Kandelin v. City of Ely
Decision Date | 28 January 1910 |
Docket Number | 16,410 - (212) |
Citation | 124 N.W. 449,110 Minn. 55 |
Parties | HERMAN KANDELIN v. CITY OF ELY |
Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for St. Louis county to recover $25,600 for personal injuries and special damages. The case was tried before Hughes, J., and a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $4,000. From an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, it appealed. Affirmed.
Personal Injury -- Notice to City -- Departure.
Notice of personal injuries from a defective sidewalk, given under the provisions of section 768, R.L. 1905, held sufficiently to state the place and nature of the defect, and that there was no substantial departure therefrom in the complaint. Olcott v. City of St. Paul, 91 Minn. 207 distinguished.
A. J Thomas and W. G. Bonham, for appellant.
John R. Heino and Theo. Hollister, for respondent.
Action to recover for injuries received bye plaintiff while passing along one of the sidewalks in the city of Ely. Plaintiff had a verdict, and defendant appealed from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The only question presented by the assignments of error is the sufficiency of the notice given the city of the time and place of plaintiff's injury, as required by section 768, R.L. 1905. That statute provides that every person who claims damages from any city, village, or borough, for loss or injury from a defect in a street, road, or other public place, shall cause to be presented to its council, or other governing body, within thirty days after the injury or loss, a written notice stating the time, place, and circumstances thereof, and the amount of compensation demanded. It further provides that no action for such injuries shall be brought until a notice is given as therein required.
Two notices were given by plaintiff in the case at bar, and within the time allowed by the statute, only one of which need be referred to. The second notice was a mere enlargement of the first one, stating with greater particularity the nature of the injuries received, and, so far as pertinent to the question presented, was identical with the first one. That notice was as follows:
The complaint...
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