Karam v. State Of Del. Div. Of Serv. For Children
| Decision Date | 15 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 09-904 (RBK/JS) |
| Parties | MARTHA L. KARAM, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF DELAWARE DIVISION OF SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH AND THEIR FAMILIES, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Plaintiff Martha L. Karam brings this action against her former employer, the Delaware Department of Services for Children, Youth, and Their Families, for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"). Defendant now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Defendant argues that state sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's claims. Because Defendant is a state agency and Congress has not validly abrogated Defendant's sovereign immunity regarding Plaintiffs claims, and because Defendant has not waived its immunity, the Court grants Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Defendant employed Plaintiff part-time as a Family Crisis Therapist between the year 2000 and July 28, 2007. Plaintiff has suffered from medical and mental health issues since December 2006. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) Her troubles with Defendant began around that time. She alleges that she missed work for several days in December 2006, May 2007, and June 2007 because of her health. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4; Pl.'s Attach. 5, at 4.) Defendant reprimanded her in October 2006 and suspended her for one day in December 2006. (Pl.'s Attach. 5, at 4.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff was disciplined for insubordination and attendance issues. (Id.) On June 28, 2007, Plaintiff's doctor recommended that Plaintiff take a six-week absence from work. (Am. Compl. ¶ 3.) On that same day, Plaintiff informed her supervisor that she wished to take leave pursuant to the FMLA. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff alleges that her FMLA request was "neither denied [n]or approved...-rather, it was ignored." (Id. ¶ 5).
On June 30, 2007, Plaintiff received a letter from Defendant terminating her employment as of July 28, 2007. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 5.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant terminated her because of her disability. After Plaintiff's termination, she filed a claim with the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission ("EEOC"). On August 27, 2009, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a notice of dismissal and right to sue. (Pl.'s Attach. 5, at 7.) On November 25, 2009, Plaintiff timely filed her Complaint pro se and in forma pauperis. In January 2010, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. Plaintiff timely filed her Amended Complaint in February 2010. Her Amended Complaint includes claims under the ADA and FMLA and requested monetary damages. (Am. Compl. ¶ 9.) The Amended Complaint does not specify which ADA or FMLA provisions Plaintiff is suing under.
In May 2010, Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Plaintiff timely filed a motion for an extension of time to file opposition to Defendant's motion. This Court granted Plaintiff's request, and, on October 29, 2010, Plaintiff filed a response. Defendant did not submit a reply. Defendant's motion is therefore ripe for decision.
"When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should consider the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot." UD Tech. Corp. v. Phenomenex, Inc., No. 05-842, 2007 WL 28295, at *3 (D. Del. Jan. 4, 2007) (quoting In re Corestates Trust Fee Litig., 837 F. Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A challenge to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be "facial" or "factual." Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). Motions that do not challenge the truth of the plaintiff's allegations, such as this one, are facial challenges. Cardio-Med. Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir. 1983). In reviewing a facial challenge, this Court must dismiss Plaintiffs claims if "the allegations on the face of the complaint, taken as true, [do not] allege facts sufficient to invoke [its] jurisdiction." Licata v. U.S. Postal Serv., 33 F.3d 259, 260 (3d Cir. 1994).
Defendant's sole argument on this motion is that this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs ADA and FMLA claims are barred under the doctrine ofsovereign immunity.
Each state is a "sovereign entity in [the] federal system." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). Because of their sovereignty, states are generally immune from suit for money damages. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). This principle is embodied in, but not limited by, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 712-13. Sovereign immunity also extends to any state agency that qualifies as an "arm of the state." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997).
There are at least two exceptions to state sovereign immunity. First, an individual can sue a state if: (1) Congress has "unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity[,]" and (2) Congress did so "pursuant to a valid exercise of [its Fourteenth Amendment] power." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55, 59 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)) (internal quotations omitted). Congress validly exercises its Fourteenth Amendment power when it: (1) secures the Amendment's "actual guarantees" or (2) prohibits facially constitutional conduct to remedy or deter violations of "actual guarantees" and demonstrates "'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end[.]'" Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 72728 (2003) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
Second, a state can waive its sovereign immunity. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). A state waives immunity by unequivocally consenting to suit. Id. at 682. This "stringent" test is satisfied if the state "voluntarily invokes [federal] jurisdiction" or clearly declares its intent "to submit itself to [federal] jurisdiction." Id. at 675-76. It is not satisfied if the state merely consents to suit "inthe courts of its own creation" or "'in any court of competent jurisdiction[.]'" Id. at 676 (quoting Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 577-79 (1946)).
Here, Defendant is an arm of the state, Rodriguez v. Stevenson, 243 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D. Del. 2002), and thus is immune from Plaintiff's federal claims unless Plaintiff can satisfy one of the exceptions to state sovereign immunity. Moreover, state sovereign immunity is "a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction." Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F3d 690, 693 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, the Court must grant Defendant's 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if Defendant enjoys immunity from Plaintiff's ADA and FMLA claims. The Court considers both claims in turn.
Plaintiff does not specify which ADA provision Defendant allegedly violated. Nevertheless, because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her complaint, "however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). The Court therefore liberally construes Plaintiffs Amended Complaint as asserting claims under both Title I and Title V of the ADA.
Title I prohibits an employer "[from] discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to... employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint can be construed as asserting a Title I claim because she alleges that Defendant disciplined her and terminated her employment because of her alleged disability. Title V prohibits retaliation "against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA]." 42 U.S.C. § 12203. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint canalso be construed as asserting a Title V claim. The Amended Complaint suggests that Plaintiff complained to Defendant about various negative performance reviews that she believed were based on her disability and not her actual performance. If the Court generously construes the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's allegation of wrongful termination may be predicated on her contestation of her allegedly discriminatory performance reviews.1
However, Defendant enjoys immunity from both Title I and Title V suits. Title I does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368, 374 (2001). The Supreme Court has held that the ADA's express abrogation of sovereign immunity is unconstitutional as to Title I claims because Congress did not establish that Title I was intended to remedy or deter violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees. Id. at 368. Indeed, the Court found that the ADA's legislative record does not "identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled." Id. at 368. Thus, the Court concluded that Title I was not within Congress' Fourteenth Amendmentpower, and, therefore, it cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity. Id.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have decided whether Title V is a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only Court of Appeals to have decided the issue. See Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit found that the...
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