Kanipe v. Lane Upholstery
Decision Date | 16 July 2002 |
Docket Number | No. COA01-1023.,COA01-1023. |
Citation | 566 S.E.2d 167,151 NC App. 478 |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Pearl KANIPE, Employee, Plaintiff, v. LANE UPHOLSTERY, Hickory Tavern Furniture Co., Employer, Self-Insured, Defendants. |
Patterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, L.L.P., by Henry N. Patterson, Jr. and Martha A. Geer, Raleigh, for plaintiff appellant.
Robinson & Lawing, L.L.P., by Jolinda J. Babcock, Winston-Salem, for defendant appellees.
Pearl Kanipe (Plaintiff) appeals an opinion and award filed 10 April 2001 by the Full Commission (the Commission) of the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Industrial Commission) denying her claim for disability compensation against Lane Upholstery, Hickory Tavern Furniture Co. (Defendant).1
On 26 June 1997, Plaintiff filed a Form 18 claiming workers' compensation due to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. On 11 July 1997, Plaintiff filed a Form 33 request for hearing before a deputy commissioner of the Industrial Commission in which she stated that Defendant refused to pay for treatment with her choice of physician, Dr. DePerczel, and requested compensation for her disability. On 9 September 1997, Defendant filed a Form 60 admitting Plaintiff's "right to compensation for an ... occupational disease as of 4/10, 1997" but denying that Plaintiff had suffered any disability "from work to date." The evidence presented at the hearing revealed that while Defendant had authorized carpal tunnel release surgery for Plaintiff with Dr. Carl Michael Nicks (Dr. Nicks), she underwent surgery for both her wrists with Dr. DePerczel instead. After the first surgery on 9 July 1997, Dr. DePerczel never released Plaintiff to go back to work because Plaintiff could no longer perform her duties as a sewer and "did[][not] have any other work options." While Plaintiff developed other health problems sometime after her carpal tunnel release surgeries, Dr. DePerczel thought that even without these additional problems "she would have had [only] a small chance of going back to work" as a sewer. Dr. DePerczel based his decision to keep Plaintiff out of work on the fact that "both of [Plaintiff's] hands were severely involved." Plaintiff had experienced "symptoms for such a long time, which mean[t] that there [was] more inflammation of the nerve and probably more permanent damage to the nerve." Dr. DePerczel also testified at his deposition that he had not yet rated Plaintiff for maximum medical improvement in respect to her hands.
Dr. Nicks testified during his deposition that he had performed thousands of carpal tunnel release surgeries and was familiar with the type of work that is done at furniture and upholstery plants such as the one operated by Defendant. The first and only time Dr. Nicks saw Plaintiff was on 4 June 1997. At this time, Dr. Nicks diagnosed Plaintiff with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended surgery, beginning with the right wrist and followed by surgery on the left wrist after three to four weeks. Dr. Nicks testified that, after surgery, he generally returns his patients to work after only a couple of days with limitations of one-handed work for approximately three weeks. If the work environment is dirty and could potentially soil or damage a patient's wound, Dr. Nicks will keep his patient out of work for up to a week. "At the end of three to four weeks, [Dr. Nicks] generally ... review[s] each case individually." Because Dr. Nicks individualizes the decision to return a patient to work, he could not give a general answer when asked what type of restriction he tends to impose after returning a patient to work. In explaining his approach of returning patients to work, Dr. Nicks noted that:
[t]hey[][are] always allowed to work, but with restrictions. Our policy in our office is to document the restrictions medically speaking that a patient needs to observe[,] and we let the employer decide whether they want to take them out of work or not. Sometimes those restrictions are so profound that they cannot legitimately do the job that they have always performed. And they might have to be put in a much less demanding position, but we very rarely take anybody completely out of work.
Anne Story, Defendant's human resource manager, testified at the hearing that had Plaintiff been released to light-duty employment, Defendant would have accommodated her "if there were jobs available within the restrictions."
In its opinion and award filed 26 June 1998, the deputy commissioner concluded Plaintiff was entitled to all medical expenses incurred as a result of her carpal tunnel syndrome, including expenses incurred while receiving treatment from Dr. DePerczel. The deputy commissioner also concluded Plaintiff was entitled to payment of temporary total disability compensation from 9 July 1997 onward. On appeal, the Commission, in an opinion and award filed 25 May 1999, reversed the deputy commissioner's award. The Commission found that:
The Commission concluded that (1) Defendant was not responsible for Plaintiff's unauthorized treatment with Dr. DePerczel and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to "any disability compensation" after 9 July 1997.
Upon Plaintiff's appeal from the 25 May 1999 decision, this Court affirmed the Commission's denial of Plaintiff's medical expenses with Dr. DePerczel but vacated and remanded the Commission's opinion and award in part because the Commission had failed to make any findings explaining its denial of disability compensation. See Kanipe v. Lane Upholstery, 141 N.C.App. 620, 540 S.E.2d 785 (2000)
(hereinafter Kanipe I). This Court stated that:
Perhaps the Commission based its denial on [P]laintiff's refusal to undergo medical treatment with Dr. Nicks. If so, this is not a valid reason for denial.... Alternatively, the Commission might have based its denial of disability compensation on Dr. Nicks' treatment plan, in which he determined that [P]laintiff would not have missed more than a week of work due to her injury. If that were the case, this basis would be lawful. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 97-28 (). But because the Commission never made any specific findings, we simply do not know whether it denied disability compensation on a lawful or unlawful basis. We therefore remand to the Commission to reconsider [P]laintiff's claim for disability compensation and to make explicit findings with respect to this claim.
Id. at 627, 540 S.E.2d at 790.
On 16 February 2001, Plaintiff filed with the Commission a request for supplemental briefing and oral arguments to address issues raised by the Court of Appeals decision. Without ruling on Plaintiff's request, the Commission filed a revised opinion and award on 10 April 2001 in which it added the...
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