Karen O. v. Kijakazi

Decision Date26 July 2022
Docket NumberCIVIL 21-0626-BAH
PartiesRe Karen O. o/b/o Justin O. v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD

Brendan A. Hurson, United States Magistrate Judge

Dear Counsel:

On March 12, 2021, Karen O., on behalf of her deceased son Justin O., (Plaintiff) petitioned this Court to review the Social Security Administration's (“SSA” or Defendant or “Commissioner”) final decision to deny Plaintiff's claim for Social Security benefits. ECF 1 as amended by ECF 2. I have considered the record in this case, ECF 16, Plaintiff's motion to remand the case back to the SSA with supporting memorandum of law, ECF 21 Defendant's motion for summary judgment, ECF 22, and Plaintiff's reply, ECF 23. I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). This Court must uphold the decision of the SSA if it supported by substantial evidence and if the SSA employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will GRANT Plaintiff's motion to remand, DENY the SSA's motion for summary judgment, REVERSE the Commissioner's decision, and REMAND the case to the Commissioner for further consideration. This letter explains why.

I.PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2016,[1] Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), Tr. 214-17, and a Title XVI application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), Tr 228-37. Plaintiff's amended alleged onset date is June 1, 2016.[2]275, 295, 311. Plaintiff's claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 135-38, 139- 42, 144-47, 148-50. On September 16, 2019, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing. Tr. 45-68. On September 24, 2019, eight days after the hearing, Plaintiff died by suicide. See Pl.'s Death Certificate, ECF 21-1 (stating that Plaintiff's immediate cause of death was due to “mixed drug (fentanyl, buprenorphine, and carisoprodol) intoxication; despropionyl; mitragynine, and cocaine use”).

On October 17, 2019, the ALJ issued a decision, determining that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. Tr. 28-38. Plaintiff's mother filed a request to be designated as a substitute party on his behalf. See Tr. 69 (“Notice Regarding Substitution of Party Upon Death of Claimant). On November 18, 2019, Plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council of the ALJ decision. Tr. 210-13.

On July 9, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Tr. 13-18. Therefore, the ALJ's October 17, 2019, decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the SSA. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000); see also 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(a).

II.THE ALJ'S DECISION

Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.] 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). The ALJ is required to evaluate a claimant's disability determination using a five-step sequential evaluation process used to evaluate a claimant's disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. “Under this process, an ALJ evaluates, in sequence, whether the claimant: (1) worked during the alleged period of disability; (2) had a severe impairment; (3) had an impairment that met or equaled the requirements of a listed impairment; (4) could return to her past relevant work; and (5) if not, could perform any other work in the national economy.' Kiser v. Saul, 821 Fed.Appx. 211, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472 (4th Cir. 2012)) (citation omitted).

Here, at step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “me[t] the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2018.”[3] Tr. 30. Then, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had “not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2016, the alleged onset date.” Tr. 30. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of “depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and borderline personality disorder.” Tr. 30. The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff suffered from the non-severe impairments of “cocaine dependence with intoxication, alcohol abuse with intoxication, and opioid dependence with withdrawal.” Tr. 31 (citing Tr. 906). At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Par 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Tr. 31. Despite these impairments, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:

[P]erform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant will be off task five percent of the time; can perform simple and routine tasks; can understand and carryout simple one or two step instructions; and can have occasional interaction with coworkers, the public, and supervisors.

Tr. 32. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work but could perform other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy, such as “marker” (DOT[4] 209.587-034); “stuffer” (DOT 520.685-210); and “addresser” (DOT 209.587-101). Tr. 36-37. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 37.

III.THE APPEALS COUNCIL DENIAL

“If ‘dissatisfied' with an ALJ decision as to entitlement to disability benefits, a claimant ‘may request' that the Appeals Council review ‘that action.' Meyer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 704 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.967). “When a claimant requests review of an ALJ decision, the Appeals Council ‘may deny or dismiss the request for review, or it may grant the request and either issue a decision or remand the case to [the ALJ].' Id. (emphases in original).

On November 18, 2019, the SSA acknowledged receipt of Plaintiff's request for the Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision. Tr. 210-13. In his request, Plaintiff stated five reasons that Plaintiff alleged that the ALJ's decision was flawed. See Tr. 212. In its Notice of Appeals Council Action,” dated July 9, 2020, the Appeals Council informed Plaintiff that after considering Plaintiff's reasons for disagreeing with the ALJ's decision, it did not find a basis for changing the ALJ's decision. Tr. 13. The Appeals Council limited the scope of its denial of review, stating that [t]his letter is only about your claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits. We will send you a separate letter about your claim for supplemental security income.”[5] Tr. 13. The attached order of the Appeals Council simply acknowledged receipt of “additional evidence which it is making part of the record,” referring to the admission of Plaintiff's counsel's request for review of the ALJ's decision, Tr. 210-13, which is also marked as Exhibit 18B in the record. Tr. 17. The Appeals Council concluded that the ALJ's decision is the final decision of the Commissioner in Plaintiff's case. Tr. 13.

IV.ANALYSIS

As noted, the scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's factual findings and whether the decision was reached through the application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). “The findings of the [ALJ] . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). It is “more than a mere scintilla . . . and somewhat less than a preponderance.” Id. In conducting the “substantial evidence” inquiry, my review is limited to whether the ALJ analyzed the relevant evidence and sufficiently explained their findings and rationale in crediting the evidence. See, e.g., Sterling Smokeless Coal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 439-40 (4th Cir. 1997); DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Judicial review of an administrative decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the [ALJ].”).

A. SSI CLAIM

As an initial matter, the status of Plaintiff's SSI claim is unclear. As noted above, the Appeals Council narrowed its denial of Plaintiff's request for review to Plaintiff's DIB claim. See Tr. 13, 17. Since the Court was unable to find the Appeals Council's “separate letter about [Plaintiff's] claim for [SSI],” Tr. 13, in the record, ECF 16, and neither party addressed the issue in their respective briefs, ECFs 21, 22, 23, it remains unclear as to whether the ALJ's decision is the final, reviewable decision as to both Plaintiff's DIB and SSI claims, or solely Plaintiff's DIB claim. If the latter view is correct, review of Plaintiff's SSI claim would be out of this Court's reach, as judicial review in this context is restricted to final decisions of the SSA. See, e.g. Quattlebaum v. Saul, Case No. DLB-19-3258, 2021 WL 1225542, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2021) (discussing the scope of judicial review in the context of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)'s finality requirement in Smith v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1765, 1779 (2019), and confining the Court's review to questions that the ALJ or the Appeals Council already had the chance to address). Accordingly, the Court...

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