Kanscheit v. Garrett Laundry Company
| Decision Date | 13 October 1917 |
| Docket Number | 20125 |
| Citation | 164 N.W. 708,101 Neb. 702 |
| Parties | MATHILDA KANSCHEIT, ADMINISTRATRIX, APPELLEE, v. GARRETT LAUNDRY COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the district court for Douglas county: GEORGE A. DAY JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
John G Kuhn, for appellants.
Benjamin S. Baker and A. B. Jaquith, contra.
This action was brought in the district court for Douglas county under the employers' liability act (Laws 1913, ch. 198) to recover compensation because of the death of plaintiff's decedent, Charles F. Kanscheit. The trial court found that the death of the decedent was due to an accident.
The attending physician, Dr. Porter, saw the deceased very shortly after he suffered a heat stroke. He had known Mr. Kanscheit for about ten years. He knew his physical condition and his habits. He testified that the cause of his death was heat stroke. He defined heat stroke as the result of excessive heat, and that it caused the paralysis of certain centers controlling the organization of the body. The immediate cause of his decease he said was respiratory death; that it was caused by paralysis of the center of respiration. He testified that the deceased lived about an hour after he went to see him; that he took his pulse and his respiration and his temperature; that he saw no evidence of intoxication; that there was nothing to indicate it. When asked if overheat was a disease or an accident, he said he would call it an accident. He thought that the heat rays that caused the death might be external violence.
Dr. George A. Young testified that one has a heat stroke when it is hot and where there is artificial heat such as is found in a laundry. He gave it as his opinion that the death was caused by accident. He testified that heat stroke is generally recognized as an accident. He testified an accident to be an occurrence which happens suddenly and coming apparently from some outside agency; that it produces some pathological change in the body. There was a judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $ 10 a week for 350 weeks, and for $ 100 as compensation for the expenses of the burial of the deceased.
It is contended that the deceased did not die because of any accident, and that he died of intoxication, and that his death was not due to anything within the course of his employment, but that it was due to disease, whether it was heat prostration or whatever it might have been. The evidence showed that he had been in the employ of the laundry company for about 15 years. The appellant claims that the death of the deceased was not due to an accident as defined by the employers' liability act; that the court erred in holding that the prostration and death was not due to a disease; and also erred in holding that the cause of the death arose out of and in the course of the deceased's employment. It was also claimed that there was error because the court failed to hold that the deceased...
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