Katzberg v. Regents of University of Cal.

• Citation: 29 Cal.4th 300,58 P.3d 339,127 Cal.Rptr.2d 482
• Decision Date: 27 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. S097445.,S097445.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: Richard W. KATZBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

127 Cal.Rptr.2d 482

58 P.3d 339

29 Cal.4th 300

Richard W. KATZBERG, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. The REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. S097445.

Supreme Court of California.

November 27, 2002.

Siegel & Yee and Dan Siegel, Menlo Park, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Paul D. Fogel, Raymond A. Cardozo, San Francisco; Pahl & Gosselin, Kenneth L. Kann, San Francisco, Nanette Joslyn, El Sobrante; James E. Hoist, John F. Lundberg and Jeffrey A. Blair, Oakland, for Defendants and Respondents.

GEORGE, C.J.

We granted review in this matter and in the companion case, Degrassi v. Cook (2002) 29 Cal.4th 333, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 508, 58 P.3d 360 (Degrassi), to consider whether an individual may bring an action for money damages on the basis of an alleged violation of a provision of the California Constitution, in the absence of a statutory provision or an established common law tort authorizing such a damage remedy for the constitutional violation. In the present case, plaintiff seeks, among other relief, monetary damages based upon defendant's alleged violation of his due process "liberty" interest under article I, section 7, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution (hereafter article I, section 7(a)), by failing to provide him with a timely "name-clearing" hearing after his removal as department chairman at a university medical center. We conclude that an action for damages is not available.¹

I.

In 1991, plaintiff Richard W. Katzberg was appointed professor of medicine at the University of California at Davis Medical School and Chairperson of the Department of Radiology at the University of California Davis Medical Center. In July 1995, the university commenced an investigation concerning alleged mishandling of funds by the department of radiology. In February 1996, the university issued a press release regarding the investigation, and the Sacramento District Attorney's Office thereafter announced that it would initiate a criminal investigation.

The investigation concerned approximately $250,000 that allegedly had been placed inappropriately in radiology accounts to be used for payment of department expenses. Most of this money came from rebates provided by medical equipment vendors. There never has been any allegation that plaintiff made any personal use of the challenged funds. Instead, the alleged improprieties related to placement of funds in the department's account rather than in the medical center's general funds.

In March 1996, the university announced that "appropriate personnel actions" had been initiated, but did not name any specific employee. Later that month, plaintiff was removed as chairperson of the department. He remained a tenured professor at the medical school and a staff physician at the medical center.

In February 1997, plaintiff sued various defendants on numerous grounds, and the resulting litigation has moved back and forth between state and federal courts.² For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that plaintiffs third amended complaint—the one here at issue—named as defendants the Regents of the University of California (the Regents) and the Chancellor of the University of California at Davis, Larry N. Vanderhoef (hereafter collectively, defendants). The complaint alleged that by making stigmatizing statements about plaintiff in the course of removing him from his position as department chairperson, defendants violated the liberty interest of plaintiff protected under article I, section 7(a). Although the department chairmanship was an at-will position, terminable without cause at the discretion of the chancellor of the Davis campus (and hence plaintiff concedes that he had no due process property right to that position), it is well established that "an at-will [public] employee's liberty interests are deprived when his discharge is accompanied by charges `that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community' or `impose[ ] on him a stigma or other disability that foreclose[s] his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.'" (Holmes v. Hallinan (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1523, 1530, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (Roth).) When such a liberty deprivation occurs, a party has a right to a "name-clearing hearing." (Codd v. Velger (1977) 429 U.S. 624, 627, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92

.)

The third amended complaint alleged that plaintiff had not been provided with such a hearing at which he could defend himself, either prior to, or since, his removal. The complaint also sought a variety of relief, including an injunction, damages, attorney fees, and costs.

The trial court granted defendants' motion to strike the prayer for relief. Later, in October 1999—three and a half years after plaintiffs removal—defendants offered plaintiff a name-clearing hearing. For the next few months, the parties negotiated unsuccessfully concerning the parameters of such a hearing. In February 2000, defendants revised and renewed the proposal for a name-clearing hearing, but plaintiff rejected that offer, and no such hearing has been held.

Defendants thereafter moved for summary judgment one plaintiffs due-process-liberty-interest claim on the grounds that (i) a liberty interest violation could not be proved, because the "alleged false statements are not stigmatizing as a matter of law," and (ii) even if a liberty interest violation could be proved, the remedy would be limited to a name-clearing hearing, which plaintiff previously had rejected. Plaintiff opposed the motion on the ground, among others, that defendants had not offered him an adequate name-clearing hearing.

In April 2000, following a court hearing, the trial judge granted summary judgment to defendants, finding they had offered plaintiff an adequate name-clearing hearing, and that such a postremoval hearing was the sole remedy for the asserted liberty interest violation under the due process clause of article I, section 7(a). The court found that money damages were not available under California law to remedy "infringement of liberty interests," or to remedy any alleged undue delay in the offer of a name-clearing hearing. The trial court confined its ruling on the summary judgment motion to the damages issue, and did not rule on defendants' claim that plaintiffs allegations were insufficient to demonstrate a liberty-interest violation.

Upon review, the Court of Appeal began by noting that the state constitutional due process liberty interest alleged to have been violated in this case has been recognized under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution in Roth, supra, 408 U.S. 564, 573,92 S.Ct. 2701,33 L.Ed.2d 548. In that decision the high court observed that "`[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential' [Citations.] In such a case, due process would accord an opportunity to refute the charge before University officials." (Ibid.)³ The Court of Appeal stated that it would assume for purposes of analysis that a similar liberty interest exists under article I, section 7(a) of the state Constitution, and it further assumed that the facts alleged in this case state a violation of plaintiffs due process liberty interest under this provision of the state Constitution. Focusing solely upon the damages question, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that money damages are not available to remedy such a violation of the liberty interest under article I, section 7(a).

In this court, plaintiff contends that article I, section 7(a) affords him a right to damages for the asserted violation of his due process liberty interest. By contrast, defendants assert that a name-clearing hearing is the sole remedy that a court should impose for the alleged constitutional violation. For purposes of analyzing the damages issue upon which we granted review, we shall assume, as did the Court of Appeal, that the facts alleged in the third amended complaint are sufficient to establish a violation of the due process liberty interest under the state Constitution's due process clause.

II.

Article I, section 26 of the California Constitution states: "The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." Under this provision, "all branches of government are required to comply with constitutional directives (Mosk v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 474, 493, [159 Cal.Rptr. 494, 601 P.2d 1030]

, fn. 17; Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1973) 8 Cal.3d 942, 946, [106 Cal.Rptr. 643, 506 P.2d 1019]) or prohibitions (Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 8, [95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529])." (Leger v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1454, 249 Cal.Rptr. 688 (Leger).) As we observed more than a century ago, "[e]very constitutional provision is self-executing to this extent, that everything done in violation of it is void." (Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton (1886) 69 Cal. 479, 484, 11 P. 3.)

Accordingly, the question posed in this case is not whether article I, section 7(a) is "self-executing." It is clear that the due process clause of article I, section 7(a) is self-executing, and that even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are required to comply with its terms. Furthermore, it also is clear that, like many other constitutional provisions, this section supports an action, brought by a private plaintiff against a proper defendant, for declaratory relief or for injunction. (See generally Skelly v. State Personnel Board (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774; Friesen, State Constitutional Law:...