Kane v. City Council of City of Cedar Rapids

Decision Date20 September 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-932,94-932
Citation537 N.W.2d 718
PartiesAlan KANE, Charles Edwards, Lora Lea Edwards, Mark Hanrahan, and Ann Dorr, Appellants, Charles Schillig, Robert Schillig, and Gary Schillig, Plaintiffs, v. The CITY COUNCIL OF the CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, Larry Serbousek, Wayne Murdock, Lyle Hanson, J.D. Smith, and David Kramer, in Their Official Capacities as Members of the City Council of the City of Cedar Rapids, and the Board of Adjustment of the City of Cedar Rapids, James Sattler, David McManus, Joan Koontz, and Michael Flynn, in Their Official Capacities as Members of the Board of Adjustment for the City of Cedar Rapids, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Deborah J. Hughes and Alfred E. Willett of Irvine & Robbins, Cedar Rapids, for appellants.

Mohammad H. Sheronick, City Attorney, Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

ANDREASEN, Justice.

This is an action by surrounding property owners challenging the approval by the Cedar Rapids City Council (council) of a revised site development plan for a condominium project. They claim that approval of the plan did not receive the statutory required three-fourth majority vote of the council and that the approval constituted illegal spot zoning. The surrounding property owners appeal from the district court ruling upholding the council's action and the validity of challenged municipal code provisions. We affirm.

I. Background.

At the request of a developer, Robert Yaw, a property known as 2025-2035 First Avenue S.E. was rezoned by city ordinance in 1979 from an R-1, single-family residence district, to an R-6, multiple-family residence district. The rezoned property was surrounded by residential homes and the Brucemore historic site. A site development plan was also approved which permitted the construction of a condominium with access on First Avenue. The Yaw condominium project was not constructed.

In 1987 a church sought approval of a site development plan on the premises which would permit construction of a church building. By resolution the council repealed the Yaw condominium site plan and approved the church revised site development plan. The church project was not constructed.

On August 20, 1992, Leo Peiffer, an architect, submitted a revised site development plan which would permit the construction of twin six-story condominium towers on the premises. The plan also included the development of an access road over an adjacent residential lot with access on Cottage Grove Avenue. This R-1 lot was purchased shortly before Peiffer submitted the revised site development plan. A condominium was located across the street from the Peiffer project and the area across First Avenue and Cottage Grove Avenue S.E. was zoned R-5.

The council referred the request to the city planning commission. At the city planning meeting interested persons were heard. Objections and concerns were expressed by letter and by those in attendance. The commission also received memorandum and recommendations from the city engineer, the fire department, and the city traffic engineer. The city planning commission recommended the council approve the proposed site plan, with access on Cottage Grove Avenue, subject to securing a legal opinion which concurred with the building department's interpretation that an R-1 lot can be used as access to an R-6 lot. After the recommendation was submitted, the city attorney filed with the council an opinion agreeing with the department's interpretation.

The council set consideration of the Peiffer revised site development plan for public hearing. At the hearing the council received a written protest to the Peiffer plan signed by over fifty residents. Later, the council imposed additional conditions upon the developer relating to the access driveway. The city traffic engineer continued to express his preference that the condominium development access on Cottage Grove Avenue rather than First Avenue.

On October 21 the council approved by resolution the Peiffer revised site development plan by a vote of three to two. The surrounding property owners appealed to the city board of adjustment claiming the board had jurisdiction to hear appeals of an administrative decision. The appeal was dismissed by the board of adjustment. The surrounding owners then challenged the council's action by filing a petition for writ of certiorari and for declaratory judgment in district court.

The case was tried to the court. The court entered a declaratory judgment that the city had complied with all procedural requirements in approving the Peiffer revised site development plan and that the city zoning ordinance provision allowing the use of a residential district lot for vehicle access to another residentially zoned lot was valid facially and as applied.

Five surrounding homeowners appealed the court's judgment. On appeal they urge (1) the council is required to have four votes to approve by ordinance the Peiffer revised site development plan under Iowa Code section 414.5 (1991), (2) the approval of the site plan that incorporated the R-1 lot constitutes impermissible de facto spot zoning, and (3) the zoning ordinance provision allowing an R-6 lot to access over an R-1 lot is invalid on its face and as applied in that it permits spot zoning.

II. Scope of Review.

This combined certiorari-declaratory judgment action was filed as a law action. However, the parties do not dispute the case was tried in equity. Our review is de novo. Iowa R.App.P. 4; Ernst v. Johnson County, 522 N.W.2d 599, 602 (Iowa 1994).

III. Super Majority Vote Requirement.

The governing body of a city, the council, may amend its zoning ordinances at any time it deems circumstances justify such action, and such an amendment is valid if statutory procedural requirements are followed, and the amendment is not unreasonable or capricious, nor inconsistent with the spirit of the zoning statute. Keller v. City of Council Bluffs, 246 Iowa 202, 207-08, 66 N.W.2d 113, 116-17 (1954). There is a strong presumption of legality when reviewing city zoning ordinances, and if the validity of the classification for zoning purposes is fairly debatable, the council's judgment must be allowed to control. Brackett v. City of Des Moines, 246 Iowa 249, 260, 67 N.W.2d 542, 547 (1954). An amendment to a city zoning ordinance requires the new ordinance be in accordance with the city's comprehensive plan, that it be considered after notice at a public hearing, and that the ordinance be read on three different days. Iowa Code §§ 380.3, 414.3, .4. The reclassification of the Yaw property in 1979 from single-family to multiple-family residence district was accomplished by the adoption of an ordinance. The validity of this reclassification is not challenged.

The surrounding property owners make two procedural challenges to the council's action. They urge approval of a revised site development plan requires both the favorable vote of at least three-fourths of all council members and the approval be accomplished by adoption of an ordinance, not merely a resolution.

At the time of the reclassification of the property Iowa law provided:

Such regulations, restrictions, and boundaries may, from time to time, be amended, supplemented, changed, modified, or repealed. In case, however, of a protest against such change signed by the owners of twenty percent or more either of the area of the lots included in such proposed change, or of those immediately adjacent in the rear thereof extending the depth of one lot or not to exceed two hundred feet therefrom, or of those directly opposite thereto, extending the depth of one lot or not to exceed two hundred feet from the street frontage of such opposite lots, such amendment shall not become effective except by the favorable vote of at least three-fourths of all the members of the council.

Iowa Code § 414.5 (1979).

In 1984 the provisions of section 414.5 were amended to clarify the eligibility of property owners to protest and to require that the written protest be filed with the city clerk. 1984 Iowa Acts ch. 1176, § 1. The statute was further amended in 1985. Added to the statute, as the second and third sentence, was the following:

Notwithstanding section 414.2, as a part of an ordinance changing land from one zoning district to another zoning district or an ordinance approving a site development plan, a council may impose conditions on a property owner which are in addition to existing regulations if the additional conditions have been agreed to in writing by the property owner before the public hearing required under this section or any adjournment of the...

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8 cases
  • Perkins v. Bd. of Supervisors
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 15 Noviembre 2001
    ...We start this discussion with the strong presumption of the validity of the ordinance and amendments thereto. Kane v. City Council of Cedar Rapids, 537 N.W.2d 718, 724 (Iowa 1995) (citing Neuzil v. City of Iowa City, 451 N.W.2d 159, 163 (Iowa 1990)). If the reasonableness of the amendment i......
  • ELY JR. v. CITY COUNCIL Of The City Of AMES
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • 30 Junio 2010
    ...and there are reasonable grounds to treat the subject property differently, the spot zoning is valid. Kane v. City Council of the City of Cedar Rapids, 537 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Iowa 1995). We determine whether a reasonable basis exists for the spot zoning by considering factors such as the size......
  • Schrank v. PENNINGTON COUNTY BD. OF COM'RS
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 10 Mayo 2000
    ...island of property with restrictions on its use different from those imposed on the surrounding property." Kane v. City Council of Cedar Rapids, 537 N.W.2d 718, 723 (Iowa 1995). The amendment to the zoning ordinance applies in every HS district in Pennington County and as such cannot be ter......
  • Weinhold v. Wolff
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 23 Octubre 1996
    ...the parties agreed to try the case in equity, however, our review is not at law but de novo. See Iowa R.App.P. 4; Kane v. City Council, 537 N.W.2d 718, 721 (Iowa 1995). We give weight to the district court's findings of fact, but we are not bound by them. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(7). Even so, we......
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