Sean O'Kane AIA Architect, P.C. v. Puljic

• Decision Date: 28 November 2012
• Docket Number: FSTCV106005729S.
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: SEAN O'KANE AIA ARCHITECT, P.C. v. Goran PULJIC et al.

SEAN O'KANE AIA ARCHITECT, P.C. v. Goran PULJIC et al.

No. FSTCV106005729S.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk.

November 28, 2012

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Alan Spirer, Westport, for Sean O'kane Aia Architect, P.C.

KEVIN TIERNEY, Judge Trial Referee.

This court, based on the parties' stipulation, has bifurcated the trial. The only issues before this court are the viability of the Special Defenses of the statute of limitations and laches.

The operative complaint is the Amended Complaint dated October 5 2011 (# 109.00). It is in two counts; breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff is seeking money damages for architectural services provided by the plaintiff for construction and restoration of the defendant's home in Darien, Connecticut. Both parties are named as defendants in each of the two counts. The amount of unpaid architectural services claimed is $92, 201.35. To this Amended Complaint the defendants filed an Amended Answer, Special Defenses, Set off and Counterclaim dated April 20, 2012 (# 133.00). The Second Special Defense addressed to the breach of contract count states: " The right of action for the cause stated in the First Count of the Second Amended Complaint did not accrue within six years next before the commencement of this action. This action is therefore barred under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-576." The Third Special Defense addressed to the unjust enrichment count states: " The right of action for the cause stated in the Second Count of the Second Amended Complaint did not accrue within six years next before the commencement of this action. This action is therefore barred under Connecticut General Statutes § 52-276." The Fourth Special Defense to the unjust enrichment count states: " The doctrine of laches precludes Plaintiff from recovering upon the cause of action stated in the Second Count of the Second Amended Complaint." To the two Special Defenses alleging the statute of limitations, Gen.Stat. § 52-576, the plaintiff filed a Matter in Avoidance of Special Defense dated January 19, 2012 (# 117.00). That Matter in Avoidance stated: " 1. As alleged by the Defendants and admitted by the Plaintiff in Defendants' Counterclaim ‘ Plaintiff and Defendants were aware that the potential existed for each of them to bring claims against the other related to the project.’ 2. As alleged by the Defendants and admitted by the Plaintiff in Defendants' Counterclaim ‘ Plaintiff and Defendants agreed that they would not bring claims against one another related to the project until the litigation between the Defendants and their contractor was resolved.’ 3. Upon information and belief, the litigation between the Defendants and their contractor was not resolved until sometime in 1995. 4. Accordingly, the commencement of any period of limitations as alleged by the Defendants has been tolled." This Matter in Avoidance only addressed the two Special Defenses of statute of limitations. The court assumes that the plaintiff meant 2005 in paragraph 3. The court will disregard this typographical error. The court will refer to this agreement pled in avoidance as a stand still agreement.

In addition to the above three Special Defenses, the defendants filed other Special Defenses, a set-off, and a two-count counterclaim. The plaintiff filed Special Defenses and setoffs to those counterclaims. The pleadings were closed on February 28, 2012 (# 126.00).

At the beginning of the trial, the parties submitted a written Stipulation Re Adjudication dated May 1, 2012 (# 142.00). " WHEREAS, the Defendants have asserted special defenses based on the statute of limitations (First Count) and the doctrine of laches (Second Count) (hereinafter ‘ the Special Defenses'), in addition to other special defenses that are unrelated to the issues to be adjudicated." " WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to bifurcate the trial to enable an adjudication of the facts and issues relating to the Special Defenses before an adjudication of the other facts and issues in the case." The parties stipulated that the trial may be bifurcated for the purposes of adjudicating the facts and issues relating to the above mentioned three Special Defenses before any adjudication of other facts and issues. Further terms and conditions were set forth in the Stipulation, which depended upon this court's decision as to the above three Special Defenses.

" No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section." Gen.Stat. § 52-576(a). Both parties agree that the contract is in writing, is an executed contract, and that Gen.Stat. § 52-576(a) is the appropriate statute of limitations that could apply to this lawsuit. " The Defendants contend that the statute of limitations began to run when the Plaintiff rendered Invoice No. 23 in February 2003. However the Plaintiff's responsibilities and services pursuant to the Agreement and the Construction Contract continued well into 2005." Plaintiff's Post-Trial Brief, # 144.00 page 10.

" Laches occurs when neglect or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to an adverse party so as to operate as a bar to relief in equity ... Laches consists of two elements. First, there must have been a delay that was inexcusable, and, second, that delay must have prejudiced the defendant ... The mere lapse of time does not constitute laches." Traggis v. Shawmut Bank of Connecticut N.A., 72 Conn.App. 251, 262, 805 A.2d 105 (2002). " Laches is purely an equitable doctrine, is largely governed by the circumstances, and is not to be imputed to one who has brought an action at law within the statutory period." State v. Lombardo Brothers Mason Contractors, Inc., 302 Conn. 412-17, fn. 3 (2012); A. Sangivanni & Sons v. F.M. Floryan & Co., 158 Conn. 467-74, 262 A.2d 159 (1969). The plaintiff is seeking to recover in the Second Count on unjust enrichment. Since unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine, the equitable defense of laches is an appropriate equitable defense. Crown Linen Service, Inc. v. Apple East of Danbury, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV 07-5011649 (April 15, 2008, Rittenband, J.T.R.).

The First Count alleges breach of contract, which is an action at law. A breach of contract is not an equitable action and the court therefore is not at liberty to weigh the equities in an action at law for breach of contract. Laches is not an appropriate defense to breach of contract and it has not been raised as a special defense to the First Count for breach of contract. Florian v. Lenge, 91 Conn.App. 268 282-83, 880 A.2d 985 (2005); Seramonte Associates v. Smith, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Housing Session, Docket No. CVNH 9706-8247 (January 21, 2008, Levin, J.); Delfini v. Clark, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV 06-5001367 S (February 5, 2010, Burke, J.).

There is a split of authority among the Superior Court judges as to whether or not the statute of limitations, Gen.Stat. § 52-576, is applicable to the equitable claim of unjust enrichment. " Unjust enrichment and quantum merit claims are most analogous to contract claims and are subject to the six-year statute of limitations as well." Bourbeau v. Alph Q, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, at Hartford, Complex Litigation Docket No. X03 CV 05-4015076 (May 20, 2008, Langenbach, J.); Generation Partners, LP v. Mandell, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. FST CV 09-5010537 S (July 22, 2011, Jennings, J.T.R.). " There is no Connecticut appellate authority that squarely addresses which is the appropriate statute of limitations" for claims of unjust enrichment. Corbett v. Petrillo, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket Number CV 06-5005440 S (February 29, 2008, Skolnick, J .T.R.).

This court believes that the better analysis is to treat breach of contract cases as subject to the statute of limitations, Gen.Stat. § 52-576, and treat the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment as being subject only to the time limitations of laches. " In an equitable proceeding, a court may provide a remedy even though the governing statute of limitations has expired, just as it has discretion to dismiss for laches an action initiated within the period of the statute." Rossman v. Morasco, 115 Conn.App. 234, 256, 974 A.2d 1 (2009); Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 326-27, 528 A.2d 1123 (1987).

Any issue as to whether the proper plaintiff is Sean O'Kane individually, Sean O'Kane Architect AIA or Sean O'Kane, AIA Architect, PC is not relevant to either the statute of limitations or laches defenses, which are the only two issues before this court in the bifurcated proceeding.

The court finds the following facts and legal conclusions.

The plaintiff and the defendant, Melinda Puljic, executed a contract dated November 11, 2000 for the architectural services. Ex. 1, Ex. 19, Admission 1. and 2. The contract was addressed to both defendants, " Mr. & Mrs. G Puljic." Both defendants were the owners of the Darien house on which the addition, restoration and alteration work was to be performed. Both defendants paid the plaintiff for earlier architectural services. The contract required the plaintiff to provide the following services for the " PROJECT": " Proposed architectural design, construction drawings and consultation for proposed additions and alterations to the existing Puljic residence located at 8 Searles Road in Darien, Connecticut." The...