Karlan v. Enloe
| Decision Date | 25 April 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 48004,48004,1 |
| Citation | 198 S.E.2d 331,129 Ga.App. 1 |
| Parties | Morton KARLAN et al. v. Jean O. ENLOE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Since the plaintiffs neither took issue with the judge's announced intention to recall the jury and give them instructions on comparative negligence nor objected to the charge as given, they impliedly acceded to the proposition that comparative negligence was an issue in the case.
2. A verdict below the amount of special damages proved by uncontradicted evidence must be reversed.
3. The verdict in favor of the plaintiff wife for pain and suffering was not as a matter of law inadequate.
The five plaintiffs here are respectively Morton Karlan, owner, his wife Marilyn Karlan, driver, and their three minor children who were passengers in an automobile hit from the rear by the defendant Jean Enloe while they were stopped at a city street intersection to allow a bus approaching from the right to make a left turn in front of the Karlan vehicle. Mrs. Karlan was first treated for pain, then hospitalized for two weeks, and continued thereafter to receive treatment from various doctors, plus some additional hospital attendance, for several months. The medical witnesses differed as to the extent and permanency of disability, but the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff were in general unquestioned.
The only defense testimony relating to negligence came from the defendant herself. She testified that as she was going down an incline she saw the plaintiff's car ahead of her and thought it was in motion; that it was at the next intersection and an approaching bus was edging into the intersection at right angles, signalling a left turn in front of the plaintiff; that she watched these vehicles, she thought the plaintiff was going to hit the bus, she was distracted by the bus or not distracted but watching it because it seemed the thing to watch at the time; that she did not notice whether the plaintiff's rear lights were on, she thought the plaintiff was going to hit the bus, she did not apply her brake until about 35 paces ('35 of my steps') away, and she then skidded into the rear of the plaintiff's automobile, which was in fact stationary waiting for the bus to make its left turn before crossing the intersection. She entered a plea of guilty in traffic court to the charge of following too closely.
The jury returned verdicts in favor of each of the plaintiffs. The three children were awarded $50 each and filed no appeal. The adult Karlans appeal to this court on the ground, among others, that the verdicts and judgments as to them were inadequate and without evidence to support them.
Jack Paller, Atlanta, for appellants.
Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy, Eugene G. Partain, Daniel M. Coursey, Jr., Atlanta, for appellee.
1. After the jury had retired, counsel for the defendant called to the court's attention the fact that he had failed to instruct them on comparative negligence, at which time the plaintiff's counsel commented only that he hoped the court would also make it clear that the jury was to give no undue significance to the fact that they were called back to receive this additional charge. No objection to the charge as given was made. Thus, the plaintiff did not object to the instruction in the trial court, and inferentially acceded to it in advance. No error is shown. Colley v. Stump, 119 Ga.App. 220(2), 166 S.E.2d 616. We observe, however, that under the defendant's own testimony she was proceeding slowly, saw the plaintiff's automobile at or very near the intersection in ample time to stop in the traffic lane behind it and saw the bus easing into the intersection ahead of it, but she 'thought it was still moving' and 'thought that the plaintiff's automobile was going to hit the bus.' Since these two vehicles were immediately in front of her, and since the plaintiff could not cross the intersection until the bus got out of the way, whether she hit it or not, this seems a hardly adequate explanation of why the defendant did not stop before colliding with the plaintiff. Whether on another trial the issue of comparative negligence is properly in the case will of course be a matter for the trial judge to decide at...
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Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Boykin
...mental anguish, as an element of general compensatory damages, need not be specially pled. Cf. OCGA § 9-11-9(g); Karlan v. Enloe, 129 Ga.App. 1, 4(3), 198 S.E.2d 331 (1973). 7. Error is enumerated upon the admission over objection of evidence concerning attorney's fees. Appellant contends t......
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McClure v. Georgia Power Co., 67935
...in favor of the plaintiff. The award of the jury was for its determination based upon the evidence submitted. See Karlan v. Enloe, 129 Ga.App. 1, 4(3), 198 S.E.2d 331; Young v. Southern Bell Telephone, etc., Co., 168 Ga.App. 40, 41, 308 S.E.2d 49; Bell v. Camp, 109 Ga.App. 221, 224(4), 135 ......
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Starks v. Robinson
...one of more ancient vintage nor will we follow a decision in which one judge concurred in the judgment only [see e.g. Karlan v. Enloe, 129 Ga.App. 1, 198 S.E.2d 331 (1973) ] in preference to several cases generally concurred in by all the judges on the division [see McDonald, supra, and cas......
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Cox v. Associated Cab Co., 51745
...and without considering pain and suffering exceed the amounts awarded by the jury and that this requires a new trial. See Karlan v. Enloe, 129 Ga.App. 1, 198 S.E.2d 331. What the appellants have forgotten is that it is not the amount of special damages which may be claimed, but rather the c......