Laughlin v. Olszewski

• Decision Date: 30 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-20544,96-20544
• Citation: 102 F.3d 190
• Parties: John Jay LAUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.H. OLSZEWSKI; The City of Houston, Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 190

102 F.3d 190

John Jay LAUGHLIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.H. OLSZEWSKI; The City of Houston, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-20544

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 30, 1996.

William Edward King, Kemah, TX, for John Jay Laughlin, plaintiff-appellant.

Fred A. Keys, Jr., Houston Police Officers Association, Houston, TX, for J.H. Olszewski, defendant-appellee.

Andrea Chan, Office of the City Attorney for the City of Houston, Houston, TX, for the City of Houston, defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff John Jay Laughlin filed this civil rights action against J.H. Olszewski and the City of Houston under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Laughlin appeals. Because Laughlin has failed to allege a constitutional violation, we affirm.

Laughlin and David G. Wallace were both officers and shareholders of several corporations bearing the name "Ameristar." Wallace hired Olszewski, a twenty-five year veteran of the Houston Police Department, to provide security during the removal of Laughlin as an officer and employee of Ameristar. Wallace told Olszewski that Laughlin would be voted out at a meeting of the board of directors and would be given a trespass warning not to return to Ameristar. At some point, Wallace intimated that Laughlin's removal was the subject of litigation, although there was no pending litigation at that time.

Wallace, Kenneth James Swieter, and Kenneth J. Menges conducted the board meeting at the offices of Ameristar's legal counsel and informed Laughlin that he had been removed as an officer and employee of Ameristar. Menges then warned Laughlin that he would be arrested if he returned to Ameristar's offices.

Laughlin disregarded Menges' warning and immediately returned to Ameristar where he encountered Olszewski. Olszewski identified himself as a City of Houston police officer, informed Laughlin that he was trespassing, and warned him that he would be arrested if he did not leave. Although Laughlin protested that he was legally entitled to remain on the premises, Olszewski ordered Laughlin to leave immediately and did not allow him to retrieve his personal property from his office. Prior to the encounter, Wallace had told Olszewski that all of Laughlin's belongings had already been packed and mailed to Laughlin at his home.

Laughlin left the property without incident. It is undisputed that Olszewski did not touch Laughlin, did not reach for his sidearm, did not place Laughlin in handcuffs, and did not tell Laughlin at any time that he was under arrest.

Laughlin alleges that after he left the premises, employees of Ameristar ransacked his office, stealing and destroying his personal property. Laughlin does not, however, allege that Olszewski participated in or knew about these actions.

Laughlin brought this suit against Olszewski and the City of Houston under § 1983, ¹ alleging that Olszewski violated his constitutional rights by arresting him and seizing his personal property without probable cause. ² The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Olszewski and the City of Houston because (1) Laughlin was not arrested; (2) Olszewski would have had probable cause to arrest Laughlin if Laughlin had remained on the premises; (3) Olszewski was protected from suit under § 1983 by qualified immunity; and (4) Laughlin failed to demonstrate that the City of Houston's policies resulted in any constitutional deprivation as required under § 1983. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Lee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 34 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir.1994). Summary judgment is appropriate where the record, taken as a whole, "together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). We resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party, but only when there is an actual controversy--that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts. McCallum Highlands, Ltd. v. Washington Capital Dus, Inc., 66 F.3d 89, 92 (5th Cir.1995).

Laughlin first asserts that the district court erred in holding that there was no arrest where Laughlin was at all times free to leave the premises. Specifically, Laughlin argues that mere submission to a "show of authority" by a police officer is sufficient to constitute an arrest. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (holding that "[a]n arrest requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority") (emphasis in original); Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1126 (5th Cir.1993) (finding that defendant's use of flashing red light to stop plaintiff on interstate was seizure by use of show of authority). We disagree. While Laughlin is correct that law enforcement officials may effect an arrest by means of a "show of authority" without exerting physical force, "[a]s a legal term of art, ... 'show of authority' has the meaning given it by [Michigan v.] Chesternut[, 486 U.S. 567, 573, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) ]: there is a show of authority by an officer if, but only if, a reasonable person believes he is not free to leave." United States v. Valdiosera-Godinez, 932 F.2d 1093, 1099 n. 2 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 921, 113 S.Ct. 2369, 124 L.Ed.2d 275 (1993). Laughlin was not only free to leave; he was told he would be arrested if he did not leave. The district court did not err in finding that there was no arrest where Laughlin was neither detained by Olszewski, nor believed he was being so detained.

Although the district court did not expressly address the contention, Laughlin asserted below and asserts again on appeal that Olszewski effected an illegal seizure when he refused to allow Laughlin to retrieve his personal property from his office, thereby allowing his former business partners to steal and destroy his private files. Again, we disagree.

A seizure under the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596, 109 S.Ct. 1378, 1381, 103 L.Ed.2d 628 (1989). While a seizure can occur where the specific object taken or detained is unintentional, the detention or taking itself must be willful. "This is implicit in the word 'seizure,' which can hardly be applied to an unknowing act." Id. Olszewski stated in his deposition testimony that Wallace assured him that Laughlin's personal property had already been packed up and sent to his residence. Laughlin offers no evidence to show that Olszewski otherwise knew that Laughlin's property was still in his office. Therefore, from Olszewski's perspective, there was nothing to take or detain; any interference with Laughlin's possessory interests in his property was a wholly unintentional consequence of his...