Kasper v. City of Middletown
| Decision Date | 13 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.3:02 CV 844 (CF).,CIV.A.3:02 CV 844 (CF). |
| Citation | 352 F.Supp.2d 216 |
| Parties | Hope KASPER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIDDLETOWN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
John R. Williams, Williams & Pattis, New Haven, CT, for Plaintiffs.
James M. Sconzo, Kevin R. Brady, Halloran & Sage, Lewis K. Wise, Elizabeth J. Robbin, Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle, Hartford, CT, Trina A. Solecki-Aucaigne, City Attorneys Office City of Middletown, Middletown, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Hope Kasper and Helen Kerkes brought this action against the City of Middletown ("Middletown"), Debra Moore ("Moore"), and Local 466, Council 4, of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO ("Local 466" or "Union"), alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the Connecticut common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count One alleges that Middletown discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their sex, and Count Two alleges that Local 466 discriminated against the plaintiffs on the same basis. Count Three alleges that Middletown and Local 466 engaged in concerted action to deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Count Four alleges that defendants Middletown and Local 466 jointly committed the state law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.2
Middletown has filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment. Local 466 has filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment.
Kasper and Kerkes are long-time employees of Middletown, and at one time belonged to Local 466, which represents Middletown municipal employees and employees of the Middletown Board of Education.
Local 466 is considered a "wall-to-wall" bargaining unit, in that it represents all Middletown municipal employees, regardless of job classification. The union contains two general categories of employees: those employed in "white-collar" jobs, who are predominantly female, and those employed in "blue-collar" jobs, who are predominantly male. Kasper and Kerkes (both white-collar employees) allege that the distinction between white- and blue-collar workers is based on sex rather than job classification, and that Local 466 and Middletown conspired to treat the white-collar portion of the union less favorably because those workers were predominantly women. Kasper and Kerkes claim that the defendants' discriminatory conduct came to a head as Local 466's collective bargaining agreement was set to expire in June 1999.
In January 1999, both plaintiffs ran for office in Local 466. Kasper sought election as the union's president, while Kerkes ran for election as First Vice President.4 The union election was held on January 21, 1999. Kasper and Kerkes both lost their races. They then (along with one of the losing blue-collar divisional vice president candidates) formally protested the election results to a judicial panel of Local 466's parent union, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees ("AFSCME"). Kasper's and Kerkes' principal complaint was that election officials improperly had counted absentee ballots in the final total, when such ballots are prohibited by AFSCME rules.5 If only walk-in votes had been counted, Kasper and Kerkes both would have won their respective races. On April 22, 1999, the AFSCME judicial panel ruled that although absentee ballots indeed were prohibited, the confusion within Local 466 on this item meant that discounting the absentee ballots cast would disenfranchise some union members.6 AFSCME ordered a new election to be held within forty days of its ruling.7
At the same time that they were protesting the Local 466 election results, Kasper and Kerkes assisted the Connecticut Independent Labor Union ("CILU") in soliciting support from white-collar union members to force a different election, this time on the issue of whether there should be an independent white-collar bargaining unit. CILU filed a petition with the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations ("SBLR") on January 28, 1999, seeking to "carve out" the white-collar employees from Local 466 and represent them as an independent union. An election on the proposed carve-out was held on May 13, 1999. White-collar workers had the choice of four options: 1) to elect representation by CILU; 2) to elect continued representation by Local 466; 3) to elect representation by an AFSCME bargaining unit distinct from Local 466; or 4) to have no union representation at all. The white-collar workers voted to form a separate union affiliated with CILU.8 Because the pro-CILU vote would create a new union in the state, the proposed change had to be ratified by the Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations. On April 13, 2000, the State Board of Labor Relations denied CILU's request to carve out the white-collar employees into their own unit (notwithstanding the election results), ruling that the white-collar employees did not possess sufficiently unique job characteristics to warrant a separate union. The carve-out election results were dismissed, and the white-collar employees remained members of Local 466.
While these various proceedings were pending, Local 466 was operating under a collective bargaining agreement that expired June 30, 1999. As Local 466 and Middletown sought to begin negotiating a successor agreement, the SBLR was still considering the white-collar employees' carve-out request. On August 5, 1999, Local 466 and Middletown entered into an agreement to negotiate for a new blue-collar contract, and included a clause that should the SBLR deny the carve-out, the scope of negotiations would expand to cover all issues pertaining to white-collar workers.9 Based in part upon that signed agreement, Middletown and Local 466 entered into a new contract on April 6, 2000. The blue-collar workers enjoyed the higher salaries and benefits of the new contract immediately. As the contract was retroactive to June 30, 1999, blue-collar workers also received an additional payout to make them whole as of that date.
Approximately a week later, the State Board of Labor Relations issued its decision denying a separate bargaining unit to the white-collar employees. An extension of Local 466's new collective bargaining agreement, also applying its terms to white-collar workers, then was signed on October 25, 2000. At that point, the white-collar workers began to receive the same salary and benefit increases as the blue-collar workers; white-collar employees also received supplementary compensation to make them whole for the retroactive period of June 30, 1999 until October 25, 2000. The extension of the collective bargaining agreement to white-collar workers made no other changes to the original contract, apart from a few amendments relating to the work schedules of communication dispatchers.10
Kasper and Kerkes allege that due to their involvement in these events, they suffered various acts of discrimination. On August 24, 2000, Kasper filed a complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities ("CHRO") against Middletown and Local 466 alleging gender discrimination, retaliation and harassment. Kerkes filed a virtually identical complaint with the CHRO on August 28, 2000.
Under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[i]f, on a motion ... to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment...." Defendants Middletown and Local 466 each filed their pending motions as motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, as motions for summary judgment. As part of those motions, each defendant also filed a Rule 56 statement. The plaintiffs responded to defendants' motions by submitting their own Rule 56 statement. As all these statements concern details outside the pleadings, their consideration by the Court requires that the pending motions be deemed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.11 See Dacourt Group, Inc. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 747 F.Supp. 157, 159-60 (D.Conn.1990).
In the context of a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, however, the Court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992). Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991); see also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir.1992).
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