Kail v. Wolf Appliance, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | 15-CV-3513(JS)(GRB) |
| Parties | IVAN and MELANIE KAIL, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. WOLF APPLIANCE, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
For Plaintiffs:
Mark S. Reich, Esq.
Vincent Michael Serra, Esq.
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd, LLP
58 South Service Road, Suite 200
Melville, New York 11747
For Defendant:
Douglas Scott Heffer, Esq.
Yonaton Aronoff, Esq.
Anne Berkowitz Sekel, Esq.
Foley & Lardner LLP
90 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10016
Gordon Davenport, Esq.
Foley & Lardner LLP
150 East Gilman Street
Madison, Wisconsin 53703
Max B. Chester, Esq.
Foley & Lardner LLP
777 East Wisconsin Avenue
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
Defendant Wolf Appliances, Inc. manufactures high-end cooking appliances, including dual fuel ranges, which combine gas cooktop burners with electric ovens underneath. Plaintiffs Ivan and Melanie Kail have owned a Wolf range since 2006. For the last eight years, however, the Kails received at least ten replacement parts and units to address cosmetic issues with the interior of the oven: Whenever the couple used the self-cleaning function, the oven liner chipped and cracked. Under the two-year limited warranty, which came with the original unit and restarted with each replacement, Wolf covered all parts and labor for any part of the product. But Wolf alleges, and the Kails dispute, that in 2014, the parties agreed to modify the warranty to exclude any cosmetic-related damages. After the chipping continued, the Kails requested a new replacement. Under the terms of the allegedly modified warranty, Wolf declined, and so the Kails filed this proposed class action.
Wolf now asks for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 24.) For the following reasons, Wolf's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Court will begin with a general overview, amplifying the facts in the analysis to come.1 As with allsummary judgment motions, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties, and all inferences and ambiguities are drawn in their favor. Capobianco v. City of N.Y., 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005).
In the fall of 2006, the Kails acquired their first Wolf range as a gift from Ivan's employer. (Pls.' 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶¶ 2-3.) Melanie assumed the primary role in selecting the specific model.2 (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.) One deciding factor was the cobalt blue porcelain finish that coats the interior of the oven. (Ivan Tr. 50:3-9; Melanie Tr. 22:7-11; see also Nov. 2002 Press Release at 1.) As a signature aesthetic, Wolf says, the porcelain will "enhance the oven's interior, creating a bold cooking backdrop." (http://www.subzero-wolf.com/wolf/ranges/dual-fuel/36-inch-dual-fuel-range-4-burners-infrared-charbroiler (as last visited August 16, 2017).) Unfortunately, the porcelain cracked andchipped whenever the couple used the range's self-cleaning feature.3 (Melanie Tr. 137:14-24.)
Between 2006 and 2014, the Kails received at least three replacements units: (1) a paid upgrade in September 2009; (2) a free replacement in March 2012, and (3) a free replacement in the spring of 2014.4 (Stetson Decl. ¶ 4.) The Kails also received replacement liners in January 2007, May 2007, September 2008, July 2010, August 2010, and December 2012. (Id.) As this pattern emerged, Wolf offered a cosmetic allowance of $500 or a buyback of the unit, but with the exception of the 2009 upgrade, the Kails "always opted for exchanging or replacing the units." (Pls.' 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 40 (brackets and quotation marks omitted).)
Each replacement unit (as opposed to replacement parts) came with a new warranty. (Ltd. Warranty.)5 Under its full two-year warranty, Wolf "covers all parts and labor to repair or replace any part of the product that proves to bedefective in materials or workmanship" from the date the unit is installed. (Id.)
Two of the replacement units require particular attention. First, in late September 2009, the Kails paid $500 to upgrade their range from a 36-inch model to a 48-inch model. (Stetson Decl. ¶ 6.) Ivan has "a recollection of some sort of a dialogue" with an unidentified Wolf employee over the decision to upgrade. Without recalling the exact verbiage, Ivan paraphrased the conversation: "[T]hey don't believe that this issue we were having in the small unit would happen in a larger unit." (Ivan Tr. 151:14-152:13, 155:19-156:8.) The representative sent a letter memorializing this conversation, which required a countersignature "indicating [Ivan's] acceptance." (Aug. 2009 Ltr. at 1.)
Second, in the spring of 2014, the Kails received their most recent replacement. (Pls.' 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 43.) Matthew Heitmann, a Wolf customer service representative, advised the Kails that if they accepted the new replacement, its warranty would not cover any future porcelain damage. (Ivan Tr. 61:3-62:13, 163:19-23.) This was explained to Ivan via telephone and then memorialized in a follow-up letter dated March 14, 2014. Here is what that letter says, in pertinent part:
This letter is to confirm our conversation regarding a No Charge Replacement of your unit . . . . We appreciate your patience while we work to provide you with a brand new unit as quickly as possible. Please note that no further product exchanges will occur on this replacement unit due to porcelain issues. We will also not repair any porcelain crazing or chipping on the new product.
(Mar. 2014 Ltr. (emphasis in original).) In his deposition testimony, Ivan recalled the conversation and acknowledged that he received the letter. (Ivan Tr. 166:9-167:2.)
In any event, Stephanie Stetson, a Wolf Customer Service Manager, has explained that warranty modifications are apparently a rare occurrence at Wolf. It is unclear whether your standard customer service representative has the authority to modify warranties on behalf of Wolf. (Stetson Tr. 138:24-139:4.) At the very least, the Director of Customer Service, Steve Zimmerschied, would be involved in that process. (Id. 135:2-6.) Based on the present record, there is no indication that he was. (Id. 137:7-138:17.)
Nevertheless, the porcelain continued to chip, and in 2015, the Kails complained to Wolf, which declined to provide another replacement under the terms of the allegedly modified warranty. (Stetson Decl. ¶ 9.) The Kails continue to use their range but are unhappy with the cosmetic issues. (Pls.' 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 49.)
On June 16, 2015, the Kails filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves and other nationwide Wolf customers.6 In it, they assert claims against Wolf for: (1) breach of express and implied warranties under state law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA" or the "Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq.; (2) negligent misrepresentation; and (3) deceptive practices and false advertising under New York General Business Law, §§ 349, 350. (Compl., Docket Entry 1, ¶¶ 16-17.)
On October 17, 2016, Wolf moved for summary judgment. (Docket Entry 24.) Discovery was stayed between October 7, 2016 and May 17, 2017. (Minute Entry 23.)
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). "Material facts are those which 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' and a dispute is 'genuine' if 'the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Coppola v.Bear Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).
As a general matter, the range at issue is the Kails' 2014 replacement. (See Pls.' Br. at 24-25.) With that in mind, the Court will begin by analyzing the warranty-based claims: (1) breach of the written warranty, (2) breach of any express warranties created by affirmations of fact or promises, (3) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and (4) violation of the MMWA.
A "claim for breach of express warranty requires proof that an express warranty existed, was breached, and that plaintiff had relied on that warranty." Reed v. Pfizer, 839 F. Supp. 2d 571, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). "Under New York law, a seller may extend or exclude express and/or implied warranties." Jackson v. Eddy's LI RV Ctr., Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 523, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Wolf's standard warranty "covers all parts and labor to repair or replace any part of the product that proves to be defective in materials or workmanship." (Ltd. Warranty at 1.) But Ivan, Wolf says, accepted a modified warranty that excluded any porcelain issues. (Def.'s Reply Br. at 8.)
To begin, the Kails frame some of their arguments in terms of preexisting legal obligations and improper contractual modifications. (Pls.' Br. at 11-13.) Those arguments confuse the issue, however, because each free-of-charge replacement, including the 2014 unit, came with a new warranty. In other words, a new warranty means a new contract.7
Shifting back to Wolf's argument, it is true that Ivan spoke with Matthew Heitmann and acknowledged a letter memorializing their conversation. (Ivan Tr. 61:3-62:13, 163:19-23, 166:9-167:2.) But whether Heitmannn had the authority to modify Wolf's standard warranty is an issue of fact, as demonstrated by the following colloquy with a Wolf Customer Service Manager:
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