Kalb v. State
Decision Date | 11 March 1943 |
Docket Number | No. 14406.,14406. |
Citation | 25 S.E.2d 24 |
Parties | KALB. v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The judge, after charging the rule as to the degree of mental conviction required where establishment of the defendant's guilt depends solely upon circumstantial evidence, did not err in stating further that "the term 'hypothesis' as used in that connection means such reasonable inferences or such reasonable deductions as an ordinarily prudent man would make in the light of his every day experience or in the light of his knowledge of human conduct and human behavior."
2. Acquiescence or silence, when the circumstances require an answer or denial or other conduct, may amount to an admission. When a statement tending to incriminate a person is made in his presence and he remains silent, the mere fact that he is under arrest or is in custody at thetime will not render evidence of such statement and silence inadmissible as an implied admission, or make it improper to instruct the jury in reference to such evidence.
3. The charge on flight was not unwarranted by the evidence, or otherwise erroneous as insisted.
4. The preliminary evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie foundation for admission of the testimony as to statements made by the deceased and offered by the State as dying declarations, and the statements shown to have been made were not inadmissible for any reason urged. The mere fact that the declarant lived for about three and a half months after making them was not controlling upon the admissibility of such statements.
5. The charge on the subject of dying declarations was not subject to exception on the ground that it contained an expression of opinion by the trial judge, and was not otherwise erroneous as contended. While the lapse of a long period of time between the making of the declaration and the event of death may within itself constitute some evidence that the declarant had not despaired of recovery, it is nevertheless true, as was seated in the charge, that the actual period of survival after making the declaration is not controlling. If further instructions were desired, they should have been requested.
6. The charge to the effect that if there was a conspiracy between the defendant and another person to rob the deceased, and if during the commission of a robbery any person acting with the defendant in furtherance of such conspiracy killed the deceased, it would be murder, even though there was no original plan or agreement to kill, was a substantially correct statement of law, and was not erroneous as unwarranted by the evidence, or upon the ground that a conspiracy to rob is not a conspiracy to murder.
7. The charge on the right of the jury to recommend the defendant to the mercy of the court if they should find him guilty of murder was not, in any view as to its correctness, harmful to the defendant, since the jury did find him guilty, with such recommendation in their verdict.
8. Under the evidence and the defendant's statement, the charge as to the forms of verdict that the jury would be authorized to return did not contain an expres sion of opinion by the trial judge, and was not otherwise erroneous, as insisted.
9. The complaint that certain testimony was elicited by the trial judge and allowed to remain before the jury does not show error, it not appearing that there was any objection to the testimony or that any ruling or other action was invoked. Nor is there any merit in the contention as to expression of opinion by the trial judge in his interrogation of the witness.
10. The evidence authorized the verdict, and the court did not err in refusing a new trial.
Error from Superior Court, Hall County; T. S. Candler, Judge.
Jesse Kalb was convicted of murder, with recommendation of mercy, and he brings error.
Affirmed.
Joseph G. Collins and Hammond Johnson, both of Gainesville, for plaintiff in error.
G. Fred Kelley, Sol. Gen., of Gainesville, Ellis G. Arnall, Atty. Gen., and A. J. Hartley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
Jesse Kalb and Thomas Emmett were jointly indicted for the offense of murder, and on separate trials were convicted of the offense charged. In the case of Emmett the verdict contained no recommendation. On the trial of Kalb the jury recommended mercy. Each defendant moved for a new trial, which the court refused, and the defendant excepted. In the order of their appearance, we have dealt first with the writ of error as brought by Emmett, and we now have for determination the case of Kalb.
While the exceptions were different in most instances, some questions were common to both, and we have studied the cases together, both as to the law and the facts.
The statement made in the Emmett case will illustrate in a general way the nature of both cases so far as the State's contentions were concerned, and will render unnecessary any extended statement in the instant case. See Emmett v. State, Ga. Sup., 25 S.E.2d 9.
The defense made by Kalb, however, was entirely different from that asserted by Emmett, in that he conceded that an unlawful assault was made upon McConnell, and that he himself had a part in it, insisting, however, that in all that he did he was acting under duress exerted by Emmett.
In his statement on the trial he explained how he happened to be traveling with Emmett, and told of their arrival and stay at McConnell's place. He stated that they purchased a pint of whisky from McConnell, and that he later gave them a pint, and that they sat around, drank, and talked. Concerning other matters, including the actual assault, he stated:
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Thomas v. State
...149 Ga. 209(6), 99 S.E. 614; Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814(2), 152 S.E. 76; Cobb v. State, 185 Ga. 462(2), 195 S.E. 758; Kalb v. State, 195 Ga. 544, 25 S.E.2d 24." Wilson v. State, 229 Ga. 224, 224-225, 190 S.E.2d 78, 79 (1972). See also Ezzard v. State, 229 Ga. 465, 192 S.E.2d 374 So teste......