People ex rel. Rusch v. Ladwig

• Decision Date: 07 April 1937
• Docket Number: No. 23576.,23576.
• Citation: 365 Ill. 574,7 N.E.2d 313
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. RUSCH v. LADWIG et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

365 Ill. 574

7 N.E.2d 313

PEOPLE ex rel. RUSCH

v.LADWIG et al.

No. 23576.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 18, 1937.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1937.

Error to Cook County Court; Edmund K. Jarecki, Judge.

Contempt proceeding by the People, on the relation of John L. Rusch, against Edward Ladwig and others. The defendants were found guilty of contempt, and they bring error.

Affirmed.Thomas D. Nash, Michael J. Ahern, Louis Greenberg, and Mayer Goldberg, all of Chicago, for plaintiffs in error.

Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., and Ditchburne & Lounsbury, all of Chicago (Thomas J. Johnson, Jr., of Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.

STONE, Justice.

Plaintiffs in error seek a reversal of the judgment of the county court of Cook county adjudging them in contempt of court for misconduct while serving as judges of election in the city of Chicago, and sentencing them to imprisonment for one year in the county jail of Cook county. They bring the cause directly here on the ground that constitutional questions are involved concerning the validity of the City Election Act (Smith-Hurd Ill. Stats. c. 46, § 159 et seq.). Their counsel attack section 13 of article 2 of that act (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 46, § 186). Notwithstanding this section of the City Election Act has been repeatedly sustained by this court since the case of People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596,8 N.E. 788,56 Am.Rep. 793, counsel here say that they have new grounds of attack. As to some of their points, counsel seem to confuse new ground of attack with new argument on old grounds. This court has held that when an act, though sustained as valid, is attacked on grounds not previously examined by this court, it will take jurisdiction to consider such grounds of attack, but that does not mean that because counsel may have thought of some argument not pressed upon the court concerning a ground of attack previously passed upon, such will justify the taking of the case or consideration of the court. This court has so many times made this announcement that there should be no misunderstanding on the part of counsel concerning it.

One ground of attack here is, that section 13 of article 2 of the City Election Act is in violation of section 18 of article 6 of the Constitution, in that it is not a general law as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. They say that the jurisdiction of county courts can be extended only by an amendment of the Act of March 26, 1874 (Smith-Hurd Ill. Stats. c. 37, § 171 et seq.), to extend the jurisdiction of such courts; that the language of section 18 of article 6 means that extension of jurisdiction of the county court must be by ‘a’ general law, and that there being a general law for extension of county court jurisdiction, further jurisdiction can be conferred only by amendment of that act. While this is but another phase of an argument answered by this court in People ex rel. Rusch v. Enger, 364 Ill. 464, 4 N.E.(2d) 870;People v. White, 334 Ill. 465, 166 N.E. 100;People v. Gordon, 274 Ill. 462, 113 N.E. 864, 866;Sherman v. People, 210 Ill. 552, 71 N.E. 618, and People v. Hoffman, supra, we will again say that section 13 of article 2 of the act in question is not in violation of section 18 of article 6 of the Constitution. In the first place, the constitutional provision is not that further jurisdiction may be given to county courts by ‘a’ general law, but the language is ‘such other jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law.’ Obviously, any law, general in its nature, providing other jurisdiction for the county court, complies with section 18 of article 6. In People v. Gordon, supra, citing People v. Hoffman, 116 Ill. 587, 5 N.E. 596,8 N.E. 788,56 Am.Rep. 793, where this same objection was raised, this court said: ‘This Election Law is not local or special because of the limited number of cities, towns, and villages which may have adopted it. It may rather be said of it that it is general, because of the possibility that all the cities, towns, and villages in the state may accept its provisions, if they choose.’ While counsel for plaintiffs in error concede that this court has decided that the law is not local or special, yet they say this court has not determined whether such additional jurisdiction can be only by amendment to the County Court Act. If the act is general, as these cases hold that it is, section 18 of article 6 is complied with. There is nothing in that section of the Constitution limiting the Legislature to a single act. This contention is without merit.

It is next contended that the act violates the fifth clause of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution which declares that no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only but the law revived or the section amended shall be inserted at length in the new act. The argument supporting this claim of invalidity is that section 13 of article 2 of the act affects the jurisdiction of county courts and so is an amendment to the County Court Act. They say this has never been passed upon and rely upon Nelson v. Hoffman, 314 Ill. 616, 145 N.E. 688, and People ex rel. v. Stevenson, 272 Ill. 325, 111 N.E. 1018. In the Nelson Case the act held violative of section 13 of article 4 was an act to amend an act regarding chattel mortgages by adding thereto a section known as section 4a (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 95, § 4a note). Under the original act, section 4 (Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 95, § 4 note) declared every chattel mortgage acknowledged and recorded in accordance with the act, if bona fide, good and valid against all the world from the time of filing for record. The only purpose in the enactment of section 4a was to amend section 4 so that mortgages acknowledged and recorded should be valid liens, from the time of filing for record, against everybody except creditors of the mortgagor, as to whom they were not valid liens unless filed for record within ten days after execution. As is clearly seen, the enactment there considered was of the exact kind against which section 13 of article 4 is aimed. Both sections there considered dealt with the filing for record of chattel mortgages. The only purpose of section 4a was to change section 4 so that such mortgages should not be valid prior liens against all the world. Such a case is not analogous to the situation before us. So with the Stevenson Case, where an act known as the Real Estate Agency Corporation Act (Laws 1915, p. 330), amended sections 1 and 5 of the General Incorporation Act (Laws 1871-72, p. 296) without setting up the amended sections in full in the new act. It was there held that the act did nothing more than change the provisions of those sections of the General Incorporation Act and for that reason those sections should have been set out. It is contended here that section 13 of article 2 of the City Election Act changes the act of 1874 relating to jurisdiction of county courts. This is a misapprehension. No existing jurisdiction of county courts is changed or affected in any manner. The fact that new or additional jurisdiction not in any way conflicting with that already vested in the county court is given by an act, independent and complete in itself, does not bring the section within the prohibition of section 13 of article 4. Many examples occur in the statutes where the effect of an independent act is to change, by implication, parts of a previous act, yet such are not in violation of section 13 of article 4, though the former sections are not copied into the new act. For example, in the case of contests of election, the statute on elections confers jurisdiction on the county court in certain specific contests not necessarily included in the jurisdiction conferred by the County Court Act. Many other cases appear in the Statutes.

In Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593, this court said: ‘The mischief intended to be remedied by the constitution was that of the amendment of statutes by reference to their titles only. Under the practice which had prevailed, to amend a previous act merely by reference to its title, and in the insertion or striking out of certain words, or the making of some substitution therein, the amendatory act, of itself, would be unintelligible, and it would require examination, and comparison with the prior act, to understand what the real purport of the amendatory act was,-hence the constitutional inhibition that ‘no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only;’ and in remedy of the evil the further provision is, ‘but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act.’' It was there held that sections 1 and 3 of an act entitled, ‘An Act to restrict the powers of counties, cities, towns and villages in licensing dram shops,’ etc. (Laws 1883, p. 92 [Smith-Hurd Ill.Stats. c. 43, §§ 110, 183 notes]), did not violate the provisions of section 13 of article 4, though it was claimed that they amended the Dram Shop Act of 1874, without setting forth the sections amended in full. It was there said: ‘It is not perceived what purpose of use, or what intent of the constitution, would be subserved by the republication of chapter 43 of the Revised Statutes as a part of the act of June 15, 1883.’

In Hollingsworth v. Chicago & Carterville Coal Co., 243 Ill. 98, 90 N.E. 276, 277, the rule to be observed in determining whether an act violates this clause of section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, was well put by the late Justice Cartwright, as follows: ‘If the act is complete in itself without reference to the general act, it does not contravene the constitutional provision merely for the reason that it repeals, modifies, or amends, by implication, the general act. Any new provision of law may in some sense be said to amend and change the prior system of laws, and whenever there is an irreconcilable conflict between two acts the later one must prevail. To the extent of the conflict the...