Karnes v. People Ex Rel. J. S. Rumsey.

Citation1874 WL 8976,73 Ill. 274
PartiesGEORGE KARNESv.THE PEOPLE ex rel. J. S. Rumsey.
Decision Date30 September 1874
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. HARRISON & WHITEHEAD, for the appellant.

Mr. JOHN M. ROUNTREE, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an application for an order for the sale of delinquent lands in Cook county, and lots in the city of Chicago, by the county treasurer and ex-officio collector, for taxes for the year 1871. The application was made to the February term, 1873, of the county court. It was resisted by appellants on the grounds that, under the law, the court had no right to convene on the first Monday of the month, but should have met on the third Monday; because the collector gave notice that he would sell such lands and lots as he might recover an order to sell, on the tenth day of the following March, being the fifth Monday after the commencement of the court at which the application was made, when it is contended that the law required the sale on the fourth Monday thereafter; and because the year for which the tax was due is not named in the collector's report. Notwithstanding the objections, the county court rendered an order for the sale of the land for the taxes due, from which order an appeal was prosecuted to the circuit court, where on a trial the judgment was affirmed; and to reverse that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

It is urged that under the present constitution, and the general laws of the State, it was illegal for the Cook county court to meet on the first Monday of the month, but should have met on the third. Reference is made to the 29th section of article 6 of the constitution, which provides that “All laws relating to courts shall be general and of uniform operation; and the organization, jurisdiction, powers, proceedings and practice of all courts of the same class or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and effect of the process, judgments and decrees of such courts severally, shall be uniform.” By the act of the 21st of February, 1859, p. 95, section 11, it is provided that, “The terms of the county courts of this State for the transaction of probate business shall be held on the third Mondays of each month, instead of on the first Mondays of each month.” By an act of the General Assembly, adopted February 28th, 1867, (Sess. Laws, p. 71,) it was enacted that terms of the county court of Cook county should be held on the first Monday in each month.

The argument is that the constitution repealed this act of 1867, as it requires all laws relating to courts to be general and of uniform operation, and this act being special, the general law of 1859 must govern, and the court could only convene on the third Monday in each month. Constitutions, like all other laws, must have a reasonable and practical interpretation. To give this language a literal application, would require all courts in the State to meet on the same day, and the terms to be of the same length. This could not have been intended, because it must have been apparent to the framers of that instrument that such a thing could never be carried into effect. The business in one circuit or one county would be manyfold greater than in another; hence more time would be required in the one than in the other. The circumstances of the people, the difference in climate in different portions of our State, and a variety of circumstances, render it almost if not absolutely necessary that our courts should meet at different times.

It would seem that a literal application of this language would require all laws to apply to the Supreme, circuit, county, city and justices' courts, and to be general and uniform. That all of these courts should be required to meet at the same time, and have terms of the same length, would be an absurdity that we can not attribute to the body of men who framed our fundamental law. Without stopping to inquire to what this language should be confined, we have no hesitation in saying that it can not apply to the time when these several courts shall meet, or the length of their terms. Nor do we see that the remaining language of that section makes such a requirement. This objection is therefore not well taken.

It is next urged the notice of the sale of the lands was to a wrong day, and hence the order of sale could not be legally made. On the 22d of March, 1872, (Sess. Laws 1871-2, p. 667,) an act was adopted relating to the revenue and its collection, which, by the 10th section, provides that the notice of sale of lands for delinquent taxes and assessments be given for the second Monday of the month...

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16 cases
  • People ex rel. Rusch v. Ladwig
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • April 7, 1937
    ...of the constitution, are universally recognized as constitutional and valid. In discussing this matter, it was said, in Karnes v. People ex rel. Rumsey, 73 Ill. 274: ‘Constitutions, like all other laws, must have a reasonable and practical interpretation. To give this language a literal app......
  • Gage v. Busse
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 31, 1880
    ...v. The People, 78 Ill. 570. Objection that portions of the tax were unconstitutional should have been urged in the court below: Karnes v. The People, 73 Ill. 274. The records of a court import absolute verity and evidence to prove want of jurisdiction will not be received if the records aff......
  • Hutchinson v. Self
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 26, 1894
    ...such facts as would show the invalidity of the tax. Durham v. People, 67 Ill. 414;Mix v. People, 81 Ill. 118;Id. 86 Ill. 312;Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274;Buck v. People, 78 Ill. 560; Chiniquy v. People, Id. 570; Frew v. Taylor, 106 Ill. 159;Bracket v. People, 115 Ill. 29, 3 N. E. 723. In t......
  • Indiana, D.&W. Ry. Co. v. People ex rel. Jones
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1903
    ...the points raised by such objections, and the presumption is that all else is admitted to be correct and free from objection. In Karnes v. People, 73 Ill. 274, we said (page 280): ‘It would be a perversion of justice to permit a party to raise specific objections, and contest the rendition ......
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