Coffman v. Bowen

• Decision Date: 23 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 87-1518,87-1518
• Citation: 829 F.2d 514
• Parties: , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,575 Hallie COFFMAN, as Executrix of Estate of Junior R. Coffman, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 514

829 F.2d 514

19 Soc.Sec.Rep.Ser. 73, Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,575

Hallie COFFMAN, as Executrix of Estate of Junior R. Coffman Plaintiff- Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services of the United States, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 87-1518.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 5, 1987.

Decided Sept. 23, 1987.

Montie Van Nostrand, Webster Springs, W.Va., for plaintiff-appellant.

James Anthony Winn, Asst. Regional Counsel, Office of the Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Health & Human Services (Beverly Dennis, III, Chief Counsel, Region III, Philadelphia, Pa., Charlotte Hardnett, Supervisory Assistant, Regional Counsel, Washington, D.C., Marc R. Schwartz, Asst. Regional Counsel, William A. Kolibash, U.S. Atty., Betsy C. Steinfeld, Asst. U.S. Atty., Wheeling, W. Va., on brief), for defendant-appellee.

Before ERVIN and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Senior Circuit Judge for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judge:

Hallie Coffman, as Executrix of Estate of Junior R. Coffman, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia (Kidd, J.), which affirmed the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of Junior Coffman's claim for Social Security disability benefits. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's judgment with instructions to remand to the Secretary for a computation and award of benefits.

On May 7, 1981, Junior Coffman, then fifty-six years of age, applied for disability benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 416(i) and 423, alleging an onset date of August 19, 1980. In the Secretary's initial Disability Determination, Coffman was held to have retained residual functional capacity to perform light work that did not include stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling, and his claim for benefits was denied. Coffman's request for reconsideration was denied. At the request of Coffman's counsel a hearing was held on July 23, 1982, before an administrative law judge, who determined that Coffman was not under a disability as that term is defined in the Act. The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration affirmed. Coffman commenced his district court action on December 22, 1982. On February 9, 1986, "so tired of this kind of living", Coffman committed suicide. His wife was substituted as plaintiff, and, on November 21, 1986, her complaint was dismissed.

The only witness at the administrative hearing was Coffman himself. Coffman testified that his schooling had terminated at the eighth grade and that he had worked in the coal mines for over thirty years. He said that he was hospitalized on August 20, 1980 because of a work-related injury to his back and that his attending physician at the time of the hearing was Dr. Louis Groves, whom he was seeing regularly. Coffman complained of steady and severe back pain, intermittent but severe heart pain, and difficulty with his breathing. He was taking tenormin and quinidine for his heart, butazolidin for his arthritis, spironolactone for high blood pressure, and valium, apparently for his nerves. He said that he was unable to engage in any physical activity and that Dr. Groves, his attending physician, had told him he'd never be able to do work of any kind. He also said that a Dr. Gomez had tried unsuccessfully to fit him with a back brace and had concluded that all any doctor could do was give him pain pills.

Coffman's medical history is found in the hospital records and doctors' reports that were marked in evidence. Dr. J.W. Hunter, who treated Coffman during his hospitalization, diagnosed his injury as an acute lumbosacral strain. Dr. Groves reported that Coffman had far advanced degenerative changes throughout his spine, rheumatoid arthritis with pain in multiple joints that varied in intensity and location, and x-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis. Dr. Groves concluded that "without any question this man is totally and permanently disabled for any occupation [the Secretary] might reasonably expect him to pursue."

Dr. A.C. Thompson, a consultative doctor for the Secretary who examined Coffman on June 11, 1981, reported that Coffman had chronic discogenic disease of the lumbar spine, benign hypertension and mild chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. In Dr. Thompson's opinion, these findings were disabling for heavy work. A radiologist's report forwarded by Dr. Thompson supported his finding of degenerative disc disease at L5-S1. Other medical records in evidence show that Coffman suffered from occupational pneumoconiosis with 30 percent functional impairment attributable to this disease, that he had a mild to moderate high frequency hearing loss and had lost parts of several fingers on his left hand.

A district court's primary function in reviewing an administrative finding of no disability is to determine whether the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 405(g); see Knox v. Finch, 427 F.2d 919, 920 (5th Cir.1970). However, the court's duty does not end there. A factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir.1980); Williams v. Ribicoff, 323 F.2d 231, 232 (5th Cir.1963); Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F.Supp. 776, 785 (E.D.Va.1976). Our review of the record has convinced us that the ALJ applied erroneous legal standards in making several factual findings in the instant case.

A well established rule followed with minor variations in almost every circuit is the so-called attending physicians rule. As applied in the Fourth Circuit, that rule requires that the opinion of a claimant's treating physician be given great weight and may be disregarded only if there is persuasive contradictory evidence. Foster v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 1125, 1130 (4th Cir.1986); Mitchell v. Schweiker, 699 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir.1983). The ALJ, in the instant case, after acknowledging Dr. Groves' conclusion that Coffman was disabled from gainful employment, said:

The weight to be given such conclusionary statement depends on the extent to which it is supported by specific and completed clinical findings and other evidence. I find that this conclusionary statement does not have the required support in the record.

The first quoted sentence was a misstatement of the legal principles and standards that should have guided the ALJ in making his factual findings. "A treating physician's testimony is ignored only if there is persuasive contradictory evidence." Foster v. Heckler, supra, 780 F.2d at 1130 (emphasis in original). There was no persuasive contradictory evidence in the instant case. For this reason, if for no other, the denial of benefits must be reversed.

Indeed, not only was there no persuasive contradictory evidence, there was in fact substantial supportive evidence. Dr. Groves forwarded fifteen pages of medical reports with his opinion letter, including clinical notes of seven examinations of Coffman, a treadmill workload and physical performance test, a radiological examination of Coffman's lumbar, dorsal, and cervical spine, an ecg analysis, and the results of a rheumatoid arthritis test. The findings of Dr. Hunter and Dr. Thompson already have been noted. Finally, there was the testimony of Coffman himself.

It was well established in 1982 that subjective complaints of pain and physical discomfort could give rise to a finding of total disability, even when those complaints were not supported fully by objective observable...