Kane v. Locke

• Decision Date: 10 December 1943
• Docket Number: No. 33504.,33504.
• Citation: 12 N.W.2d 495,216 Minn. 170
• Parties: KANE v. LOCKE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

12 N.W.2d 495

216 Minn. 170

KANE v. LOCKE.

No. 33504.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

December 10, 1943.

Rehearing Denied January 20, 1944.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Lars O. Rue, Judge.

Action by Genevieve Kane against Cassius M. Locke for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. From an order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Robert Cowling and Seth Lundquist, both of Minneapolis, for appellant.

Freeman, King & Geer, of Minneapolis, for respondent.

YOUNGDAHL, Justice.

This appeal is from the order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial in an action for the recovery of damages for personal injuries sustained as the result of a collision between plaintiff's and defendant's automobiles.

The accident occurred on the morning of October 10, 1941, in Minneapolis at the intersection of Spruce Place, which runs in a general northerly and southerly direction, and West Grant street, which runs in a general easterly and westerly direction, and crosses Spruce Place at right angles. Both streets are approximately 35 feet wide. The area immediately surrounding the intersection is in close proximity to the downtown district, and congested. At the time of the collision, automobiles were parked along both streets close to the intersection. Four large buildings, flush with the sidewalk, created another obstruction, thus making it difficult for drivers to observe approaching cross traffic. On the day of the accident the weather was clear and the streets dry. Plaintiff was riding in her automobile, which was driven by her husband, in a northerly direction on Spruce Place. Defendant was traveling west on West Grant street, approaching the intersection from plaintiff's right. The testimony is conflicting as to which party entered the intersection first, and the relative traveling speed of the parties is placed at from 15 to 25 miles per hour for the plaintiff, and from 3 or 4 miles to 15 for the defendant. When the collision occurred both cars appear to have stopped suddenly. Plaintiff's car skidded slightly to the left with the rear portion resting beyond the center of the intersection and the front wheels beyond the northerly curb line of Spruce Place. Defendant's bumper collided with the right rear fender and wheel of plaintiff's car. It is undisputed that there was some damage to the fender, running board, and door of plaintiff's car. The extent of the damage was in dispute. The testimony is conflicting regarding the damage, if any, to defendant's car. Plaintiff claims that there was damage to the grill and the radiator, which was leaking profusely after the collision. Defendant denies any substantial damage to his car. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of the accident caused by defendant's negligence she sustained certain personal injuries. Defendant denies any negligence on his part and contends that plaintiff's injuries, if any, were contributed to by her own negligence. The case was submitted on these issues to the jury, which returned a general verdict for defendant. From the order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial, this appeal followed.

Three attorneys have appeared in this case in behalf of plaintiff. The firm of Carlson & Carlsen tried the action. Mr. Seth Lundquist was substituted subsequent to the trial. He appeared in the motion for a new trial and wrote appellant's brief. A few days before the oral argument in this court, plaintiff terminated the services of Mr. Lundquist and employed Mr. Robert Cowling to represent her on the oral argument. Upon the argument, Mr. Cowling specifically withdrew from the consideration of this court all the assignments of error except those which relate to: (1) The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict; and (2) the propriety of the court's order denying a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. We therefore confine our discussion to these two questions.

Plaintiff asserts that the physical facts demonstrate beyond question that her automobile reached the intersection first and that she had the right to proceed ahead of defendant. Therefore, it is her position that the verdict for defendant is not reasonably sustained by the evidence and that she is entitled to a new trial. With this view we are not in accord. The only disinterested witness who saw the collision testified that defendant entered the intersection first. True, it was undisputed that the front portion of defendant's automobile struck the right rear wheel and fender of plaintiff's car after plaintiff had crossed the center line of West Grant street. Plaintiff urges that the testimony, considered in the light most favorable to defendant, indicates that he was traveling approximately five miles an hour when he reached the intersection and that plaintiff was traveling 25 miles an hour. She makes much of the point that with the automobiles operating at these speeds the collision could not possibly have occurred where it did. This argument places too much reliance upon mathematical nicety and fails to consider the fact that the testimony of the witnesses as to distances and speed is based on estimates and their impressions as to what they observed at the time. Such testimony cannot be held to the exactness relied upon...