Katz-Crank v. Haskett

• Decision Date: 08 December 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–1809,15–1809
• Citation: 843 F.3d 641
• Parties: Sherry Katz–Crank, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Kimberly Haskett, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

843 F.3d 641

Sherry Katz–Crank, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Kimberly Haskett, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15–1809

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued November 13, 2015

Decided December 8, 2016

Derek Wilczynski, Attorney, BLANCO WILCZYNSKI, PLLC, Troy, MI, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

David A. Arthur, Frances Barrow, Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants–Appellees KIMBERLY HASKETT, CHARLIE WILLIAMS, TODD ROKITA.

Amanda J. Dinges, Attorney, OFFICE OF THE CORPORATION COUNSEL, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants–Appellees THOMAS TRATHEN, MARION COUNTY.

Before Posner, Ripple, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.

Sykes, Circuit Judge.

Sherry Katz–Crank is a Michigan lawyer with a practice in cemetery management. An unscrupulous client used her services in the course of defrauding cemetery trust funds of $22 million. When Katz–Crank discovered the fraud, she promptly contacted state regulatory authorities. The client was indicted on embezzlement charges. Katz–Crank was charged as an aider and abettor, though a jury would ultimately acquit her.

Her reputation disgraced and her law practice in shambles, Katz–Crank sued the state and county officials who were in any way involved in the prosecution. She alleged that they conspired to violate her federal constitutional rights; she raised several state-law claims as well. The district judge entered judgment on the pleadings in the defendants' favor on some claims and dismissed others for failure to state a claim.

We affirm. Most of Katz–Crank's claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment or prosecutorial immunity. The balance of the complaint was properly dismissed for failure to state a plausible claim for relief.

I. Background

The case was resolved on the pleadings, so the following factual summary is from Katz–Crank's complaint. Katz–Crank is a lawyer from Michigan with a practice in the esoteric field of cemetery management. In 2004 Robert Nelms retained her to assist in his acquisition of cemeteries and funeral homes in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. The trust funds associated with these cemeteries were valued at about $22 million.¹ In 2007 Katz–Crank learned that Nelms was under investigation by the Indiana Secretary of State for misappropriating cemetery trust assets.

Katz–Crank promptly called Kimberly Haskett, an investigator in the Secretary of State's office, to offer her full cooperation in the investigation. Haskett did not return the call. Apparently she didn't need Katz–Crank's help; in 2008 Nelms was indicted on charges of embezzling $22 million in cemetery trust funds.² He pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain and agreed to testify against Katz–Crank.

Although Haskett never returned Katz–Crank's call, she did find time to contact some of her clients to advise them that Katz–Crank was under criminal investigation. In July 2008 Katz–Crank was charged in Marion County with aiding and abetting Nelms's embezzlement. She was arrested that month, and both the Indiana Secretary of State and the Marion County prosecutor's office issued press releases publicizing the arrest.³ On December 7, 2010, a jury acquitted Katz–Crank of all charges.

Exactly two years later Katz–Crank filed suit in federal court against Marion County and multiple state and county officials who were directly or indirectly involved in the criminal investigation and prosecution. The state defendants are former Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita, Haskett, and Charlie Williams, another investigator in the Secretary of State's office. The county defendants are former Marion County Prosecutor Carl Brizzi, former Deputy Prosecutor Mary Hutchinson, former Deputy Prosecutor Barbara Crawford, Investigator Thomas Trathen, and Marion County itself.

The number of claims is no less multitudinous. Katz–Crank brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution, "abuse of process," and violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; three federal conspiracy claims (one each under § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 ); and state-law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants were sued in their official and individual capacities.

The defendants moved variously for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The judge entered judgment on the pleadings in the defendants' favor on some of the federal claims, dismissed others with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6), and dismissed the state-law claims with leave to replead. Katz–Crank filed an amended complaint limited to the state-law claims. It too was dismissed for failure to state a claim, this time with prejudice. This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Our review is de novo. Barr v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Ill. Univ. , 796 F.3d 837, 839 (7th Cir. 2015). We don't need to parse which of Katz–Crank's claims were resolved under Rule 12(c) and which were resolved under Rule 12(b)(6) ; "[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is subject to the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." United States v. Wood , 925 F.2d 1580, 1581 (7th Cir. 1991). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must "state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). We accept the allegations in the complaint as true unless they are "threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere conclusory statements." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

A. Federal Claims

1. Claims Against the State and County

We begin with the federal claims against Marion County and against the state and county officials in their official capacities, which are the equivalent of claims against the state and county. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 101–02, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984) (state officials); Grieveson v. Anderson , 538 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2008) (county officials). These claims can be quickly dispatched.

The Eleventh Amendment bars suit in federal court against nonconsenting states absent some specific types of congressional authorization not applicable here.⁴ See Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 101–02, 104 S.Ct. 900 ; see also Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart , 563 U.S. 247, 253–54, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011). Accordingly, all claims against the state officials in their official capacities were properly dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds.

Marion County is a "person" under § 1983 and may be held liable for violating Katz–Crank's federal rights if its policies or customs caused the violation. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 690–91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The complaint alleges lots of individual misconduct by county officials, but it nowhere identifies any county policy or custom that caused Katz–Crank's injury. Katz–Crank's brief does not fill the gap. That dooms the claims against the County itself (and by extension, the claims against the county officials in their official capacities). See id. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ; see also Grieveson , 538 F.3d at 771.

2. Claims Against the Marion County Prosecutors

Katz–Crank also brings several federal claims against three Marion County prosecutors in their individual capacities. Prosecutors are protected by robust immunity from federal tort liability, "whether common law or constitutional, ... for acts they commit within the scope of their employment as prosecutors." Fields v. Wharrie , 740 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Katz–Crank's federal claims against the prosecutors implicate conduct within the scope of this broad immunity.

Katz–Crank alleges that the prosecutors (1) indicted her without probable cause; (2) made false and inflammatory public statements in press releases; (3) acted "maliciously"; (4) refused to consider exonerating evidence she tried to give them; (5) presented false evidence to the grand jury; and (6) delayed her trial. Most of these allegations encompass prosecutorial acts or omissions for which the Marion County prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity. See Bianchi v. McQueen , 818 F.3d 309, 318 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining that absolute immunity covers "what goes on in the courtroom" and grand-jury proceedings); id. ("[I]t's clear that absolute immunity knocks ... the [plaintiff's] claims premised on allegations that [the prosecutor] presented false statements to the grand jury and at trial.").

The only close call is the allegation about false and inflammatory public statements in press releases, which arguably falls outside the immunity shield. The Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor's "statements to the media are not entitled to absolute immunity." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 277, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). But a close reading of the complaint reveals that this allegation—made only very generally, without identifying any particular false statement—appears in the complaint's description of the means by which the defendants conspired to deprive Katz–Crank of her federal rights in violation of § 1983. As we'll explain in a moment, the § 1983 conspiracy claim fails because the complaint doesn't state a claim for any underlying constitutional tort. So even if this particular allegation doesn't fall within the scope of prosecutorial immunity, it does not support a cognizable federal claim for relief.

3. Claims Against the State Officials and Investigators

The state officials and the county investigators do not enjoy absolute immunity from suit in their individual capacities, so we turn now to the substance of the federal claims against them. Katz–Crank brings claims under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The...