Kaufmann v. Kaufmann
| Decision Date | 08 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 36093,36093 |
| Citation | 246 Ga. 266,271 S.E.2d 175 |
| Parties | KAUFMANN v. KAUFMANN. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Tony Center, Atlanta, for appellant.
Lawrence B. Custer, Marietta, for appellee.
Gary E. Kaufmann appeals an order holding him in contempt of court for willfully disobeying a previous order arising out of a case involving divorce, alimony, custody, child support and property division. The parties were granted a divorce in 1977 and in February, 1978, an order was entered disposing of the remaining issues in the original case. There were two subsequent orders resulting from contempt proceedings. In the order which is the subject of this appeal, entered September 13, 1979, the court held Dr. Kaufmann in contempt of court but allowed him to purge himself by paying $15,000 representing minimal costs for repair of the home awarded to Mrs. Kaufmann by the divorce decree, $1,409.15 for 1978 ad valorem taxes and $700 as attorney fees. Dr. Kaufmann enumerates twenty errors which deal with four basic issues to be decided by the court: (1) Is imprisonment for contempt unconstitutional in this case as imprisonment for debt? (2) Did the court's order that Dr. Kaufmann pay $15,000 to Mrs. Kaufmann for repairs to the home constitute a modification of its original order? (3) Did the court's order that Dr. Kaufmann pay the 1978 ad valorem taxes constitute a modification of its original order? (4) Was the award of attorney fees erroneous?
(1) Appellant argues that imprisonment for contempt in a case involving alimony constitutes an unconstitutional imprisonment for debt. This issue is well settled in regard to civil contempt cases. Davis v. Davis, 138 Ga. 8, 74 S.E. 830 (1912). It further appears that a finding of criminal contempt with the sanction of unconditional imprisonment for non-payment of alimony is constitutionally permissible. Ensley v. Ensley, 239 Ga. 860, 238 S.E.2d 920 (1977), and cases cited therein. If the contemnor, although ordered imprisoned, may purge himself prior to the imprisonment, the case is a civil contempt. This is the situation before us. The sanction imposed by the court is constitutionally permissible.
(2) Dr. Kaufmann insists that the court erred in finding him in contempt for his failure to pay the 1978 ad valorem taxes on the former marital home. He argues that the order that he pay the ad valorem taxes amounts to an impermissible modification of a final judgment and decree in a contempt setting.
The final judgment and decree of the trial court on all issues except that of divorce was entered in February, 1978. The decree is silent as to the payment of the ad valorem taxes: "As additional division in kind alimony, Defendant shall convey to Plaintiff all his right, title and interest in and to the residence of the parties known as 630 Colebrook Court, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, and Defendant shall execute a conveyance to Plaintiff transferring said residence to her subject to the existing encumbrances thereon, including a first mortgage to The Equitable Life Insurance Comapny (sic), payable at the rate of $550.00 per month, and a second mortgage encumbrance payable to Joseph Troop and Troop and Associates, Inc. with a balance face amount due of approximately $6,000.00." Mrs. Kaufmann contends that since Dr. Kaufmann was the owner of the home on January 1, 1978, the obligation to pay the ad valorem taxes is his obligation. It is true that ad valorem tax liability is determined by ownership of property on January 1 of a given year. Code Ann. § 92-6202; Weaver v. Weaver, 242 Ga. 327, 249 S.E.2d 36 (1978); Zuber Lumber Co. v. City of Atlanta, 237 Ga. 358, 227 S.E.2d 362 (1976). This court has held that the husband, owner of the property on January 1 of the year the parties divorced, was liable for ad valorem taxes even though the decree was silent as to the responsibility for such taxes where the decree provided that the property be conveyed free of encumbrances. Ward v. Ward, 236 Ga. 860, 226 S.E.2d 52 (1976). The court has found the ad valorem taxes to be the responsibility of the husband where the conveyance was by warranty deed when the decree was silent on the duty to pay the taxes and where there was no specific command to convey the property free of encumbrances. Weaver v. Weaver, supra.
Here, the decree is silent as to who will pay the ad valorem taxes. The decree provides that the house be transferred to wife subject to existing encumbrances thereon. The transfer was accomplished by quitclaim deed. A further paragraph in the decree provides: "On and after the date of this Judgment, Defendant shall not be responsible for any debt or obligation incurred by Plaintiff, and Plaintiff shall not be responsible for any debt or obligation incurred by Defendant, however any reasonable family obligations incurred prior to the entry of this Final Dispositive Judgment and Decree shall be paid by Defendant."
It is clear that the 1978 ad valorem taxes on the marital dwelling, which was in Dr. Kaufmann's name, was a reasonable family expense incurred prior to the divorce. The word "incur" has been interpreted in this State to have its ordinary meaning. Ga. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Calhoun, 127 Ga.App. 213, 193 S.E.2d 35 (1972). The definitions found in Webster's Third New International Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary indicate that the common meaning is to become liable or subject to. There is no question but that Dr. Kaufmann became liable for the 1978 ad valorem taxes on January 1, 1978, due to his status as owner of the house. This is true even though these taxes were not payable at that time. Since he was responsible for all reasonable family obligations incurred before the divorce, the court did not modify its original decree in finding in its order of December, 1978, that the obligation to pay the taxes...
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Cowart v. Ga. Power Co.
...or whether it is so contrary to the apparent intention of the original order as to amount to a modification." Kaufmann v. Kaufmann , 246 Ga. 266, 268-269 (3), 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980) ; accord Kirkendall v. Decker , 271 Ga. 189, 191, 516 S.E.2d 73 (1999). In that regard, "[t]he trial court has......
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Sutherlin v. Sutherlin, S17F0613
...trial court in a contempt case has wide discretion to determine whether [its] orders have been violated." Kaufmann v. Kaufmann , 246 Ga. 266, 268 (3), 271 S.E.2d 175 (1980). The court is not authorized to modify a previous decree in a contempt order, but it is always empowered to interpret ......
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Cowart v. Ga. Power Co.
... ... intention of the original order as to amount to a ... modification." Kaufmann v. Kaufmann , 246 Ga ... 266, 268-269 (3) (271 S.E.2d 175) (1980); accord ... Kirkendall v. Decker , 271 Ga. 189, 191 (516 S.E.2d ... ...
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