Kaneohe Bay Cruises, Inc. v. Hirata

• Decision Date: 24 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 15865,15865
• Citation: 75 Haw. 250,861 P.2d 1
• Parties: KANEOHE BAY CRUISES, INC., a Hawaii corporation, Seig Schuster, and Yoshimasa Yamaguchi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Edward Y. HIRATA, individually and in his capacity as Director of the State Department of Transportation, and David E. Parsons, individually and in his capacity as the State Boating Manager of the State Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1

861 P.2d 1

75 Haw. 250

KANEOHE BAY CRUISES, INC., a Hawaii corporation, Seig Schuster, and Yoshimasa Yamaguchi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Edward Y. HIRATA, individually and in his capacity as Director of the State Department of Transportation, and David E. Parsons, individually and in his capacity as the State Boating Manager of the State Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15865.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Sept. 24, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

1. On appeal, an award of summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard applied by the trial courts. Under HRCP Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper where the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. HRCP 59(e) motions for reconsideration are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.

3. The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.

4. When the classification attacked is for regulatory purposes, the burden is upon the litigant to show that it is arbitrary and capricious and that it bears no reasonable relation to the object of legislation. The general law is that regulatory classifications are presumed valid and constitutional and are to be upheld unless no reasonable state of facts is conceivable to support them.

5. Under the rational basis test, the court essentially asks whether a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. In making this inquiry, a court will not look for empirical data in support of the statute. It will only seek to determine whether any reasonable justification can be conceived to uphold the legislative enactment.

6. Once it is determined that the legislature passed the statute at issue to further a legitimate government purpose, then the pertinent inquiry is only whether the legislature rationally could have believed that the classification would promote its objective. The lawmakers are under no obligation to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative judgments. Rather, those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decision maker.

7. Once it is determined that the statute's purpose is legitimate, the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Equal protection does not mean government must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.

8. Standing is that aspect of justiciability focusing on the party seeking a forum rather than on the issues he wants adjudicated. And the crucial inquiry in its determination is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant the plaintiff's invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his or her behalf. One who challenges the constitutional validity of a statute must show that as applied to him or her the statute is invalid. Constitutional rights may not be vicariously asserted.

9. There is no unerring test to determine when state law is without effect by reason of federal preemption. A federal purpose to displace state law could be evidenced in one of several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute. A state statute is void to the extent it conflicts with a federal statute--if, for example, compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.

10. The circuit court does not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for reconsideration if the arguments and evidence supporting the motion could and should have been produced in opposition to the other party's motion for summary judgment.

Clayton C. Ikei, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Dawn N.S. Chang, Johnson H. Wong, Deputies Atty. Gen., on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendants-appellees.

Before MOON, C.J., LEVINSON and RAMIL, JJ., and JAMES S. BURNS, Intermediate Court of Appeals Chief Judge in Place of Klein, J., Recused, and Nakatani, Circuit Judge, Assigned by Reason of Vacancy.

MOON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiffs-appellants Kaneohe Bay Cruises, Inc., Seig Schuster, President of Kaneohe Bay Cruises, and Yoshimasa Yamaguchi, a tour agent, (collectively, K-Bay) filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in circuit court, seeking to invalidate certain provisions of Act 313, passed by the 1990 Legislature, which bans the commercial operation of thrill craft and other commercial waterborne activities in Kaneohe and Maunalua Bays on weekends and on state and federal holidays. Kaneohe Bay Cruises operates a tour boat and water sports business which includes thrill craft operations. Yoshimasa Yamaguchi operates a tour business which caters to Japanese tourists. K-Bay's suit against defendants-appellees Edward Y. Hirata, individually and in his capacity as the Director of the State Department of Transportation, and David E. Parsons, individually and in his capacity as the State Boating Manager of the State Department of Transportation (collectively, the State) alleges that Act 313, § 4: (1) is unconstitutional as violative of equal protection; (2) invidiously discriminates against persons based on their race; and (3) is preempted by federal law.

K-Bay appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State on all of K-Bay's claims and the denial of K-Bay's subsequent motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

This appeal is the last act in a sequence of events that began in 1987 when the Hawaii legislature passed Act 247, directing the Department of Transportation (DOT) to adopt and promulgate rules to regulate the operation of thrill craft in Hawaii's waters. The legislature had determined that such measures were necessary because "the commingling in waters of thrill crafts and persons engaged in nonmotorized water activities is a threat to the public health and safety, justifying strict regulation." Sen.Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 57, in 1987 Senate Journal, at 839. Additionally, the legislature found that "thrill crafts have caused a significant deterioration of the environment" and that "the protection of the public health and safety and preservation of the general welfare require the prohibition of thrill craft operation in the waters of the State, except in areas ... designated by the [DOT]." Id.

In 1988, the DOT adopted and promulgated the Ocean Recreation Management Rules and Areas (ORMRA), in which, among other things, commercial thrill craft operations were restricted in certain areas of Kaneohe Bay. In 1989, the legislature passed Act 342, requiring the DOT to adopt and promulgate additional restrictions on thrill craft operations, including time periods during which such operations would be entirely banned. The legislature found that "because areas such as Kaneohe Bay ... are heavily utilized by the public, it has been proposed that all commercial ocean recreation activities be banned on weekends and holidays." Sen.Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 96, in 1989 Senate Journal, at 799. Additionally, the legislature stated that amendments included in Act 342 would allow the DOT "to initiate the suspension of thrill craft ... during periods such as weekends and holidays when areas such as Kaneohe Bay ... are heavily utilized by others, thereby improving overall public safety and minimizing conflicting uses." Id.

Pursuant to Act 342, the DOT proposed amendments to the ORMRA to ban commercial thrill craft operations in Kaneohe Bay on weekends and holidays. The DOT also conducted public hearings on the proposed amendments. However, several commercial thrill craft operators successfully forestalled the DOT's effort by bringing suit to challenge the administrative procedure that the DOT had followed in proposing the amendments. In a settlement between the thrill craft operators and the State, the operators agreed to dismiss their complaint in return for the State's promise that it would not enforce the weekend and holiday ban until the procedure was amended.

Thereafter, in 1990, the legislature took the initiative and passed Act 313, banning, inter alia, commercial thrill craft operations in Kaneohe Bay and Maunalua Bay on weekends and holidays, and also banning all commercial ocean recreation activities in the two bays on Sundays. Specifically, Act 313, § 4 provides in pertinent part:

(g) During all weekends and state and federal holidays, no commercial operator shall operate a thrill craft, or engage in parasailing, water sledding or commercial high speed boating, or operate a motor vessel towing a person engaged in water sledding or parasailing in Kaneohe Bay and Maunalua Bay on Oahu[.]

(h) On Sundays, all commercial ocean recreation activities, including those listed in this section, shall be prohibited on Oahu in Kaneohe Bay and Maunalua Bay ... effective January 1, 1991.

In § 1 of Act 313, the legislature included the following specific findings and declarations to explain the purpose of the Act:

(1) The operation of thrill craft and high-speed motorized vessels in the waters of the State poses an unacceptable risk of harm to humans and the environment. The operation of thrill craft and high-speed motorized vessels in some of the State's heavily used recreational waters has resulted in the...