Kannon v. Galloway
| Decision Date | 31 December 1872 |
| Citation | 61 Tenn. 230 |
| Parties | JAMES KANNON v. WM. GALLOWAY. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
FROM MAURY.
Appeal from the Circuit Court. T. M. JONES, Special Judge.
FRIERSON & FLEMING and MYERS, LOONEY & WHITTHORNE for Galloway.
WM. P. MARTIN and A. M. HUGHES for James Kannon.
Galloway brought this action against Kannon in the Circuit Court of Maury County, upon a note for $10,671.85. Kannon pleaded non est factum, and upon the trial the jury rendered a verdict for Galloway for the amount of the note and interest, and a new trial having been refused, Kannon appealed in error to this Court.
Several affidavits were presented upon the motion for a new trial, of persons professing to be experienced and skillful in determining the difference between genuine and forged signatures; affiants express the opinion that the note sued on is a forgery.
Kannon states in an affidavit that he did not know that he could prove the facts by those witnesses stated in their affidavits, until after the verdict of the jury was rendered, except as to one of them, whose attendance he could not procure. Why he could not procure the attendance of the affiant last referred to is not stated; nor is it stated that there were not other experts by whom he could have proved the same facts, whose attendance he could have procured.
There was much testimony upon the trial pro and con, upon the genuineness of the signature to the notes sued on; non est factum being in fact the only plea pleaded by defendant below. The affidavit does not show that any effort was made to procure the evidence of experts and we do not think that these affidavits show any sufficient reasons why this Court should reverse in order that plaintiff in error should have a new trial.
Only one other error is seriously urged why the judgment should be reversed. From the record it appears that on the trial some eighteen signatures of Kannon to notes and other instruments, which were admitted by both parties to be genuine, were by consent allowed to go to the jury for the purpose of being compared by them with the signature to the note.
Where the parties to the suit consent that signatures not in the record, but which they admit to be genuine, may be submitted to the jury, to be compared by them with the signature in controversy, the jury may make the comparison to aid them in the determination of the question submitted.
When the jury were about retiring...
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State v. Matheson
...was permitted in this case on the same principle as its use was allowed in Frank v. Chemical National Bank, 84 N.Y. 209, and Kannon v. Galloway, 61 Tenn. 230, 2 230 -- for the purpose of discovering whether the signature to a written instrument introduced in evidence was genuine; and it is ......
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Monday v. Millsaps
...without exception, that newly discovered opinion or expert testimony cannot be the basis for the granting of a new trial. Kannon v. Galloway, 61 Tenn. 230; 66 C.J.S., New Trial, § 102, p. 294. Nor, generally, will a new trial be granted for the purpose of letting in newly discovered evidenc......
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Brown v. Weik
...opinion or expert testimony cannot be the basis for granting a new trial. Monday v. Millsaps, supra, in turn relies upon Kannon v. Galloway, 61 Tenn. 230 (1872), in which the Supreme Court Kannon states in an affidavit that he did not know that he could prove the facts by those witnesses st......