Kasparian v. County of Los Angeles

Decision Date14 September 1995
Docket NumberNo. B080752,B080752
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7304, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 12,402 Avedis KASPARIAN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants.

DeWitt W. Clinton, County Counsel, J. Patrick Joyce, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Riordan & McKinzie, Kenneth Klein and Gina M. Calvelli, Yacoubian & Zerunyan, Frank Vram Zerunyan, Robie & Matthai, Pamela E. Dunn, Raiskin & Revitz, Steven J. Revitz, Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and John L. Segal, Los Angeles, for defendants and appellants.

Bruce Altschuld, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

CROSKEY, Associate Justice.

In this appeal, the defendants and appellants, County of Los Angeles, Michael D. Antonovich, an elected member of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (collectively, the "County defendants"), Western Jewelry Mart Joint Venture ("Joint Venture"), Kirkor Suri and Jak Sukyas (collectively, the "WJM defendants") seek to overturn a seven figure judgment, including both compensatory and punitive damages, entered on November 1, 1993, in favor of the plaintiff and respondent Avedis Kasparian.

Plaintiff's claim, as it went to the jury, was based on an alleged conspiracy between the County defendants on the one hand and the WJM defendants on the other to intentionally interfere with the prospective economic advantage anticipated by plaintiff from certain negotiations to resolve partnership and other disputes between plaintiff and the WJM defendants. Because we conclude that (1) such an interference tort could not legally be committed by the WJM defendants, and thus there could be no conspiracy as a matter of law, (2) there was no substantial evidence that Antonovich had the requisite knowledge or intent to commit, or conspire to commit, that same tort, and (3) there was no substantial evidence that the acts of Antonovich caused the damages claimed by plaintiff, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions to enter judgment in favor of the defendants.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1

The Joint Venture, a general partnership, was formed in 1978 to own and operate the Jewelry Mart building at 6th and Hill Streets in downtown Los Angeles. The defendants Sukyas and Suri were two of its five general partners. 2 At the time that the Joint Venture The lease was then renegotiated and the restaurant space was converted to thirty-six sales booths (measuring between 70 and 100 square feet each) which were in turn subleased by plaintiff to various retail jewelers. Plaintiff's leased portion of the ground floor of the Jewelry Mart building (about 3,600 square feet) became known as Plaza II. The remaining portion was known as Plaza I and the Joint Venture, as lessor, leased similar booths in that space to retail jewelers. This resulted in the ground floor of the building (about 8,000 square feet) being devoted to retail jewelry businesses. The other eleven floors of the twelve story building were leased to wholesale jewelers.

purchased the building, a restaurant occupied part of the ground floor. Shortly after the Joint Venture purchased the building the restaurant sold its leasehold interest to plaintiff. 3

At some point prior to May of 1980, a dispute arose between the Joint Venture and plaintiff over the payment of his rent obligations under the lease. This dispute was ultimately resolved on May 1, 1980 by the formation of a limited partnership known as the Plaza II Partnership ("Plaza II"). The Joint Venture was the general partner and plaintiff was the limited partner. The purpose of the partnership was to manage the business, renting the thirty-six jewelry booths. The Joint Venture had the responsibility under the partnership agreement for managing the business, renting the spaces, collecting rent, providing maintenance and upkeep, paying all expenses and dividing the net revenue. Plaintiff had no management responsibilities but he was entitled to 50% of the net revenue and all "key money" paid by tenants. 4 Plaza II was to last until May 31, 1999, the date of the termination of the master lease between plaintiff and the Joint Venture.

At the inception of Plaza II's operations it produced only enough revenue to pay plaintiff about $2,000 per month. However, by 1988, the year most relevant to our concerns, plaintiff was being paid, as his share of the net revenue, between $20,000 and $25,000 per month. Under the terms of the partnership agreement plaintiff, upon the termination of Plaza II, would receive nothing, as the partnership's only asset was the leasehold interest to a portion of the ground floor of the Jewelry Mart building.

For a time Plaza II was very successful. In the early 1980's there were relatively few jewelers compared to the demand. However, by 1991 this had changed as more and more jewelry plazas opened in the downtown area. Business dropped, leases expired and profits diminished. The testimony at trial reflected that a recession had hit the jewelry business by the end of the 1980's from which it had not recovered by the time of the trial of this action.

Another dispute arose in 1982 between the Joint Venture and plaintiff over monies allegedly due to plaintiff for construction work and expenses incurred in connection with the conversion of the restaurant space into thirty-six jewelry booths. Plaintiff filed suit and, after a summary judgment in favor of the Joint Venture was reversed on appeal, the case went to trial in August of 1988 (the "construction case"). Judgment was entered in plaintiff's favor on November 16, 1988 for $247,000 (the "construction judgment"). This judgment was ultimately paid in 1991 after it was affirmed on appeal in February of that year.

In March 1988, before the construction case went to trial, plaintiff filed another action While certain law and motion matters were pending, the assigned trial judge (the Hon. Eric Younger) ordered the parties into a settlement conference with retired Justice Robert Feinerman. They had two meetings with him, one on October 14, and the other on October 19, 1988. Prior to the first conference, the Joint Venture had determined to resolve the entire matter by offering to buy-out plaintiff's interest in Plaza II. At the October 14 conference they offered to pay $1.8 million to plaintiff. He rejected this offer and demanded $3 million. This counter-offer was unacceptable to the Joint Venture.

against the Joint Venture arising out of still another dispute over the management and operation of Plaza II (the "partnership case"). Plaintiff claimed that the Joint Venture had misappropriated funds belonging to Plaza II and he sought an accounting, the appointment of a receiver and damages. He did not seek dissolution of Plaza II nor did he seek any remedy which would have forced the Joint Venture to buy out his interest in that partnership. The Joint Venture cross-complained against plaintiff seeking money damages for his alleged interference with its ability to refinance the Jewelry Mart building.

At the October 19, 1988 meeting, the Joint Venture raised its offer to $2 million, which was intended to resolve the partnership case and the then anticipated construction judgment as well. Plaintiff again rejected this offer and demanded $3 million. The attorney representing plaintiff at that time suggested that the Joint Venture structure its offer in such a way that a larger portion of the payment could be allocated to plaintiff's personal injury damages (i.e., emotional distress) so that the income tax consequences to both parties would be such as would enable them to reach a settlement. This proposal was ultimately rejected by the Joint Venture apparently because of concerns as to its legality.

Plaintiff seemed to testify at trial that an agreement was reached to buy out his interest in Plaza II for $2.5 million, subject to the approval of the accountants. However, we are uncertain what to make of this claim. In his testimony, plaintiff indicated that this was to be net to him (which is more consistent than inconsistent with a $3 million gross settlement). 5 Moreover, in his own pre-trial deposition testimony and answers to interrogatories, plaintiff denied that any settlement had been made; and the testimony of all other witnesses negated the making of any such agreement. When the parties appeared in front of Judge Younger for a mandatory settlement conference on November 4, 1988, nothing was said about an agreement; indeed, the lack of a settlement prompted the setting of a trial date at that time. At oral argument in this appeal, plaintiff's On November 4, 1988, Judge Younger determined that the case had not been settled by Justice Feinerman's efforts. He therefore set the trial date for November 28, 1988. The parties appeared in Judge Younger's courtroom on that date ready to go to trial. However, due to the court's congested calendar, the case trailed for several days. On December 2, Judge Younger continued the trial to February 27, 1989.

counsel denied that any "firm or formal" agreement had ever been made to buy-out plaintiff's interest in Plaza II. Actually, one of his legal arguments before this court is inconsistent with any contention that he had a contract with the Joint Venture for a buy-out of his partnership interest. 6

Sometime in late October or early November 1988, but after the second settlement conference on October 19, Suri, who was a financial and political supporter of Antonovich, telephoned him to arrange a luncheon meeting with the several Joint Venture partners, including the WJM defendants. There was evidence that it was about this time that Suri had advanced $10,000 to purchase two tables at a fund raising event being held for Antonovich, who was then running for re-election to his supervisorial seat. 7 The...

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