Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 April 2020
• Docket Number: SC 20257
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Ohan KARAGOZIAN v. USV OPTICAL, INC.

335 Conn. 426

238 A.3d 716

Ohan KARAGOZIAN

v.USV OPTICAL, INC.

SC 20257

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 12, 2019

Officially released April 15, 2020^*

John R. Williams, New Haven, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Robert M. Palumbos, pro hac vice, Philadelphia, with whom was Elizabeth M. Lacombe, Boston, for the appellee (defendant).

Scott Madeo and Brian Festa filed a brief for the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities as amicus curiae.

Robinson, C.J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.

D'AURIA, J.

The plaintiff, Ohan Karagozian, an optician formerly employed by the defendant, USV Optical, Inc.,¹ brought this action for constructive discharge, alleging that (1) the defendant required him to provide optometric assistance services to a doctor of optometry in violation of the public policy of the state of Connecticut, (2) the defendant refused and failed to excuse the plaintiff from those duties, and (3) "[a]s a result, the plaintiff was compelled to resign his position with the defendant ...." The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's corrected revised complaint on the ground that the allegations in the complaint could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements of a constructive discharge claim.² The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike, relying on Brittell v. Dept. of Correction , 247 Conn. 148, 178, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998), for the proposition that a claim of constructive discharge requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer intended to force the employee to resign. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had not only failed to allege this intent requirement in his complaint, but also failed to allege the second requirement of a constructive discharge claim—that his work conditions became so intolerable that a reasonable person in his shoes would have felt compelled to resign.

Interpreting and applying our decision in Brittell in the same fashion as the trial court, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that there was "no allegation in the complaint that reasonably [could] be construed to claim that the defendant intended to create conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign." (Emphasis in original.) Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc. , 186 Conn. App. 857, 867–68, 201 A.3d 500 (2019). We disagree with the Appellate Court's interpretation of Brittell , although we affirm its judgment on the alternative ground it identified.

To plead a prima facie case of constructive discharge, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the employer intentionally created the complained of work atmosphere, (2) the work atmosphere was so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign, and (3) the plaintiff in fact resigned. Brittell does not, as the Appellate Court has ruled in several cases, require a plaintiff claiming constructive discharge to allege that the employer intended to force the employee to quit, but only to allege that the employer intended to create the conditions that the plaintiff claims compelled the employee to quit. However, in the present case, we agree with the Appellate Court and the defendant that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege the second requirement of a constructive discharge claim in his complaint. Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint fails as a matter of law to allege that the defendant created a work atmosphere so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's shoes would have felt compelled to resign.

The following facts and procedural history, as contained in the record and in the Appellate Court's decision, are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the plaintiff began working in an optical department operated by the defendant and located in a JCPenney store in Trumbull. As a licensed optician manager, the plaintiff's role involved providing optometric assistant services to the doctor of optometry at the store. His specific duties included, but were not limited to, maintaining records, scheduling appointments, preparing patients for vision examinations, adjusting and repairing glasses, modifying contact lenses, measuring intraocular pressure of eyes using a glaucoma test

, and measuring the axial length of eyes using ultrasound equipment. About three months into his employment, the plaintiff asked his supervisors that "he not be required to perform such duties ...." According to the plaintiff, he made this request on at least three separate occasions on the basis of his belief that these duties violated the public policy of the state of Connecticut.

As support for his belief that these duties violated the state's public policy, the plaintiff attached to his complaint copies of a declaratory ruling issued by the Board of Examiners for Optometrists on May 1, 2002, and a cease and desist consent order issued by the Board of Examiners for Optometrists and the Board of Examiners for Opticians in February, 2006. In the plaintiff's view, the declaratory ruling "prohibits employees under the control of unlicensed third parties from performing services for licensed optometrists." The cease and desist consent order, the plaintiff alleged, provided that Walmart, Inc., had agreed not to permit licensed opticians to perform the duties of an optometric assistant or to perform services for optometrists by whom they were not employed. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that his duties violated public policy, as set forth in General Statutes § 31-130 (i),³ in that "neither the defendant nor JCPenney had a staffing permit allowing either of them to provide staffing services to the doctor." The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defendant refused the plaintiff's requests and failed to excuse him from these duties. As a result, the plaintiff claimed, he was compelled to resign his position. He then brought this action for constructive discharge.

The defendant moved to strike the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's allegations did not, as a matter of law, satisfy the requirements of a constructive discharge claim. Specifically, the defendant argued, the documents on which the plaintiff relied—the declaratory ruling and the cease and desist consent order—were not binding on the parties in the present case and did not create a private right of action for optometric assistants. The defendant also contended that the plaintiff's reliance on § 31-130 (i) was misplaced because his complaint made no allegation that optometrists employed by the defendant charged the defendant for hiring opticians. As to the elements of a constructive discharge claim, the defendant argued that the plaintiff's complaint failed to establish that the employer intentionally created an intolerable work atmosphere that forced the plaintiff to quit.

The trial court agreed with the defendant and granted the motion to strike the complaint. The plaintiff declined to replead and, instead, after the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendant, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The Appellate Court's decision relied on its interpretation of the standard we established in Brittell for a constructive discharge claim. The plaintiff then petitioned this court for certification to appeal, which we granted on one issue: "Did the Appellate Court correctly construe and apply Brittell v. Dept. of Correction , [supra, 247 Conn. 148, 717 A.2d 1254 ], in holding that an action for constructive discharge in violation of public policy requires that the plaintiff allege and prove not only that the employer intended to create an intolerable work atmosphere but that the employer intended thereby to force the plaintiff to resign?" Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc. , 331 Conn. 904, 201 A.3d 1023 (2019).

On appeal to this court, the plaintiff reasserts his position that a constructive discharge allegation should not focus on the "employer's state of mind but on the objective reality of the working conditions and the impact of that objective reality, not upon the particular worker in question, but upon a hypothetical reasonable person in the worker's position. ... By requiring the employee to prove ... that the employer intended to force him to resign, the Appellate Court ... imposed a requirement that defeats the very purpose of the constructive discharge doctrine." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted.) Accordingly, the plaintiff urges this court to reverse the Appellate Court's judgment upholding the trial court's decision to strike his complaint.

I

"Because a motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review of the court's ruling ... is plenary.... We take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint that has been stricken and we construe the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. , 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016).

To evaluate whether the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's ruling that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for constructive discharge, we first must determine whether the Appellate Court properly applied the constructive discharge standard that we described in Brittell v. Dept. of Correction , supra, 247 Conn. 148, 717 A.2d 1254 : "Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily.... Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would...