Kacher v. Houston Community College System

• Decision Date: 29 April 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. H-95-5646.
• Citation: 974 F.Supp. 615
• Parties: Detna KACHER, Plaintiff, v. HOUSTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM, Evelyn Burns, and Teresa Rice, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

974 F.Supp. 615

Detna KACHER, Plaintiff, v. HOUSTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM, Evelyn Burns, and Teresa Rice, Defendants.

Civil Action No. H-95-5646.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.

April 29, 1997.

Laurence Wade Watts, Watts and Associates, Houston TX, for Detna Kacher.

Michael Kuhn, Arturo Gabriel Michel, Bracewell and Patterson, Houston, TX, for Houston Community College, Evelyn Burns and Teresa Rice.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ATLAS, District Judge.

Pending before the Court are the "Defendants' Objections to Magistrate's Memorandum and Recommendation Denying Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" [Docs. # 62] and Plaintiff's Response thereto [Doc. # 65]. By Memorandum and Recommendations entered on February 20, 1997, [Doc. # 59], Magistrate Judge Calvin Botley recommended that the Court deny Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. # 33 and 35].¹

This matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). The Objections are timely filed. The Court has reviewed the Memorandum and Recommendations, Defendants' Objections, and Plaintiff's Response, and has made a de novo review of the material on file in light of the Magistrate Judge's recommended disposition of the summary judgment motions. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 925 F.2d 853, 855 (5th Cir.1991).

In summary, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Defendants' motions should be denied because this matter raises various questions of material fact. This Court agrees substantially with the Magistrate Judge's ultimate conclusions but modifies the Magistrate Judge's Memorandum and Recommendation in accordance with the following opinion. For the reasons explained below, Defendant HCCS's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 33] is DENIED. Defendants Evelyn Burns and Teresa Rice's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 33] is GRANTED IN PART, in that all of Plaintiff's claims against these individual defendants in their individual capacities are dismissed except for Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Defendant Rice.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Detna Kacher ("Plaintiff") began her employment as a full-time instructor in the Radiography Department of Defendant Houston Community College System ("HCCS") in the spring of 1990. On March 3, 1992, Plaintiff began a long term disability leave of absence when she underwent a liver transplant.² When she returned from leave, on June 1, 1993, she and Defendant Teresa Rice, the head of the HCCS Radiography Department, arranged for Plaintiff to work part-time, teaching and writing for HCCS during the summer.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff represented that her physical condition allowed her to work only part-time upon her return from leave. However, Plaintiff's account suggests that she was able to and would have liked to work more hours but that Defendants would not make any more work available to her. Plaintiff avers that because she believed that she still retained her full-time status, she assumed that she would resume a full-time schedule of teaching classes in the fall semester.

In the fall, Defendants did not assign Plaintiff full-time teaching responsibilities. Instead, Plaintiff continued teaching part-time until the following spring. Plaintiff claims that in April 1994, she learned for the first time that she had been discharged from her full-time position while she was on disability leave. She claims that until April 1994, she did not know that she no longer held a full-time position and did not realize that an instructor who was hired the previous summer and began teaching in September, 1993, had replaced her. Plaintiff claims that in April 1994, Keffus Falls, an HCCS Human Resources Officer, informed her that she had been dismissed from her full-time position in September 1992, six months into her disability leave. See Affidavit of Detna Kacher ("Kacher Affidavit"), Exhibit A of Appendix to Plaintiff's Joint Response to Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Appendix") [Doc. # 48], ¶ 25.

Defendants contend that HCCS advertised two full-time instructor positions in June and July, 1993, and that Plaintiff could have applied for these positions but chose not to. Because Plaintiff did not apply, Defendants argue that they believed Plaintiff was no longer interested in working full-time.

Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); breached her employment contract; and violated her constitutional right to due process.³ Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of these claims. With respect to the ADA claim, Defendants contend that Plaintiff was not a "qualified individual" as defined by the ADA, that Plaintiff's requested accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on HCCS, and that, because Plaintiff received disability benefits after she returned from leave, she is estopped from even arguing that she would have been able to resume her former position. With respect to Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract, Defendants contend primarily that Plaintiff's contract expired by its own terms during Plaintiff's disability leave and that Defendants had no obligation to notify Plaintiff that she was no longer employed as a fulltime instructor. With respect to Plaintiff's constitutional claim, Defendants contend primarily that because Plaintiff's contract expired during her leave, Plaintiff had no property interest in her continued employment and therefore may not assert a claim for deprivation of due process. In addition to these defenses, the individual defendants argue that individuals may not be liable under the ADA; that they, as individuals, had no contract with Plaintiff; and that they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's due process claim.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc); Bozè v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 804 (5th Cir.1990). The facts are to be reviewed with all inferences drawn in favor of the party opposing the motion. Bozè, 912 F.2d at 804 (citing Reid v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986)). However, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the nonmovant "only when there is an actual controversy — that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Laughlin v. Olszewski, 102 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir.1996).

The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a material fact issue with respect to those issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial. If the movant meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate with "significant probative evidence" that there is an issue of material fact so as to warrant a trial. Texas Manufactured Hous. Assn. v. Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir.1996); Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 586, 136 L.Ed.2d 515 (1996); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 718-19 (5th Cir.1995); Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994).

The nonmovant's burden may not be satisfied by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, metaphysical doubt as to the facts, or a scintilla of evidence. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 65 F.3d 452, 459 (5th Cir.1995), revised on other grounds, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. In the absence of any proof, the court will not assume that the nonmovant could or would prove the necessary facts. McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir.), revised on other grounds upon denial of reh'g, 70 F.3d 26 (5th Cir.1995); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188-89, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)). Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. at 2552).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the ADA by refusing to restore her to her previous position when she returned from disability leave and by refusing to make a reasonable accommodation so that she could resume her former teaching duties. The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against "a qualified individual with a disability" with respect to that person's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or to otherwise adversely affect the person's status as an employee "because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "Discrimination" includes "not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

1. Individual Defendants

Individuals who do not meet the...