Kassab v. San Diego Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 22 September 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 07-cv-01071-BAS(JLB)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: STEVE KASSAB, Plaintiff, v. SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

STEVE KASSAB, Plaintiff, v. SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 07-cv-01071-BAS(JLB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

September 22, 2015

ORDER:

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR ALTERNATIVELY FOR AMENDMENT OF THE JUDGMENT (ECF NOS. 280, 281, 282, 283); AND

(2) GRANTING EX PARTE MOTION TO FILE LATE RESPONSE BRIEF (ECF NO. 288)

Presently before this Court is a motion filed by plaintiff Steve Kassab ("Plaintiff") for a new trial or, alternatively, for amendment of the judgment (ECF No. 280, 281, 282, 283). Plaintiff commenced this civil rights action on June 12, 2007. From March 3, 2015 through March 6, 2015, a jury trial was held on the only remaining issue in the case: whether defendants Skinner and Hernandez (collectively "Defendants") used excessive force by subjecting Plaintiff to excessive heat during his arrest on July 13, 2006. (See Pretrial Order, ECF No. 232 at pp. 1-2.) On March 6, 2015, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants and judgment was enteredaccordingly. (See Jury Verdict, ECF No. 272; Judgment, ECF No. 275.) Plaintiff now moves for a new trial, or alternatively for amendment of the judgment, on several grounds. Defendants oppose (ECF No. 289).¹

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion for a new trial or, alternatively, for amendment of the judgment is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 12, 2007, Plaintiff commenced this action against the San Diego Police Department, City of San Diego, City Attorney's Office, and several police officers. The First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), the operative complaint, was filed on April 25, 2008 alleging a violation of (1) California Civil Code § 51 et seq, (2) false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (incorporating unlawful search and seizure in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983), (3) assault/threat and intimidation/retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (5) excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 49.)

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on October 17, 2008. (ECF No. 81.) On September 22, 2009, the Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in its entirety. (ECF No. 123.) The Court granted summary judgment onPlaintiff's causes of action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for assault/threat and intimidation/retaliation, unlawful arrest without probable cause, and unlawful search and seizure, finding they are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 475 (1994) because they seek to attack the validity or duration of Plaintiff's confinement, for which the exclusive remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at pp. 5-7.) The Court also granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's excessive force claims against the individual officer defendants, finding they are entitled to qualified immunity, and on Plaintiff's excessive force claims against the entity defendants, finding they are immune from suit under the Monell doctrine. (Id. at pp. 7-11.) The Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law causes of action. (Id. at pp. 11-12.)

On October 16, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. (ECF No. 125.) On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court's summary judgment order. (ECF No. 140.) The Court reversed on Plaintiff's excessive force claim against the individual officers. In reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated:

The district court also granted summary judgment on Kassab's excessive force claim against the individual officers alleging that he was subjected to excessive heat. The district court concluded that qualified immunity applied because the force used was de minimus and because it was not clearly established that the officers' conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

However, in his verified amended complaint and his declaration in opposition to summary judgment, Kassab stated that he was detained in a police car for more than four hours, with the windows rolled up, no air conditioning, and an interior temperature of 115 degrees. According to his sworn statements, Kassab suffered from heat stroke, had difficulty breathing, and almost passed out several times. These facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Kassab, create a triable dispute as to whether defendants used excessive force. See Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 781 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen an officer's conduct is so patently violative of the constitutional right that reasonable officials would know without guidance from the courts that the action was unconstitutional, closely analogous pre-existing case law is not required to show that the law is clearly established." (citation andinternal quotation marks omitted)); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 651 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing factors for determining whether the force used was excessive, and stating that the test for reasonableness is often a jury question).

Accordingly, we reverse summary judgment on Kassab's claim as to the individual officers and remand for further proceedings.

(Id.)

After the Ninth Circuit's order was issued, the defendants moved to dismiss all parties except for defendant officers Skinner and Hernandez and to limit the issues to be tried. The Court granted the motion and dismissed all parties except for defendant officers Skinner and Hernandez. (ECF No. 181.) The Court further limited the trial to the excessive force claim that allegedly took place on July 13, 2006. (Id.)

Starting on March 3, 2015, the Court held a 4-day jury trial on Plaintiff's excessive force claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants and the Court entered judgment accordingly. (See ECF Nos. 272, 275.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the Court to alter or amend a judgment, or order a new trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a), (e). Rule 59 does not specify specific grounds for new trial, but a court is bound to grant a new trial for "grounds that have been historically recognized." Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003); Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007). The grounds on which such motions have been granted include "claims that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, that the damages are excessive, or that, for other reasons, the trial was not fair to the party moving." Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (citation and internal quotations omitted); see also Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 510 n. 15 (9th Cir. 2000). In addition, such motions may be granted where the verdict "is based upon false or perjurious evidence, or to prevent a miscarriage of justice." Passantino, 212 F.3d at 510 n. 15; see also Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd., 762 F.3d829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he district court can grant a new trial under Rule 59 on any ground necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.").

"Upon the Rule 59 motion of the party against whom a verdict has been returned, the district court has the duty to weigh the evidence as the court saw it, and to set aside the verdict of the jury, even though supported by substantial evidence, where, in the court's conscientious opinion, the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence." Molski, 481 F.3d at 729 (internal quotations and citation omitted). However, "a district court may not grant a new trial simply because it would have arrived at a different verdict." Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Silver Sage Partners, Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect to evidentiary rulings, "[a] new trial is only warranted when an erroneous evidentiary ruling substantially prejudiced a party." Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Improper Dismissal of Defendants

Plaintiff argues a new trial is warranted because the Court improperly dismissed both the City of San Diego and Catherine Millet as defendants "without permitting Plaintiff the discovery necessary to establish that Officer Millet was a proper defendant . . . and that the City's policies and procedures have been to tolerate and cover up such activity on the part of its officers sufficient to render the City as a public entity liable for the damages stemming from Plaintiff's excessive force claim." (ECF No. 280 at p. 12.) Plaintiff claims this presented Plaintiff "with an 'empty chair' dilemma which greatly prejudiced his case." (Id.)

Plaintiff's argument that a new trial is warranted because the City of San Diego and Catherine Millet were improperly dismissed is unavailing. Plaintiff does not identify which discovery ruling of the Court prejudiced his case. However, to the extent he argues this Court improperly denied his requests to re-open discovery as tothe City of San Diego and Catherine Millet on the eve of trial for the purpose of establishing they were proper defendants, such a ruling was not an abuse of discretion and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Broad discretion is vested in the trial court to permit or deny discovery, and its decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant."). Only one claim for excessive force remained for trial against the two officer defendants who Plaintiff alleged committed the excessive force. The Court's Pretrial Order permitted Plaintiff to call Ms. Millet and several police officers, including supervisory officers, with the City of San Diego, as witnesses at trial to the...