilson, R. H. Wilson, S. E. Tyler, and E. L. Tyler, alleged to be the heirs of M. E. Layton and Fletcher Layton, from whom defendants' ancestor purchased the land by general warranty deed, and prayed for judgment against the vouched-in defendants in the event judgment for the land should be against them. The plaintiffs by supplemental petition specially excepted to that part of defendants' answer setting up improvements in good faith, and pleaded that Wm. E. Stanton was of unsound mind, and had been since his infancy, and that he was of unsound mind at the time and before defendants took possession of the land in controversy, and that as to him the statute of limitations did not apply. He claimed an undivided half interest in the land. The plaintiff, John Fretwell, guardian of Raymond and Fannie Fretwell, took a nonsuit, and after the evidence was all in, the court directed a verdict for all the vouched-in defendants, and as to this action the appellants make no complaint. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict was rendered for plaintiff, upon which judgment was entered in his favor for an undivided one-half of the land, and for the sum of $785.55, found by the jury for rents of the land. Plaintiff entered a remittitur of this sum. Defendants filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled, and in a proper manner brings the case before us on appeal.

The court sustained plaintiff's special exception to defendants' plea of improvements, and this action of the court is the basis of appellants' first assignment of error. The plea is as follows: "Now come the defendants in the above numbered and entitled cause by their attorneys, and represent to the court that they and those under whom they claim have had adverse possession, in good faith, of the premises in controversy, and described in plaintiff's petition, for more than one year next before the commencement of this suit; that all of said land was acquired by deeds duly executed, and for valuable considerations paid by the vendees, and the defendants herein, being said vendees and their heirs, believed, and had good reason to believe, that they thereby acquired a good and valid title thereto. And defendants further say that they and those under whom they claim have made permanent and valuable improvements on said land and premises in good faith, and depending upon their title thereto, during the time they had such possession, as follows:" Then follows the various items of improvements with the cost or value of each, aggregating $3,050. The assignment cannot be sustained. The statute provides that the defendant may allege that he and those under whom he claims have made permanent and valuable improvements on the land sued for, during the time they have had such possession, stating the improvements and their value, respectively, "and stating also the grounds of such claim." Art. 5277, Rev. St. 1895. The only grounds of the claim asserted by appellants are that the land was acquired by them by deeds duly executed and for a valuable consideration, and that they believed, and had good reason to believe, that they had acquired a good and valid title thereto, and that the improvements were made on the land in good faith, and depending on their titles thereto, during the time they had possession. This allegation, we think, does not meet the requirements of the statutes that the grounds of the claim shall be stated. To constitute appellants possessors in good faith they must not only have believed that they were the true owners, and have grounds for that belief, but they must have been ignorant that their title is contested by one claiming a better right, unless they had strong grounds to believe that the adverse claim is destitute of legal foundation (Parrish v. Jackson, 69 Tex. 615, 7 S. W. 486), and it was incumbent upon them to allege facts which would justify the belief in the validity of the title under which they claimed (Johnson v. Schumacher, 72 Tex. 338, 12 S. W. 207; Thompson v. Comstock, 59 Tex. 318; Holstein v. Adams, 72 Tex. 485, 10 S. W. 560; Riggs v. Nafe [Tex. Civ. App.] 30 S. W. 706).

The second assignment complains of the action of the court in giving plaintiffs' special charge No. 3, which is as follows: "The jury are charged that when a man becomes chronically of unsound mind he is presumed to continue in such condition until the contrary is proven; that when one is adjudged to be of unsound mind, then he is presumed to continue in that condition until the contrary is proved." The objections to the giving of this charge are that there was no evidence that Stanton was chronically of unsound mind, and because he was adjudged to be of unsound mind long after defendants had taken actual possession of the land, and because the "coupling together of the two conditions set out in the charge" was calculated to and did lead the jury to believe that if Stanton was ever adjudged to be of unsound mind, he was necessarily in that condition at the time of the suit. As to the first contention, we find that the evidence justified the giving of the first part of the charge. There was testimony to the effect that Stanton was idiotic, and had been so from his infancy, which antedated the commencement of the actual possession of the land by defendants. The other objections are without merit. Limitation did not begin to run against Stanton at the time actual possession of the land was taken by defendants, if at that time he was of unsound mind, and the suspension of the statute in such case did not depend on whether or not Stanton had been adjudged insane. Nor could the jury have understood from the charge that, if Stanton had been once adjudged of unsound mind, he was necessarily in that condition at the time of the trial, and this is especially true in view of the fact that at the instance of the defendant the jury were instructed that unless Stanton was of unsound mind before possession was taken by defendants and those under whom they claim, then limitation began to run against him from the date of taking such possession and continued to run as long as such possession was held; and, further, that if Stanton had any lucid interval during the time defendants held possession, then limitation began to run against him from the time of such lucid interval. The assignment is overruled.

The action of the court in giving plaintiff's requested charge No. 4 is made the basis of appellants' third assignment of error. The charge instructed the jury, in effect, that a person is to be deemed of unsound mind when he has not the ability to transact the ordinary affairs of life, to understand their nature and effect, and exercise his will in relation to them. The objection is that a person might not have the ability to transact the ordinary affairs of life and yet be of sound mind; that the charge did not show that mental ability was meant, and such meaning could not be presumed. In the connection in which the language is used it is inconceivable that the jury could have understood the court to have reference to physical ability. Nor is the charge subject to the further objection urged against it that it is upon the weight of the evidence. The assignment cannot be sustained.

The charge of the court upon the issue of limitation was sufficient, and the assignments attacking it are overruled. If defendants desired a fuller charge upon the subject, they should have requested it.

The court instructed the jury that, in the event they found for plaintiff, their verdict should be as follows: We, the jury, find for the plaintiff that he was of unsound...