Kaufman v. Perkins

• Decision Date: 08 January 1921
• Docket Number: 16010.
• Citation: 114 Wash. 40,194 P. 802
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: KAUFMAN et al. v. PERKINS et ux.

194 P. 802

114 Wash. 40

KAUFMAN et al. v. PERKINS et ux.

No. 16010.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 8, 1921

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; A. W. Fraler, Judge.

Action by E. C. Kaufman and others against William D. Perkins and wife. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Reversed, with directions to enter judgment for appellants.

Peters & Powell, of Seattle, for appellants.

Carroll B. Graves, of Seattle, for respondents.

HOLCOMB C.J.

This action is for the specific performance of an alleged agreement for a five-year lease of community real property belonging to defendants.

Defendants appealed from the judgment of the trial court, decreeing specific performance; holding that plaintiffs were entitled to the occupancy of the premises as lessees thereof for a term of five years from November 10, 1919; quieting their interest and title in the leasehold for such period; and enjoining defendants from disturbing plaintiffs in the possession of the premises as long as plaintiffs should perform the terms and conditions of the lease.

On April 23, 1914, defendants, who, as the owners of lot 11 block 16, of S. A. Bell's addition to the city of Seattle, were erecting thereon a building to be used as an apartment house, executed a lease of the premises to G. E Sherwood and wife for a term of five years from September 1 1914. This lease provided, however, that, in the event the building was not ready for occupancy by September 1, 1914 the lease should not begin to run until the building was ready, when the term should run for five years therefrom. In accordance with this provision, it was November 10, 1914, when the term began, and it was to run until November 10, 1919. On February 20, 1918, one Driscoll was the tenant; the property having passed to him through several hands. He was having financial difficulties and was unable to make certain needed improvements on the premises. Among other things, the installation of coal burners or furances was necessitated by the then existing oil shortage; notice having been given that oil would be discountinued. Driscoll thereupon gave up his tenancy, one R. L. Langer agreeing with appellant Perkins that he would take an assignment of the lease, and an extension thereof, for his brother, Roland G. Langer. Accordingly, Perkins sent the following letter:

'Seattle, Wash., Feb. 20, 1918.

'R. G. Langer: We will draw up the necessary extension of the present lease of the Sheridan Apartments, or make out a new lease commencing November 10, 1919, for a period of two years at $9 per room, and the three following years at $9.50 per room; terms and conditions similar to the present lease, and the present mortgage on the furniture as security to be extended or arranged for by you.

'Yours truly,

'WDP:A

Wm. D. Perkins.'

Thereafter appellants refused to enter into a formal agreement for the extension of the lease or the making of a new lease, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the letter in question, and notified respondents that they (appellants) would not be bound thereby and that respondents must surrender the premises on November 10, 1919. Respondents then brought the action for specific performance of the alleged agreement in question.

Various rulings of the trial court are assigned as error, but we think a decision as to whether the failure of Mrs. Perkins to sign or acknowledge the agreement for the extension of the old lease or the execution of a new one excused compliance therewith, or whether the circumstances of the case are such as to estop her from denying the validity of the agreement, will be conclusive of this appeal.

Mrs. Perkins testified to the effect that she had always been satisfied to have her husband handle community affairs, including the leasing of community real estate; and the question is whether she is now estopped to deny his authority to represent her in this transaction. On this question of estoppel, respondents cite, among other cases, Young v. Porter, 27 Wash. 551, 68 P. 362, an action for specific performance of an oral agreement to convey an undivided half interest in certain real and personal property. Specific performance was there decreed; but, in order to show that there the facts were different in material respects from those of the instant case, we quote from the concluding portion of the opinion in that case as follows:

'So far as the personal property was concerned it was simply an incident of the real estate; and, while the wife was not a party to the original agreement, the finding of the court is to the effect that it was at all times customary for the husband to personally conduct all community business of himself and wife. This he had a right to do under the law, so far as the personal property was concerned; and it was personal property which, under the agreement with the respondent, was invested in this pottery plant. She also knew of the position occupied by the respondent in relation to the property, for she joined with the respondent and her husband in the lease of the property. Other testimony in the case shows conclusively that she was cognizant of, and in effect consented to, the whole transaction.'

It is plain that, on account of the difference in circumstances, that case has no bearing upon the case now before us.

On this question respondents cite also the case of Washington State Bank v. Dickson, 35 Wash. 641, 77 P. 1067, another action to compel specific performance. Respondents here rely upon the language in that opinion where, referring to the contention that the contract for the conveyance of community property there under consideration was void because not signed by the wife, we said:

'But it is not the rule in this state that a contract for the sale of community real property must be signed by the wife in order to be binding upon her. We have held it enough if the contract, when made by the husband, had the sanction and approval of the wife, or if it was subsequently ratified by her'--citing authorities.

To distinguish the Dickson Case from the one at bar, it is...