Kansas City, M. & B. Ry. Co. v. Chiles

• Decision Date: 22 May 1905
• Citation: 86 Miss. 361,38 So. 498
• Parties: KANSAS CITY, MEMPHIS & BIRMINGHAM RAILROAD COMPANY v. BEVERLY CHILES
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

38 So. 498

86 Miss. 361

KANSAS CITY, MEMPHIS & BIRMINGHAM RAILROAD COMPANY v. BEVERLY CHILES

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 22, 1905

FROM the circuit court of Monroe county, HON. EUGENE O. SYKES Judge.

Chiles the appellee, was plaintiff, and the railroad company, the appellant, was defendant in the court below. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor the defendant appealed to the supreme court.

The facts are either stated in, or are clearly inferable from the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

J. W. Buchanan, for appellant.

The court erred in refusing the peremptory charge asked on the part of the appellant.

First--Because the speed of the train was not the proximate cause of the injury, and the same could have been avoided but for the gross negligence of the appellee.

Second--Because the appellee signed a release in full satisfaction of all supposed claims that he had against the appellant for a valuable consideration.

The testimony shows that appellee was at a place where he had no right to be. His day's work was completed, and he took the chance of going home over the railroad right of way rather than the public road. He was in no sense doing any duty required of him by the railroad company.

The appellee signed a release in full satisfaction of all damages sustained by the accident to him. There is nothing in the record to bring this case within the rule of the case of Jones v. Railway Co., 72 Miss. 32, or Railway Co. v. Jones, 73 Miss. 110.

It will be borne in mind that this accident occurred on December 16, 1902. The settlement was made on February 12, 1903. In the Jones case the accident happened on one day, the negro's leg was amputated on the next, and on the evening of the day his leg was amputated, while under the influence of opiates, the release was obtained.

W. H. Clifton, for appellee.

A release, purporting on its face to be a complete settlement, has in its favor the strong presumption of validity which attaches to all written instruments, and the evidence to set it aside must be clear, precise, and indubitable. On the other hand, one who signs a written instrument without intending to, and who is chargeable with no negligence in not ascertaining the character of it, is no more bound than if it were a forgery. And this result will follow whether the signing was through mistake and surprise or from fraud. One of the most common claims by which it is sought to avoid a release in personal injury cases is that the instrument was signed in the belief that it was an instrument of a different nature. In such cases the person seeking to avoid the release on the ground of fraud or mistake is not required to return what he has received.

In personal injury cases involving this question, ordinarily the facts are in some respects peculiar, and in determining whether the release is binding or not, we should look to the condition of the injured person, the relation of the parties, and the circumstances preceding and attending the execution of the instrument. Jones v. Ala. & V. Ry. Co., 72 Miss. 22; Norfleet v. Beale, 34 So. 328; 20 Am. & Eng. Ency Law (1st ed.), p. 761, and notes; Welsh v. Railway Co., 70 Miss. 20; Sobieski v. St. Paul & D. Ry. Co., 42 N.W. 863; O'Brien v. Railway Co., 57 N.W. 425; Bliss v. Railway Co., 36 N.E. 65.

On the merits of the case defendant is liable under Code 1892, § 3546, for the injury inflicted, although plaintiff may have been a trespasser on its right of way at the time he was hurt. Patterson's Railway Accident Law, p. 192, note 4; C. R. R. Co. v. Bruinson, 19 Am. & Eng. Ry. Cas., 42. The excessive speed was the only thing that could have cast the bar of iron off at such a tangent. A. & V. Ry. Co. v. Carter, 77 Miss. 511; Stevens v. Yazoo, etc., R. R. Co., 81 Miss. 195.

Argued orally by J. W. Buchanan, for appellant, and by W. H. Clifton, for appellee.

OPINION

TRULY, J.

Appellant contends that it was entitled to a peremptory charge in its favor on the trial in the court below. This contention is based on two theories:

First--That the testimony proved beyond a doubt that appellee's own negligence contributed to his injury, and that the rapid speed at which its train was running through the corporate limits of the town of Nettleton at the time of the injury was not the proximate cause thereof. The proof shows that appellee was an employe of appellant, and was at the time of the accident on his way home on his customary route, at the conclusion of his day's work. This route led him over a well-defined path invariably traveled by the public, running on the embankment and near the roadbed of appellant. At the time of the accident appellee was some distance from the track, having stepped off the embankment to avoid the train, and when he received the injury was standing at the foot of the embankment, twelve or fourteen feet distant from the passing train. We do not think that this conduct on the part of appellee could be reasonably construed as contributing in any...