Kamar Intern., Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co.
Decision Date | 28 September 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 79-3666,79-3666 |
Parties | , 1981 Copr.L.Dec. P 25,309 KAMAR INTERNATIONAL, INC., a corporation, and Kamar, Inc., a corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. RUSS BERRIE AND CO., a corporation Sol Levy, an individual, and Russ Berrie and Co. West, Inc., a corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Joseph R. Evanns, Herzig & Walsh, Inc., Beverly Hills, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael A. Painter, Cooper, Epstein & Hurewitz, Beverly Hills, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Before GOODWIN and SKOPIL, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON, * District Judge.
Kamar, Inc. appeals from a judgment of the district court finding Kamar's purported copyrights of stuffed toy animals invalid and not infringed and finding no unfair competition or Lanham Act violation.
Both Kamar, Inc. and Russ Berrie, Co. sell stuffed toy animals. Kamar's toys are copyrighted as "soft sculptures" and are manufactured by Korean subcontractors. The subcontractors take Kamar's designs and make stuffed animals from them, affixing Kamar's copyright notice and distinctive logo to each completed toy.
Berrie's stuffed animals are also copyrighted, but Berrie purchases them directly from Korean manufacturers. Three of Berrie's Korean manufacturers, (Young Il Inc., Suck Kyung, and Won Jeung), were previously employed by Kamar to manufacture Kamar's stuffed animals.
This court has said that the prerequisites for copyright registration are minimal:
Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
Berrie contends that because stuffed toy animals are widely available to manufacturers like himself, and that because Kamar's concepts of toy animals were taken from the public domain, Kamar's stuffed animals are not copyrightable. The district judge agreed and adopted Berrie's proposed findings to that effect.
In order to support its finding that the animals were not copyrightable, the court would have had to find that Kamar's stuffed animals lack originality. See id. Nowhere, however, is the word originality used by either Berrie or the trial court. There are no factual findings denying that Kamar's toys are original. The question does not appear to have been addressed by the district court. This omission seems unusual in view of the truism that originality is the sine qua non of copyrightability. All we have are two factual findings by the court; one of which says that (presumably all) stuffed animals are in the public domain. The other says that Kamar's toys were taken from the public domain.
Such findings do not establish lack of originality:
"(T)he mere fact that plaintiff used a matter in the public domain does not in and of itself preclude a finding of originality, since plaintiff may have added unique features to the matter so as to render it copyrightable ...." R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., Inc., 444 F.Supp. 1080, 1083-84 (E.D.N.Y.1978).
See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857, 97 S.Ct. 156, 50 L.Ed.2d 135 (1976) ( ). Therefore, without a valid finding of lack of originality, the trial court could not conclude that Kamar's "soft sculptures" were not copyrightable because Kamar's concept of toy animals was taken from the public domain.
Berrie makes the novel contention that realistic depictions of live animals are not copyrightable. The district court agreed and instructed Berrie to prepare findings to that effect. These findings are actually conclusions of law, and they are erroneous.
We find no authority for Berrie's proposition. Anyone can copyright anything, if he adds something original to its expression. 1 Nimmer on Copyright, Chpt. 2 (1981). The cases cited by Berrie and the court below to the contrary, are not in point. Indeed, the very contention urged has been expressly rejected. "The mere fact that ... (a stuffed toy chimp is) based on a live model does not deprive (him) ... of the necessary amount of originality." Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955); see also, Dollcraft Industries, Ltd. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg., 479 F.Supp. 1105 (E.D.N.Y.1978) ( ); R. Dakin & Co. v. A & L Novelty Co., Inc., supra ( ). Kamar's copyright cannot be invalidated on this ground.
Neither can the copyright be invalidated for lack of proper notice. Berrie argues that because pictures of the copyrighted animals appeared in catalogues that did not contain a copyright notice, the animals were thrust into the public domain. He cites as authority 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1909 Copyright Act). 1 Section 10 requires that a notice of copyright be affixed "to each copy (of the work) thereof published or offered for sale in the United States by the authority of the copyright proprietor...." The argument misses the point of § 10.
Kamar's catalogue pictures of its wares are not "copies" of the work within the meaning of § 10. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, ... White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17, 28 S.Ct. 319, 323, 52 L.Ed. 655 (1908) ( ) See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.03(B) at 2-29 (1981).
In this case, the catalogue pictures are not copies of what was copyrightable in Kamar's work. That which was original, and copyrightable was the special texture and design of the stuffed animals. Photographs of the soft sculptures do not give viewers the idea created by the original; nor are the pictures the tangible things, the reproduction of which it is the purpose of the statute to protect. Distributing uncopyrighted pictures of the toys does not, therefore, invalidate Kamar's copyright. Berrie's point on this issue is not well taken. Cf. 1 Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.18(H)(2) at 2-211 (1981) ( ).
Infringement is established by copying. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977). Because, however, the act of copying is rarely witnessed, copying is ordinarily established indirectly. The plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant had access to the copyrighted items, and that the defendant's product is substantially similar to plaintiffs' work. Once this is done, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove his work was not copied, but independently created. See generally, 3 Nimmer on Copyright, Chpt. 13 (1981).
Berrie contends he had no access to Kamar's work, and that his stuffed animals are not substantially similar to Kamar's toy animals. Thus, he argues, even if Kamar's copyrights are valid, he has not infringed them. The district court agreed. The court misconceived the effect of the evidence.
In one finding, the court "found" that Berrie had no access to any of Kamar's stuffed toys. Yet in Finding 17, the court found that Berrie did business with the same Korean stuffed animal manufacturers employed by Kamar to make Kamar's stuffed animals. Under the cases, this evidence alone demonstrates access. Proof of access requires only "an opportunity to view or to copy plaintiff's work." Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., supra, at 1172. And "evidence that a third party with whom both the plaintiff and defendant were dealing had possession of plaintiff's work is sufficient to establish access by the defendant...." 3 Nimmer on Copyright, § 13.02(A) at 13-11 (1981), citing DeAcosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862, 65 S.Ct. 1197, 89 L.Ed. 1983 (1945). The court was, therefore, in error in failing to shift to Berrie the burden of proof.
The court failed to find similarity between Berrie and Kamar's stuffed toy animals. The court used too strict a test. The test in this circuit for substantial similarity is the two-part test propounded in Sid & Marty Krofft Television, supra, at 1163-64. Professor Nimmer explains it correctly as follows:
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