Karcz v. Luther Mfg. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1959
• Citation: 155 N.E.2d 441,338 Mass. 313
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Louis KARCZ v. LUTHER MANUFACTURING CO. Joseph WILLIAMSON v. LUTHER MANUFACTURING CO.

Page 441

155 N.E.2d 441

338 Mass. 313

Louis KARCZ v. LUTHER MANUFACTURING CO.

Joseph WILLIAMSON v. LUTHER MANUFACTURING CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Argued Nov. 3, 1958.

Decided Jan. 13, 1959.

Philip Goltz, Fall River, for plaintiff.

Abner Kravitz, Fall River, for defendant.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, WHITTEMORE, and CUTTER, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

These are two actions of contract, each by a former employee of the defendant, to recover retirement separation pay alleged to be payable under a labor agreement between the defendant and the union of which each plaintiff was a member. A judge of the Superior Court sitting without a jury found for the defendant in each case. The plaintiffs' consolidated bill of exceptions presents the issue of the propriety of the denial of various rulings requested by the plaintiffs, respectively, and the granting of various rulings requested by the defendant.

The following facts appear from the bill of exceptions and a stipulation. ¹ The union in 1953 renewed in somewhat changed form an agreement with the Fall River Textile Manufacturers Association of which the defendant was a member. This 1953 agreement in turn was renewed on April 14, 1956. The agreement provided, under a heading 'Retirement Separation Pay,' in art. XV(A), in part ², 'Each member mill will pay retirement separation pay to each of its employees who, having attained the age of sixty-five (65), voluntarily retires from active employment by said member mill and has, at the time of his retirement, completed fifteen (15) years or more of service for the member mill with an average employment of one thousand (1,000) hours or more for each year of such service. The amount of the retirement separation pay shall be one (1) week's pay for each service year with a maximum of twenty (20) weeks' pay.' Article XV(C), (E), and (H), which also affect the issues, are set out in part in the margin. ³

The judge found that at the time of the 1956 renewal of the agreement the defendant's treasurer and an agent of the union discussed 'conditions * * * in the textile industry.' It was pointed out by the defendant's treasurer that a wage increase, then to be undertaken by the defendant, would make competition with the southern mills more difficult and that he could not 'guarantee how long we will be able to operate.'

The defendant's management decided to liquidate the defendant 'because * * * Japanese * * * imports had made it impossible to compete and operate at a profit' and gave notice of its intention on May 8, 1956. Beginning in April, as fast as a department used up material on hand, it closed. The defendant 'ceased operations completely July 31, 1956.' The plaintiff Karcz terminated his employment the first week of June, 1956. The plaintiff Williamson's work ended July 30, 1956. Neither plaintiff made any signed request or application for retirement provisions. The judge specifically found 'that at the time of the contract it was not within the contemplation of the parties, nor foreseeable by them, that the importation of Japanese textiles would destroy * * * [the defendant's] business' and 'that at the time that * * * [the defendant] terminated its business neither Karcz nor Williamson had attained the age of sixty-five years.' This latter finding was plainly warranted as to Williamson and by the conflicting evidence about Karcz's birth date.

The judge denied various requests for rulings presented by the plaintiffs and granted various requests for rulings presented by the defendant. In effect, the plaintiffs' requests (which need not be quoted in full) sought rulings that upon the evidence the defendant voluntarily ceased the operation of its mill ⁴ and thereby prevented ⁵ each plaintiff from continuing to work long enough to become entitled under the agreement to retirement separation pay and thus excused the plaintiffs from (a) further work until age sixty-five and (b) performing various formal conditions precedent, requisite under the agreement, to their becoming entitled to retirement separation pay. The plaintiffs contend in substance that the defendant by its decision and act in ceasing production operations permanently could not deprive of retirement separation pay such of its employees as would have fulfilled, prior to the expiration of the agreement on April 15, 1958, the requirements of the agreement for such retirement separation pay.

1. In view of the result which we reach, we need not decide whether the plaintiffs should have proceeded by bill in equity as in Askinas v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 330 Mass. 103, 111 N.E.2d 740. See Leonard v. Eastern Massachusetts Street Ry. Co., 335 Mass. 308, 313-315, 140 N.E.2d 187, and cases cited. We also proceed on the assumption (see Judge Traynor's careful opinion in McCarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal.2d 45, 57-60, 315 P.2d 322, certiorari denied sub nom. Los angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters v. McCarroll, 355 U.S. 932, 78 S.Ct. 413, 2 L.Ed.2d 415) that this litigation, dealing with rights of individual labor union members under their contracts of employment and the labor agreement between the union and their employer, may be passed upon by a State court, notwithstanding § 301 of the labor management relations act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. (1952) § 185, as interpreted in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 923, 1 L.Ed.2d 972, if, indeed, § 301 is applicable here at all. We have been guided in the decision of the present cases by general principles of contract law which appear to be applied with uniformity in this and other jurisdictions and would presumably form a part of any body of Federal law which may be developed under any view of what was said in the Lincoln Mills case at pages 456-457 of 353 U.S., at pages 917-918 of 77 S.Ct. No issue under that case was raised in the Superior Court or in this court and there is no occasion for extended discussion of it. See for academic speculation about the meaning of the Lincoln Mills case, Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and The Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills case, 71 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 9, 19-25. See also Woodward Iron Co. v. Ware, 5 Cir., 261 F.2d 138.

2. The problem before us is simply one of construing the 1953 agreement as applied to the facts of the present cases. The plaintiffs must establish that, under a proper construction of the agreement, they, respectively, have a valid claim to retirement separation pay. Article XV(A) gives such pay to each employee who having 'attained the age of sixty-five * * * voluntarily retires.' See also art. XV(C). The findings of the trial judge establish that neither plaintiff satisfied either of these basic requirements, for (a) each plaintiff was found not to have reached age sixty-five while an employee, and (b) his employment was terminated involuntarily as a consequence of the closing of the mill.

3. The only question remaining is whether the defendant wrongfully, by a breach of the agreement, prevented these plaintiffs, who would have reached age sixty-five during the life of the agreement, from satisfying the terms of art. XV(A).

(a) The language of art. XV(H), quoted in footnote 3, supra, seems the clearest indication that the defendant committed no breach of contract and did not act in any manner improper under the agreement. That language expressly provides that art. XV does not 'give any employee the right to be retained in * * * service * * * or to interfere with the right * * * to discharge any employee.' In the absence of proof that the action was otherwise wrongful, art. XV(A) and (H) should be applied in accordance with their plain meaning.

(b) We need not consider what the situation would be if the plaintiffs' employment had been deliberately terminated to prevent the accrual of rights under art. XV. Here there is not the slightest indication or finding of any fraud or discrimination exercised against either plaintiff. None is alleged. The termination of their employment was clearly the consequence of the general decision to close the mill caused by the economic misfortunes of the defendant. The defendant's action was not aimed at either plaintiff.

(c) Termination of employment because of permanent closing of the mill was not in violation of the contract. No provision of the agreement bound the plaintiffs to work, or the defendant to employ either plaintiff, for any particular term or for any particular service or amount of service. The plaintiffs 'could at any time leave * * * and the defendant at any time could discharge' them for just cause. See Askinas v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 330 Mass. 103, 106, 111 N.E.2d 740; Smith v. Graham Refrigeration Products Co., Inc., 333 Mass. 181, 186, 129 N.E.2d 884. A labor agreement, in the absence of provisions indicating that the parties so intended, does not imply an undertaking of the employer to stay in business and to continue operations, or to furnish any minimum amount of employment, or indeed any employment at all. We see no basis for implying any such undertaking here. See National Overall Dry Cleaning Co. v. Yavner, 321 Mass. 434, 438, 73 N.E.2d 744; United States Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 6 Cir., 229 F.2d 396, 399, 56 A.L.R.2d 980; Local 586, Intl. U. A. W., C. I. O. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 28 C.C.H. Labor Cases, par. 69,274, pp. 89,187, 89,188 (D.Conn.); Wallace v. Southern Pac. Co., D.C.N.D.Cal., 106 F.Supp. 742, 744; Local Union No. 600, United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, U. A. W.-C. I. O. v. Ford Motor Co., D.C.E.D.Mich., 113 F.Supp. 834, 843-845; Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 469-470, 9 S.W.2d 692. See also J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332, 334-336, 64 S.Ct. 576, 88 L.Ed. 762; Rothenberg, Labor Relations, pp. 398 et seq., 417; Teller, Labor Disputes and...