Kaplan v. Hecht
| Decision Date | 05 March 1928 |
| Docket Number | No. 270.,270. |
| Citation | 24 F.2d 664 |
| Parties | KAPLAN v. HECHT, U. S. Marshal. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
K. Henry Rosenberg, of New York City, for appellant.
Charles H. Tuttle, U. S. Atty., of New York City (Thomas J. Todarelli, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before MANTON, SWAN, and AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judges.
SWAN, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).
The legality of the order of June 7, 1926, granting Kaplan probation, is not questioned, nor could it be. As he had not begun to serve his sentence, the District Court had jurisdiction under the express terms of section 1 of the Probation Act of March 4, 1925 (18 USCA § 724), "to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best." See Kriebel v. United States, 10 F.(2d) 762 (C. C. A. 7); Evans v. District Judge, 12 F. (2d) 64 (C. C. A. 6); Ackerson v. United States, 15 F.(2d) 268 (C. C. A. 2); United States v. Murray, 48 S. Ct. 146, 72 L. Ed. ___, decided January 3, 1928. Section 1 further provides that the court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may change the period of probation, but such period, including any extension thereof, shall not exceed five years. Section 2 (18 USCA § 725) reads as follows:
Appellant was convicted on April 18, 1924, and the maximum term of imprisonment which might have been imposed on him was two years. He now contends that, under section 2 above quoted, the maximum period for which he might have been sentenced expired on April 18, 1926, and that thereafter the court was without jurisdiction to revoke the probation and impose imprisonment by its sentence of November 2, 1927. This contention is not consonant with the natural meaning of section 2. The second paragraph of that section provides for the arrest of probationers either during the probation period or after its termination. In the first case, the arrest may be made either with or without a warrant and at any time; in the second, only upon a warrant and only within "the maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced." The precise meaning of this limitation need not be now determined, for appellant's case falls squarely within the first classification, as an arrest during the probation period, and the last sentence of the section expressly provides that the court may revoke the suspension of sentence and impose any sentence which might originally...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Whitfield
...at 68, 7 Ill.Dec. 913, 365 N.E.2d 198. The Wilbur court emphasized these points by quoting two federal court opinions. In Kaplan v. Hecht, 24 F.2d 664-65 (2d Cir.1928), the court stated: "`[T]he purpose [of probation] is to avoid imprisonment so long as the guilty man gives promise of refor......
-
Persall v. State
...citizenship, to ameliorate rather than penalize. Competent federal authority is likewise consonant with this latter view. Kaplan v. Hecht, 2 Cir., 24 F.2d 664; United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 358, 48 146, 149, 72 L.Ed. 309; Roberts v. United States, 64 S.Ct. 113, decided November 22,......
-
Hall v. Bostic
...of such denial has been universally recognized both in federal and state decisions. The leading case to this effect is Kaplan v. Hecht (2d Cir. 1928) 24 F.2d 664, 665, in which the Court 'The second contention is that the time during which appellant was on probation must be credited upon th......
-
State v. Ryan
...Cert. den. 377 U.S. 1000, 84 S.Ct. 1936, 12 L.Ed.2d 1051 (1964); United States v. Guzzi, 275 F.2d 725 (3 Cir. 1960); Kaplan v. Hecht, 24 F.2d 664, 665 (2 Cir. 1928); Gehl v. People, 161 Colo. 535, 537, 423 P.2d 332, 334 (Sup.Ct.1967); State v. Lowdermilk, 245 Ind. 93, 98, 195 N.E.2d 476, 47......