Kaddo v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

• Decision Date: 28 February 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 15–10647
• Citation: 238 F.Supp.3d 939
• Parties: Linda KADDO, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

238 F.Supp.3d 939

Linda KADDO, Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Case No. 15–10647

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed February 28, 2017

Bruce F. Jackson, Keego Harbor, MI, for Plaintiff.

Candace H. Lawrence, Social Security Administration, Assistant Regional Counsel, Boston, MA, Elizabeth J. Larin, AUSA, Vanessa Miree Mays, AUSA, U.S. Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TERRENCE G. BERG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This case is an appeal of the denial of Plaintiff's application for social security disability insurance benefits. This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti's Report and Recommendation dated December 29, 2016 (Dkt. 21), recommending that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be granted, that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied, and that this matter be remanded for further proceedings.

The law provides that either party may serve and file written objections "[w]ithin fourteen days after being served with a copy" of the Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Defendant filed timely objections (Dkt. 22) to the Report and Recommendation; Plaintiff filed a response to Defendant's objections (Dkt. 23). A district court must conduct a de novo review of the parts of a Report and Recommendation to which a party objects. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). "A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.

The Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Patti's Report and Recommendation, and Defendant's objections thereto. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's objections are OVERRULED, and the Report and Recommendation is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court. Consequently, this matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings, consistent with the discussion below.

ANALYSIS

A. The Social Security Act

The Social Security Act (the Act) "entitles benefits to certain claimants who, by virtue of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment

of at least a year's expected duration, cannot engage in 'substantial gainful activity.' " Combs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) ). A claimant qualifies as disabled "if she cannot, in light of her age, education, and work experience, 'engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.' " Combs , 459 F.3d at 642 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) ).

Under the authority of the Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The five steps are as follows:

In step one, the SSA identifies claimants who "are doing substantial gainful activity" and concludes that these claimants are not disabled. [ 20 C.F.R.] § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If claimants get past this step, the SSA at step two considers the "medical severity" of claimants' impairments, particularly whether such impairments have lasted or will last for at least twelve months. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Claimants with impairments of insufficient duration are not disabled. Seeid. Those with impairments that have lasted or will last at least twelve months proceed to step three.

At step three, the SSA examines the severity of claimants' impairments but with a view not solely to their duration but also to the degree of affliction imposed. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Claimants are conclusively presumed to be disabled if they suffer from an infirmity that appears on the SSA's special list of impairments, or that is at least equal in severity to those listed. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). The list identifies and defines impairments that are of sufficient severity as to prevent any gainful activity. SeeSullivan v. Zebley , 493 U.S. 521, 532, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). A person with such an impairment or an equivalent, consequently, necessarily satisfies the statutory definition of disability. For such claimants, the process ends at step three. Claimants with lesser impairments proceed to step four.

In the fourth step, the SSA evaluates claimant's "residual functional capacity," defined as "the most [the claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). Claimants whose residual functional capacity permits them to perform their "past relevant work" are not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f). "Past relevant work" is defined as work claimants have done within the past fifteen years that is "substantial gainful activity" and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn to do it. Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). Claimants who can still do their past relevant work are not disabled. Those who cannot do their past relevant work proceed to the fifth step, in which the SSA determines whether claimants, in light of their residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, can perform "substantial gainful activity" other than their past relevant work. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g)(1). Claimants who can perform such work are not disabled. Seeid. ; § 404.1560(c)(1).

Combs , 459 F.3d at 642–43.

"Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and the fact that she is precluded from performing her past relevant work." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). If the analysis reaches the fifth step, the burden transfers to the Commissioner. See Combs , 459 F.3d at 643. At that point, the Commissioner is required to show that "other jobs in significant numbers exist in the national economy that [claimant] could perform given her RFC and considering relevant vocational factors." Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) ; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g).

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is authorized pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Where the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ's decision stands as the Commissioner's final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Judicial review, however, is circumscribed in that the court "must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record."

Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support the ALJ's conclusion." Bass v. McMahon , 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Foster v. Halter , 279 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) ). This substantial evidence standard is less exacting than the preponderance of evidence standard. See Bass , 499 F.3d at 509 (citing Bell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 105 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1996) ). For example, if the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, "then reversal would not be warranted even if substantial evidence would support the opposite conclusion." Bass , 499 F.3d at 509.

The parties do not meaningfully object to Magistrate Judge Patti's thorough recitation of the medical evidence in the record, thus the Court adopts the evidence as summarized in the Report and Recommendation. Rather, Defendant raises two objections to the Report and Recommendation, primarily concerning the ALJ's conclusions and analysis of the medical evidence. Defendant's two objections are discussed below.

B. The ALJ Erred by Failing to Comply with the Appeals Council's First Remand Order

The first question is whether the ALJ complied with a remand order from the Appeals Council. A brief discussion of procedural history will bring this issue into focus. Plaintiff filed her application for disability insurance benefits on March 16, 2009, alleging that she had been disabled since December 26, 2006 (Tr. at 274–280). Plaintiff later amended her disability onset date to October 7, 2005 (Tr. at 93). Plaintiff's application was denied (Tr. at 165–168) and she sought a de novo hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. at 169–170). ALJ Jeanne VanderHeide held a hearing on January 5, 2011 (Tr. at 86–138). On March 22, 2011, the ALJ issued an opinion which found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. at 141–154). Plaintiff appealed this denial and, in August 2012, the Appeals Council vacated and remanded the ALJ's decision (Tr. at 158–161). Specifically, among other things, the Appeals Council directed the ALJ to hold a second hearing, and:

? Obtain evidence from a medical expert to clarify the nature and severity of Plaintiff's mental impairments

;

? Further evaluate Plaintiff's mental impairments ;

? Further evaluate Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) by evaluating treating and non-treating source opinions and nonexamining source opinions and to explain the weight given to such evidence (Tr. at 160–161).

On remand, the case was assigned to the same ALJ, who held another hearing on March 27, 2013 (Tr. at 38–85). On May 11, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision which again found Plaintiff not disabled (Tr. at 16–33). Plaintiff appealed again, but on December 24, 2014, the Appeals Council summarily denied Plaintiff's request for further review (Tr. at 1–3). The ALJ's second decision thus became the Commissioner's final decision. Plaintiff then timely commenced this case.

Defendant contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction to evaluate whether the ALJ complied with the Appeals Council's remand order, because a second review by the Appeals Council endorsed the ALJ's decision following the remand. There is no consensus among federal courts regarding whether an ALJ's...