Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Manion, 22522
| Decision Date | 05 November 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 22522,22522 |
| Citation | 297 S.W.2d 31 |
| Parties | 39 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2126, 31 Lab.Cas. P 70,297 KANSAS CITY TERMINAL RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Respondent, v. Keith L. MANION et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Ralph M. Jones, Charles B. Blackmar, Blackmar, Swanson, Midgley, Jones & Eager, Kansas City, for appellants. Harold C. Heiss, Russell B. Day, Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel.
Clarence M. Mulholland, Richard R. Lyman, Toledo, Ohio, Edward J. Hickey, Jr., Washington, D. C., Mulholland, Robie & Hickey, Toledo, Ohio, of counsel, for Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, amicus curiae.
Horace F. Blackwell, Jr., Sam D. Parker, Lathrop, Richter, Blackwell & Parker, Kansas City, for respondent.
The Railroad, by complaint, sought and the Circuit Court on July 7, 1955, granted an Injunction against the threatened, imminent strike by the national Brotherhood, local lodge and named defendants in a class. Evidence was presented showing that Terminal in Kansas City owns and operates the Union Station and terminal facilities for 12 interstate railroads, its service, including engines and tracks, switching and transfer of passengers, mail, baggage and freight cars. Evidence was also offered tending to show that the proposed strike would not only paralyze Terminal's business but would cripple the railroad transportation system in Kansas City and adversely affect it throughout the whole area. Defendants generally concede these conclusions.
Defendants petitioned to remove this cause to the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri. On Terminal's Motion the case was remanded to the state court by Hon. Albert A. Ridge, District Judge. Thereafter, defendants' motion for judgment or in the alternative motion for new trial was denied. Defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which court ruled it was without jurisdiction and transferred to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. See Kansas City Terminal Railroad Company v. Manion, Sup., 290 S.W.2d 63.
On March 31, 1951, plaintiff and The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen entered into a collective bargaining agreement providing that all claims or grievances by or on behalf of any employee would be processed by presentation to the carrier's designated officer, and could be appealed from rank to rank to the carrier's highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances. Paragraph C, Article 7, of the Agreement provides 'All claims or grievances involved in a decision of the highest officer shall be barred unless within six months from the date of said officer's decision, proceedings are instituted by the employee or his duly authorized representative before a tribunal having jurisdiction pursuant to law or agreement, of the claim or grievance involved.' On April 16, 1953, the 'No New Work Rule' amendment was added. This Amendment provided that engineers, firemen, and hostlers would be given no new work after completing an eight-hour day, but that they might be required to finish work assigned before the end of the eight hours and which they were proceeding on at the end of the eight hours.
Many disputes arose between Terminal and the workers, involving interpretation and application of the agreement as amended by the 'No New Work Rule.' Claims were filed by or on behalf of numerous employees for penalty pay. These were presented by the Brotherhood through administrative channels to the carrier's highest officer designated to process such claims, all as provided in the agreement. Among others, these facts were stipulated by the parties:
(1) 'Payment has been made for all straight-time work by the employees for or on whose behalf claims herein involved have been presented and overtime for hours actually worked has been paid at one and a half times the computed hourly rate of the employee.'
(2) That time claims for penalty pay were filed on behalf of or by 1114 engineers and 1069 firemen. These claims were prosecuted through carrier officer channels and appealed to Mr. C. E. Breternitz, the carrier's highest officer designated to handle claims and grievances.
(3) That each of these claims has been denied by the said C. E. Breternitz, the dates of the various denials being set forth in the stipulation.
(4) 'That no proceedings to enforce the payment of any of the time claims has ever been instituted by any defendant or by his duly authorized representative before any court or before the National Railroad Adjustment Board or before any tribunal having jurisdiction thereof, pursuant to agreement of the parties'.
Giving consideration to the denial dates as set out in the Stipulation and the date of the Circuit Court's Injunction, we find that more than six months elapsed between the last final denial and the issuance of the injunction. It could here be stated that 'overtime pay' which Terminal paid was time and one half for work hours required over eight in one day. 'Penalty pay' which defendants claimed, was for one full day's additional pay, if they were required to work more than the eight hours.
On February 3, 1954, the Brotherhood distributed among its employees a strike ballot on four questions: (1) Time claims based upon the 'No New Work Rule.' (2) Time claims based upon the Terminal's action in permitting Kansas City Plant. crews to do switching at the Cudahy Plant. (3) Miscellaneous time claims based upon other provisions of the agreement. (4) Proposed changes in the terms of the collective agreement. The result was a majority vote for the proposed strike if the Brotherhood was unable to get these claims satisfactorily adjusted.
On February 11, 1954, Terminal invoked the services of the National Mediation Board under Item 4; that is, the proposed changes in the terms of the collective agreement, but took the position that Items 1, 2, and 3, namely, the time claims, were not mediable. Federal Mediator Lane was assigned to this dispute. He came to Kansas City on March 23, 1954, to attempt mediation. Terminal refused to discuss the question of the time claims and reasserted its contention that these were not mediable. The Brotherhood sought mediation on all four issues and declared its willingness to forego striking if the Board would take jurisdiction of the entire dispute, but reasserted its intention to strike if the time claims were not included. The National Mediation Board recommended that all issues be mediated and the threatened strike be deferred. Both parties adhered to their positions as first declared. The Brotherhood fixed a date for the threatened strike. Terminal secured this Restraining Order. The Mediation Board quietly withdrew. The U. S. District Court and the Supreme Court of Missouri each disclaimed jurisdiction. So, the controversy and particularly the action of the Circuit Court in granting injunctive relief, comes to this Court for appellate review.
In addition to briefs from the plaintiff and defendants we have been favored with briefs from Conference Committees of both Railway and Labor, as Amici Curiae. As stated on page 67 of Appellant's Brief:
'State courts, when enforcing rights flowing from Federal laws, should enforce them in the same manner and extent as Federal courts would enforce them in similar suits.'
Tersely stated, plaintiff asserted it was entitled to the Injunction on two grounds: (A) The Railway Labor Act prohibits a strike to force payment of time claims. It contends that time claims are 'minor disputes,' as contrasted with, for example, an effort to enforce collective bargaining demands, or write a new basic contract, either of which would be a 'major dispute,' to secure adjustment or settlement of which, a strike would be a proper procedural weapon. It says, however, that minor disputes must be referred to the Adjustment Board and a strike to coerce settlement of such lesser disputes has for the general public good and in the interest of labor peace been forbidden by the Act. (B) The proposed strike was a breach of the contract entered into by the parties which provided that time claims be prosecuted to the highest carrier official and after denial, claimant had six months and six months only, to institute proceedings before some other tribunal having jurisdiction thereof (plaintiff claiming this authorized tribunal was the National Adjustment Board); that since claimants permitted six months to elapse after final denial without proceeding further, the claims under the contract are barred, and that all of these requirements were strictly in conformity with the Act.
Defendants assert that the Railway Labor Act and the judicial precedents interpreting the same do not forbid but rather recognize the right to strike. They claim that the Common Law, too, recognizes, and the Constitution protects, an individual's right to work or not work--a condition which is surely one of the attributes of human liberty. It might be observed here, of course, that the right of an individual person to work or not to work is not involved. We are concerned only with group or concerted action.
The National Railway Labor Act does not exactly spell out either Terminal's or Defendants' interpretation. Federal Courts have differed both as to meaning and application. It is agreed, without exception we think, that in correctly determining the question, we must examine, review, and consider Railway Labor Law as it has developed in America during the...
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