Kaufman v. Anker
| Decision Date | 02 June 1977 |
| Citation | 397 N.Y.S.2d 376,366 N.E.2d 77,42 N.Y.2d 835 |
| Parties | , 366 N.E.2d 77 In the Matter of Ruth B. KAUFMAN, Appellant, v. Irving ANKER, as Chancellor of Schools of the New York City School District, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Nancy E. Hoffman and James R. Sandner, New York City, for appellant.
W. Bernard Richland, Corp. Counsel, New York City (Lawrence B. Jones and L. Kevin Sheridan, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.
We note that respondents do not here assert "an unfettered right to terminate the employment of a teacher during his probationary period, unless the teacher establishes that the (chancellor) terminated for a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of statutory proscription" (James v. Board of Educ., 37 N.Y.2d 891, 892, 378 N.Y.S.2d 371, 340 N.E.2d 735). In this circumstance the proper standard for judicial review of the action of the Chancell of Schools of the New York City School District in terminating appellant's appointment as a probationary teacher, because she had no right to continued appointment, is whether his action was arbitrary and capricious rather than whether it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. (Contrast subd. 3 with subd. 4 of CPLR 7803; see 8 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y.Civ.Prac., pars. 7803.04, 7803.07, 7803.11-7803.13.)
We note that the by-laws of the board of education provide for a hearing at which the probationary teacher is entitled to appear and to present evidence. This hearing procedure is advisory rather than determinative; the proof is heard by the hearing committee rather than by the chancellor; and appellant concedes that the chancellor does not have to follow the recommendations of the hearing committee. It is the chancellor, not the hearing committee, who makes the determination. In these circumstances the hearing provided for by the by-laws is not a hearing within the contemplation of CPLR 7803 (subd. 4); it therefore suffices if the chancellor's decision is not arbitrary and capricious.
In the present case, inasmuch as appellant's principal recommended that her services be discontinued and the district superintendent concurred in that recommendation, it cannot be said that the chancellor's action was arbitrary and capricious.
Order affirmed.
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...is simple: the results of a 105a hearing are merely advisory and are not binding on the Chancellor. Kaufman v. Anker, 42 N.Y.2d 835, 838, 397 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377, 366 N.E.2d 77 (1978). Furthermore, while plaintiff may have had a due process right to the hearing, see Weiss, supra, he not only ......
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Frasier v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York
...its advisory findings and recommendations to the Chancellor who makes the ultimate decision ( see, Matter of Kaufman v. Anker, 42 N.Y.2d 835, 837, 397 N.Y.S.2d 376, 366 N.E.2d 77). It is a basic policy underlying Education Law § 2573(1)(a) that the responsibility for selecting probationary ......
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Storman v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ.
...and capricious” standard of judicial review applies, not the “substantial evidence” standard ( see Matter of Kaufman v. Anker, 42 N.Y.2d 835, 836–837, 397 N.Y.S.2d 376, 366 N.E.2d 77 [1977] ). Applying the proper standard, DOE's determination was not arbitrary and capricious, but was ration......
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Halcomb v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev.
...but whether the determination was rationally based in the record, and not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of Kaufman v. Anker , 42 N.Y.2d 835, 836–37, 397 N.Y.S.2d 376, 366 N.E.2d 77 [1977] ; Matter of Storman v. New York City Dept. of Educ. , 95 A.D.3d 776, 778, 945 N.Y.S.2d 281 [1st ......