Kartte v. Davis
Decision Date | 06 May 2022 |
Docket Number | Civil Action 21-3310 (JEB) |
Parties | FELIX KARTTE, Plaintiff, v. TREVOR HUGH DAVIS, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
While the COVID-19 pandemic has prodded companies all over the world to switch to remote work, this transition is not necessarily a panacea for employment disputes, as this case proves. Plaintiff Felix Kartte, a Berlin resident, was hired by Defendants Trevor Hugh Davis and his D.C.-based security-consulting companies, CounterAction, LLC and ToSomeone, Inc., as their “Director of European Operation” in September 2020. According to Kartte promises of a hiring bonus, equity, and the creation of a German subsidiary never materialized; instead, Davis began subjecting him to abuse and disparagement, ultimately terminating him in late November of the same year. Plaintiff's ensuing lawsuit alleges various torts including defamation, fraud, and tortious interference with business relations, as well as discriminatory violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act and breach of contract. In now moving to dismiss all nine counts, Defendants maintain that the operative Second Amended Complaint is replete with legal and factual deficiencies. As half a loaf is better than none for both sides, the Court awards each a partial victory granting the Motion as to some counts and denying it as to others.
The Court, as it must at this stage, draws the facts from the Second Amended Complaint, presuming them to be true. See Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Davis owns and operates both CounterAction and ToSomeone, which are located here in Washington and “provide consulting and other services with regard to, among other things, digital intelligence including threat assessments, risk management, and information operations.” ECF No. 9 (Second Amended Complaint), ¶ 13. Davis and Kartte, who lives in Germany's capital, began speaking in May of 2020, and Plaintiff ultimately accepted a job with him that September. Id., ¶¶ 14-15. “Under the terms of this contractual employment relationship, Defendant hired Plaintiff for the position of ‘Director of European Operation' of CounterAction, which Defendant characterized as a full-time, salaried senior-management-level position.” Id., ¶ 16. Davis promised Kartte a hiring bonus and an annual $130, 000 salary, as well as equity in the company to begin three months after his employment commenced. Id., ¶¶ 17-18. He also informed Plaintiff that he “planned to open a subsidiary company in Berlin, Germany, specifically to accommodate Plaintiff's employment.” Id., ¶ 19.
This transatlantic partnership had barely left the docks, however, when heavy weather set in: “[I]mmediately after Plaintiff's employment with Defendants began, Defendant started treating Plaintiff with extreme abusiveness and hostility on a regular, ongoing, and continuous basis.” Id., ¶ 23. This devolved such that Id., ¶ 28. The next step was Davis's termination of Kartte in which he said, “You are fired, you dishonest evil bastard.” Id., ¶ 29.
This, unfortunately, does not represent the end of our voyage, as the acrimony only escalated. Davis, for example, allegedly “threated Plaintiff to disclose his mother's address to the police” and to have Interpol or the FBI show up at his or his mother's house. Id., ¶ 35. He also warned Kartte that if he did not sign a non-disparagement agreement, he would contact Plaintiff's business associates and pass on derogatory information. Id., ¶ 36. No idle threat this: Davis did in fact convey false and misleading information about Kartte to “numerous individuals with whom Plaintiff has had professional connections.” Id., ¶ 37. For example, in early December, he emailed one of Kartte's business contacts: “Felix stole our intellectual property and now he is extorting me.” Id., ¶ 38. He also disclosed that Plaintiff is gay to “numerous, important business contacts” “in an effort to humiliate and embarrass Plaintiff.” Id., ¶ 39. Davis also contacted two German journalists and “falsely told them that Plaintiff had extorted him, and falsely accused Plaintiff of having shared confidential information from his previous job with Defendant.” Id., ¶ 44. Defendant additionally shared these characterizations in public tweets. Id., ¶¶ 50-51. Finally, Kartte also alleges that Davis continued to threaten and harass him directly in the months after he left his employ. Id., ¶¶ 61-66.
After two prior attempts, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading here. That document alleges nine separate counts: Defamation (Count I) for Davis's publishing on Twitter and to business associates statements regarding Plaintiff's alleged extortion and theft of trade secrets; DCHRA Violations (II, IV, V) for discrimination via both termination and a hostile work environment based on sexual orientation, race, and national origin; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 Violation (III) for race discrimination; Tortious Interference with Business Relations (VI) for telling business associates of Plaintiff's about his purported crimes; Fraudulent Misrepresentation (VII) in the enticing of Kartte to join Defendant's business; Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (VIII) for the threatening and harassing messages; and Breach of Contract (IX) for not delivering on promised features of Plaintiff's employment.
Defendants now move to dismiss all counts at least in part.
In evaluating Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, the Court must “treat the complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff ‘the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'” Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113 (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The Court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, ” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the Complaint. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
In general, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear her claims. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). It is, however, “axiomatic that . . . courts may raise the issue sua sponte” even when the parties no longer contest it. See NetworkIP, LLC v. FCC, 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Athens Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Indeed, a court has an “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority, ” Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001), and “no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction” upon it where such jurisdiction does not exist. See NetworkIP, 548 F.3d at 120 (quoting Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). A plaintiff's factual allegations will thus “bear closer scrutiny” in resolving jurisdictional issues than in resolving a motion for failure to state a claim. Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police, 185 F.Supp.2d at 13-14 (quoting 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350 (2d ed. 1987)).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in contrast, seeks the dismissal of an action where a complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citation omitted). For a complaint to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, the facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
As Defendants move to dismiss all of the counts at least in part, the Court proceeds through them in the following order: Defamation (I), DCHRA (II, IV, and V), Tortious Interference with Business Relationships (VI), Fraudulent Misrepresentation (VII), IIED (VIII), and Breach of Contract (IX). Plaintiff concedes that Count III, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, should be dismissed, so the Court will spill no ink on that cause of action. See ECF No. 15 (Opposition) at 15.
One threshold matter deserves attention, as it affects many of the counts. As part of his Opposition, Kartte attaches no fewer than 100 exhibits, many of which he then cites in support of his various arguments. See ECF No. 16 (Exhs.); see also, e.g., Opp. at 9, 12, 17, 19, 21. While record evidence would certainly be appropriate (and essential) at summary judgment, the Court at this stage considers only the allegations in the operative Complaint. The only relevant exception here, as noted below, concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, on which issue the Court may look beyond the four corners of the Complaint. See Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc., 402 F.3d at 1253 (court may consider materials outside pleadings on 12(b)(1) motion). As a result, in its ensuing Rule 12(b)(6) discussion, the Court will ignore the aforementioned exhibits.
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