Kathie L., Matter of
| Decision Date | 20 June 1979 |
| Citation | 100 Misc.2d 173,418 N.Y.S.2d 859 |
| Parties | In the Matter of KATHIE L., A Person Alleged to be a Runaway, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Family Court |
May a child who has run away from home in another state be properly adjudicated a Person in Need of Supervision for the purpose of facilitating his or her return in accordance with the Interstate Compact on Juveniles? This critical issue is presented to the Court on an undisputed statement of facts and calls into question the constitutionality of a procedure routinely used in dealing with runaway youth.
The respondent is a fifteen year old girl who resided with her father in Daytona Beach, Florida. The instant petition alleges that she "absconded from her father's home" without his consent in January of this year. The respondent maintained that she did not wish to return home, implying at the same time that she would not be welcome there in any event.
On April 10, 1979, this Court remanded the child to the Commissioner of Social Services for shelter care and a complete medical examination. This action was taken by the Court in light of its firm belief that the Spofford Juvenile Center is an absolutely unacceptable detention facility for a child alleged to be a person in need of supervision. There is statutory authority to buttress this belief. Family Court Act Section 720(3).
When the respondent failed to return to Court on the adjourned date, the law guardian moved to dismiss the petition while the corporation counsel requested a warrant for the girl's arrest.
The instant petition, routinely used in runaway cases, is an inartistic masterpiece, a catalyst for confusion that would be laughable if it didn't involve fundamental constitutional rights and the fragile emotions of helpless youth.
While containing the notation "RUNAWAY" in bold face type, it has been assigned an "S" number, the designation given to a PINS petition. And although the wherefore clause prays that the respondent be adjudicated a Person in Need of Supervision, it requests that she be dealt with in accordance with the Interstate Compact on Juveniles. This attempt to fuse two separate and distinct legal procedures fails miserably and spawns a petition that is insufficient on its face to afford relief under either.
A Person in need of supervision is defined in Section 712(b) of the Family Court Act. Any applicability to this case would require a showing that the child is "incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of a parent or other lawful authority". Clearly, a single act of running away from home does not make a child incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient. In fact, the Courts have repeatedly held that a single act of any kind is insufficient, standing by itself, to sustain a PINS finding. Matter of O., 31 N.Y.2d 730, 338 N.Y.S.2d 105, 290 N.E.2d 145 (1972); Matter of W., 28 N.Y.2d 589, 319 N.Y.S.2d 845, 268 N.E.2d 642 (1971). Moreover, running away from home, even if repeated several times, can justify no inference against the child absent proof that the child so behaved without just cause.
Such proof must be part of the petitioner's case and be sustained beyond a reasonable doubt. This conclusion is inescapable in light of the extremely serious, quasi-criminal nature of the PINS proceeding which can lead to a substantial interference by the State in the affairs and liberty of the child. (F.C.A. Sections 744; 754; Matter of S., 27 N.Y.2d 802, 315 N.Y.S.2d 861, 264 N.E.2d 353 (1970); Matter of R., 33 N.Y.2d 987, 353 N.Y.S.2d 743, 309 N.E.2d 140 (1974).
It is obvious, therefore, that this petition could not stand a challenge to its face even if the runaway act alleged occurred in New York State.
But here, the respondent was a resident of the State of Florida and allegedly ran away from her home in that State. Therefore, at the time of the act in question, there was absolutely no contact by any interested party, child or parent. With the State of New York.
If the child's father in Florida or the State of Florida itself chose to utilize the specific procedures of the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, New York might have been justified in detaining the respondent. (See McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws Section 1801 et seq.). But here, no such action was initiated. Under these circumstances New York may not detain the respondent and charge her with being "incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient" for an act committed in another jurisdiction any more than it could properly try her for a murder committed in that jurisdiction. The action taken by New York in this case was a clearly impermissible assault on the right of the respondent to travel unimpaired between the various states of the union. See, for example, State v. Cutshall, 110 N.C. 538, 15 S.E. 261. Thus, this application of the PINS statute to the respondent is unconstitutional, being in direct contravention of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
As Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring opinion in Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941):
"The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference."
See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 18 L.Ed. 744 (1868).
Since the U.S. Supreme Court has held that children are "persons" under our Constitution, (Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 511, 89 S.Ct....
To continue reading
Request your trial