Kansas City v. Plumb
| Decision Date | 05 June 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 24667,24667 |
| Parties | KANSAS CITY, Respondent, v. Patsy PLUMB, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Robert G. Duncan, Pierce, Duncan, Beitling & Shute, Kansas City, for appellant.
Herbert C. Hoffman, City Counselor, Charles A. Lewis, Richard Unruh, Asst. City Counselors, Kansas City, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, finding appellant guilty of a violation of an ordinance of Kansas City, Missouri, in a case on appeal from the municipal court. Appellant will be referred to as defendant and respondent as the city.
Defendant was charged with the offense of soliciting for immoral purposes as described by Section 47.070 Revised Ordinances of Kansas City, Missouri, 1956, which ordinance reads as follows:
The city's evidence consisted solely of the testimony of police officer Thomas Norman. The defendant offered no evidence. Norman testified that on January 8, 1966, he had been assigned to investigate vice activities in Kansas City. He had been in several places and while waiting on a corner for a red light to change he struck up a conversation with an unnamed man concerning how cold the night was. The two of them then proceeded to the new Frederic Hotel, at 312 East 9th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, where Norman and the other man each registered in separate rooms. The other man 'made arrangements for women's with an unnamed bellhop. Norman and the other man then went upstairs to their respective rooms. About twenty minutes later, Mr. Hurse, a bellhop at the hotel, appeared in Norman's room and advised that the other bellhop had gone off duty and that he (Hurse) had taken over.
Norman then 'asked him what the delay was on the girl, and he said he would send one up.' About twenty minutes later defendant knocked on officer Norman's door, which was slightly ajar and entered the room and 'asked if I was the one that wanted the entertainment.' Officer Norman was partly unclothed. They both sat on the bed, which appears to have been the only thing in the room to sit on, and she said that 'she would go a straight lay for $20, a half and half for twenty-five, and a French lay for thirty-five, act of prostitution.' Officer Norman then placed defendant Plumb under arrest. Defendant did not take off any of her clothing, did not lay down on the bed, and did not engage in any act of prostitution or perversion.
On this evidence the circuit judge, trying the case without a jury, found defendant guilty of the offense of solicitation and imposed a sentence of sixty days at the municipal farm and $100.00 fine. From such sentence, defendant has duly appealed.
On this appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment and sentence. The main burden of this challenge seems to be that the words of defendant do not carry any connotation of a suggestion or offer to engage in an act of prostitution or perversion, when such words are limited to the meaning ascribed to them by our standard dictionaries. This is so, but it is apparent that defendant spoke in the vernacular of her trade.
The offense of soliciting does not require any particularform of words, and, in fact, may be committed by gesture alone, or any other act which, from all the circumstances, conveys to the one solicited an offer to engage in an act of prostitution or perversion. See City of St. Louis v. Long, Mo.App., 395 S.W.2d 481; Kansas City v. Martin, Mo.App., 369 S.W.2d 602; Curran v. United States (D.C.Mun.App.) 52 A.2d 121; State v. Render, 203 Iowa 329, 210 N.W. 911. From the evidence as heretofore summarized, it is plain to anyone who has had any connection with law enforcement that the defendant was, in fact, offering to commit various acts of prostitution or perversion for a sliding scale of prices. It can not be questioned that such testimony was so understood by the trial judge, who, in this jury waived case, was the trier of fact. On the basis of the foregoing authorities, such evidence was amply sufficient to support the charge against defendant and the judgment and sentence entered by the court.
Defendant further contends that her conviction should be reversed on the basis that she was not guilty as a matter of law because she was entrapped by the police officer. In Missouri, as in other states and in the United States courts, entrapment is recognized as a defense, even though the facts proved against the defendant may show that he committed all acts necessary to constitute the offense denounced by the statute or ordinance. The cases are in agreement that where the criminal intent originates with the police officer, rather than with the defendant, and where, by his acts, suggestions and entreaties the officer procures the defendant to commit the offense, then the defense of entrapment may prevent a convicition. However, on the other hand, where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the defendant, and the police officer merely furnishes an opportunity for the defendant to commit the offense, then, and in that event, the defense of entrapment is not available to the defendant. It is sometimes said that if the defendant would not have committed the offense, but for the acts of the officer, then the defense of entrapment is available, but that if the defendant is ready and willing to commit the offense, and the officer only presents the opportunity, then no defense of entrapment will lie. See State v. Taylor, Mo., 375 S.W.2d 58; State v. Ward, 361 Mo. 1236, 239 S.W.2d 313; State v. Decker, 321 Mo. 1163, 14 S.W.2d 617, and cases cited therein.
Here the evidence shows that the officer posed as a willing buyer and that as a result of such pose, the defendant, a willing seller, approached the officer and offered her body for sale. In such circumstances, as is shown by the foregoing authority, no defense of entrapment will lie. It is sometimes asserted that the defense of entrapment can be interposed as a matter of law, however, in almost all instances the courts have held that the evidence makes an issue for the trier of fact as to whether or not the defense of entrapment is applicable. In the case at bar the defense of entrapment was presented to the court, sitting without a jury as the trier of fact, by motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence (which, in fact, was the close of all the evidence), and such trier of fact found against the defendant on such issue. This conclusion is amply supported by the evidence and we will not disturb it.
Lastly, defendant contends that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to try and determine this cause because she was...
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