Kaeo v. Davis

• Decision Date: 14 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 10318,10318
• Citation: 719 P.2d 387,68 Haw. 447
• Parties: Edith KAEO, Guardian of the Property of Lurline Kido, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Alfred K. DAVIS; Patrice Davis; Alfred Davis and Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellees, and City and County of Honolulu, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee, and Ford Motor Company; Hong's Ltd., dba Anna's Lounge; John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Corporations 4-10; Doe "Non-Profit" Corporations 1-10; and Doe Governmental Entities 2-10, Defendants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 387

719 P.2d 387

68 Haw. 447

Edith KAEO, Guardian of the Property of Lurline Kido Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Alfred K. DAVIS; Patrice Davis; Alfred Davis and Hawaiian Electric Co., Inc., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellees and City and County of Honolulu, Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Appellee and Ford Motor Company; Hong's Ltd., dba Anna's Lounge; John Does 1-10; Jane Does 1-10; Doe Corporations 4-10; Doe "Non-Profit" Corporations 1-10; and Doe Governmental Entities 2-10, Defendants.

No. 10318.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

May 14, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Our laws give a party the right to introduce evidence of those relevant and material facts which logically tend to prove the issues involved and which is not otherwise excluded.

2. The test of admissibility is not one of absolute proof of an ultimate fact in controversy. For relevancy is not dependent upon the conclusiveness of the testimony offered, but upon its legitimate tendency to establish a controverted fact.

3. Had the manner in which a car was driven been wholly beyond criticism, the fact of the driver's intoxication would have been wholly irrelevant in a negligence action stemming from an automobile accident. But where there was evidence of speeding and of the driver taking his eyes off the road while attempting to round a curve, a jury could infer the consumption of "four beers" by the driver, though insufficient to cause him to be intoxicated in the strict penal sense, were sufficient to impair his capacity to perceive the dangers with the clarity, make the decisions with the prudence, and operate the vehicle with the skill and caution required by law. The evidence of drinking by the driver, therefore, was relevant and material.

4. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, which means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.

5. The responsibility for maintaining the delicate balance between probative value and prejudicial effect lies largely within the discretion of the trial judge.

6. A ruling of inadmissibility premised only upon an impression that any indication of drinking by a party to a negligence action is fraught with the danger of unfair prejudice cannot be one that satisfies the cost-benefit calculus demanded by Haw.R.Evid. 403.

7. Evidence with a capacity for unfair prejudice cannot be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing party; for evidence is only material if it is prejudicial in some relevant respect.

8. Evidence of other accidents may be highly probative on material issues in a negligence action. Such evidence may be relevant circumstantially to show a defective or dangerous condition, notice thereof, or causation on the occasion in question.

9. The introduction of other-accident evidence may carry with it the problems associated with inquiry into collateral matters. To minimize these problems, this court has cautioned the trial courts that before evidence of previous accidents may be admitted on the issue of whether or not the condition as it existed was in fact a dangerous one, it must first be shown by the proponent of the evidence that the conditions under which the alleged previous accidents occurred were the same or substantially similar to the one in question.

10. This court has recognized that when the purpose of the offered evidence is to show notice the required similarity in circumstances is considerably less than that demanded when the object is to show a defective or dangerous condition or causation. This is so because all that is required to show notice is that the previous accident be such as to attract the defendant's attention to a dangerous situation.

11. Jury instructions are meant to furnish guidance to jurors in their deliberations, and the instructions to a jury should explain the law of the cause, point out the essentials to be proved on one side or the other, and bring into view the relation of the particular evidence adduced to the particular issues involved.

12. Under the special verdict procedure contemplated by HRCP 49(a) the jury makes findings of fact and the court applies the law.

13. A trial court should inform the jury of the possible legal consequence of a verdict apportioning negligence among joint tortfeasors if a party requests such an instruction and it is appropriate in the circumstances.

Collin Lau (Francis M. Nakamoto, on briefs), Deputies Corp. Counsel, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant, cross-appellee City and County of Honolulu.

Albert E. Peacock, III (Richard C. Sutton, Jr., with him on brief; Rush, Moore, Craven, Kim & Stricklin, of counsel), Honolulu, for defendant-appellee Alfred K. Davis.

Craig Kugisaki (Elton K. Suzuki, with him on briefs; Oliver, Lee, Cuskaden & Ogawa, of counsel), Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee, cross-appellant Edith Kaeo.

Before LUM, C.J., and NAKAMURA, PADGETT, HAYASHI and WAKATSUKI, JJ.

NAKAMURA, Justice.

The Circuit Court of the First Circuit adjudged the City and County of Honolulu and Alfred K. Davis jointly and severally liable for the damages sustained by Lurline Kido in a single-car accident. The City appeals, averring the trial court erred in not permitting evidence of beer-drinking before the mishap by Davis, the driver, to be heard by the jury and in rejecting an instruction that would have apprised the jury of the possible legal consequence of its verdict on the negligence attributable to each putative joint tortfeasor. Exercising an abundance of caution the plaintiff cross-appeals, claiming error on the part of the trial court in excluding evidence of allegedly similar prior accidents. We agree with the City that the circuit court committed reversible error in excluding the evidence of drinking and with the plaintiff that the offered evidence of prior accidents should have been admitted. We also think a trial jury should be informed of the legal effect of its special verdict where the plaintiff's injury resulted from the negligence of more than one defendant.

I.

Lurline Kido was seriously injured on January 12, 1979 when an automobile driven by Alfred K. Davis in which she and Samuel Taupo were passengers ran into a roadside utility pole. The accident happened at dusk while Miss Kido and her companions were on their way home from Anna's Lounge where they had spent part of the afternoon. Though the evidence developed in the course of pre-trial discovery was far from precise, it established that Davis had consumed several "beers" that afternoon. And in her deposition, Miss Kido described Davis as "feeling good" when they left the drinking establishment for Palolo Valley where they lived.

When Davis reached Palolo Valley, he drove first on Palolo Avenue and then on 10th Avenue. The accident occurred on a double-curved section of 10th Avenue near its mauka end. The sharp bends in the road there are marked by several road signs, including one indicating the presence of a curve and another advising a driving speed of 15 miles per hour even though the legal limit is 25 miles. Davis drove through the first curve without mishap. But he failed to negotiate the second safely, and the car slammed into a utility pole despite his efforts to brake it.

Taupo, the sole occupant of the ill-fated vehicle giving testimony of the accident at trial, estimated the car was travelling at a speed of 20 to 30 miles an hour prior to the crash. Davis, when questioned by a police officer on the night of the mishap, admitted he was travelling at 30 miles an hour before he applied the brakes. When the car hit the utility pole, Miss Kido was thrown against the windshield, suffering extensive head injuries that have disabled her.

The guardian of Miss Kido's property brought suit on her behalf against a host of identified and unidentified defendants; the defendants named in the pleading were the driver and his parents, the owners of the vehicle. The defendants who were subsequently identified were the manufacturer of the car, the owner of the pole that was struck, the owner of the drinking establishment where Miss Kido, Davis, and Taupo whiled away the afternoon before the untoward event, and the governmental body responsible for maintaining the road on which it happened.

But by the time the case proceeded to trial the number of defendants had been reduced by settlement or attrition. Among those remaining were Davis, whose whereabouts since the crash were a mystery, and the City. Davis, who had been served with notice of the suit by publication, was absent but represented by counsel. Counsel convinced the trial judge that the prejudicial effect of evidence of Davis' consumption of alcoholic beverages outweighed its probative value, and the jury heard nothing about the activities of the driver and his passengers during the afternoon of January 12, 1979. Thus, at trial the focus of the case was the alleged knowledge on the City's part that the winding road was unsafe and a failure to render it safe.

At the close of evidence the case was submitted to the jury on interrogatories propounded by the trial judge. The special verdict returned by the jury found the negligence of Davis and the City caused the accident, 99% of the negligence was attributable to Davis and 1% to the City, and the plaintiff suffered damages amounting to $725,000. A judgment holding Davis and the City jointly and severally liable for the damages, reduced by sums of $99,316 and $5,000 previously paid in settlement by Hawaiian Electric Company and Ford Motor Company, was entered.

II.

We begin our consideration of the appeal from the judgment and the cross-appeal by addressing the City's claim that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding from trial "testimony, whether live or by deposition, and all other evidence from any other source which would indicate that Defenda...